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1. Introduction 
At 2 a.m. on 12 November 1944, the Soviet Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs Viaches1av M. Molotov presented the Nmwe-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs Trygve Lie with far-reaching 
proposals for a change in the international legal status of the 
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago in the High North of the 
Arctic Ocean.' Lie had come to Moscow to finalise a number 
of agreements underlining the spirit of cooperation and alliance 
which, on the face of it at least, characterised the relationship 
between the Norwegian government-in-exile and the Soviet 
government after more than three years of struggle against the 
common enemy. Being totally unprepared, Lie was shocked and 
deeply worried by Molotov's proposals. Molotov demanded, 
1 There is some confusion over the terms Spitsbergen and 
Svalbard. In Norwegian usage (since 1969) the name Spitsbergen 
applies only to the largest island in the archipelago. Until 1969 this 
was called Vestspitsbergen (Western Spitsbergen). Svalbard is the 
name of the whole of the archipelago as defined by the Treaty of 
1920, including the distant Bear Island which is located approxi-
mately halfway between Spitsbergen and the North Cape. In this 
respect Norwegian usage is in accordance with the letter of the 
Treaty. The important point to bear in mind is that the term 
Svalbard, in Norwegian usage and according to the Treaty, covers 
all islands within the area defined by the Treaty. English speakers 
tend to prefer the term Spitsbergen to the unfamiliar Svalbard, 
although for instance Encyclopedia Britannica defmes the terms in 
accordance with Norwegian usage. 
Russian usage is different. "Shpitsbergen" (old name "Gru-
mant") is used in Russian to denote the "main" archipelago, while 
Bear Island (Ostrov medvezhii) is normally listed as a separate 
entity. Cf. the terminology used in L.D. Timchenko, Shpitsbergen: 
Istoriia i sovremennost, Kharkov, 1992. In the following text I will 
use Svalbard to denote the entire area as defined by the Treaty, 
except when referring directly to Russian sources or statements. 
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inter alia, that the Paris Treaty on Svalbard of 1920 should be 
declared null and void, that sovereignty over Bear Island should 
be transferred to the Soviet Union, and that the maio Spits-
bergen archipelago should be administered as a Soviet-NOiwe-
gian condominium, i.e. that it should come under joint Soviet-
Norwegian control. 
Molotov's overture led to hectic activity on the part of the 
Norwegians, and there followed an exchange between the two 
governments. In the first phase of the negotiations the Norwe-
gians tried to take the initiative from the Soviets, and presented 
their own counterproposals for a solution. This policy, which 
was heavily influenced by the advice of the Norwegian Ambas-
sador in Moscow, Rolf Andvord, culminated in the Norwegian 
draft declaration of 9 April 1945. In this document, which went 
a long way towards accommodating the most important Soviet 
demands, the Norwegians expressed their agreement in principle 
to an arrangement for joint Soviet-Norwegian defence of the 
Spitsbergen island. 
In the ensuing years the Svalbard question was one of the 
key elements influencing Norwegian policy towards the Soviet 
Union. It also seems clear that it speeded up the erosion of the 
benevolent attitude towards the Soviet Union which characte-
rised Norwegian political circles during and immediately after 
the war. However, the offensive Soviet attitude during the 
Svalbard negotiations of 1944-47 contrasts with the basic 
stability and absence of serious tension which characterised 
Norwegian-Soviet cohabitation on Svalbard for most of the 
period under review. 
Much has been written about Svalbard io Norwegian-Soviet 
relations by Norwegian historians. However, previous 
historiography has been based on Norwegian and, to a signifi-
cant although lesser degree, British and American sources. This 
study is based mainly on Soviet material from the archives of 
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the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.' 
These documents have only recently been declassified and made 
available to Russian and foreign scholars. Indeed, the archives 
themselves were until 1990 practically closed for iodependent 
historical research. 
!he focus is on Soviet policy. The study encompasses the 
pe?od from 1920 to 1953, with emphasis on the years 1944-51. 
Wrth regard to this period of Soviet attempts to alter Svalbard's 
int~mational status, I shall discuss some aspects of Norwegian 
policy as well. Norwegian historians have studied the "Svalbard 
question". from the :'?rwegian perspective from its begioning in 
1944 until the decrsron taken by the Stortiog (Parliament) in 
February 1947 to close the matter as a subject for bilateral 
Norwegian-Soviet discussions. Attention has also been focused 
?n the foll?wiog y~ars, when Svalbard continued to play a role 
m Norwegian, Sovret and Western military-strategic and foreign 
policy deliberations. Soviet sources throw additional light on the 
vie~s and conduct of some of the Norwegian officials, in 
particular Trygve Lie, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Rolf 
Andvord, the Ambassador in Moscow. An attempt will be made 
to relate my own findiogs to the maio conclusions of earlier studies.' 
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_Arlchiv. Vneshnei Po/itild Rossiiskoi F ederatsii (A VPRF, 
Forergn Policy Archives of the Russian Federation), Moscow. 1 
would like_ to thank Dr Igor V. Lebedev, Director of the Depart-
men~ of His~ry and Records of the Russian Ministry for Foreign 
Affarrs, for hrs forthcoming attitude during my numerous visits to 
the MID archives. I am equally grateful to Dr Lebedev's deputies 
and the rest of his staff. 
3 For the period up to 1925, the basic work is Trygve Mathisen 
Svalbard i internasjona/ politikk, 1871-1925, Oslo, 1951. Forth~ 
wartime period the most detailed study is Olav Riste's discussion 
in ~e second volume of his "London-regjeringa". Norge i krigs-
allzansen 1940-1945, Oslo, 1979. When Riste wrote his study, parts 
of the collectiOns of the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
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The study will focus on the following aspects: 
1. The Soviet rationale. What kind of deliberations and motives 
guided Soviet policy? The chronological aspect is obviously 
important Soviet motives changed, along with the evolution of 
Soviet military and foreign policy capabilities, the So vie IS' 
peiCeption of the world situation, and Norway's place in it Rolf 
Tamnes, in one of his studies of Svalbard in international politics, 
has argued that Svalbard in the postwar period was at the periphery 
were still closed. This is why Riste had to leave some questions 
unsolved. The best coverage of Norwegian policy in the years 
1945-47 is in Knut Einar Eriksen, "SvalbardsiJ1ilrsm111et fra krig til 
kald krig", in Historiker og veileder. Festskrift til Jakob Sverdrup, 
Oslo, 1989. Rolf Tamnes has given a synthesis of Svalbard's place 
in great power strategy in a long-term perspective, cf. his Svalbard 
og stormaktene. Fra ingenmannsland tit Kald Krig, 1870-1953, in 
Forsvarsstudier/Defence Studies, No. 7, Oslo, 1991. Another 
important synthesizing study is Nils Morten Udgaard, Great Power 
Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy. A Study of Norway's 
Foreign Relations November 1940-February 1948, Oslo, 1973. 
These works contain references to literature dealing with various 
aspeciS of the Svalbard question. The newest and most comprehen-
sive Russian work on Svalbard from the perspective of international 
law, is L.D. Timchenko's study, op.cit. (cf. note 1). Another work 
on SpiiSbergen in international relations which deserves to be men· 
tioned here because of its references to international literature, 
although it is of less direct relevance to my sbldy, is Elen C. Singh, 
The Spitsbergen(Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy, 
Oslo, 1980. For attempts at syntheses, see also various works by 
Willy 0streng, for instance Det po/iliske Svalbard, Oslo, 1975. In 
the following foolnotes interested readers will fmd references to a 
number of more specialised srudies, many of them by the authors 
mentioned above. 
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of Cold War and super power tensions.• I will argue that this was 
even more the case in the interwar period. Even during the Second 
World War ~~bard attracted only occasional attention from the 
military, deciSion makers on the Allied side.' Further developing 
Tamnes argument about Svalbard's potential significance in great 
power po~~cs, I w~ argue that Svalbard was repeatedly the object 
of geopohlical considerations, but that interest tended to dwindle 
when the general considerations of the diplomatic geopoliticians 
w~re confronted by more down-to-earth military-strategic deliber-
anons of the military establishments of the great powers as well as 
Norway. 
, ~e "potential importance of Svalbard's geographic location" 
( behggenhetens potensiale")6 remained dorman~ and none of the 
great powers was willing to risk much in order to alter radically the 
stat~s quo in the area. In the early post-Second World War period, 
SoVIet eff~ to alter Svalbard' s international stabls were checked 
by the posSI~le adverse effects an offensive policy might have had 
on far more llllportant Soviet foreign policy goals, and by the lack 
of any stron~ argumeniS in favour of foiCing through the Soviet 
demands agrunst No~egian "!'position. Soviet policy with regard 
to Svalbard was baSically stanc, and aimed at the perpeblation of 
the status quo. The initiatives from 1944-47 failed to alter this 
pattern pennanently. 
The activisiS' claimed that control over the waters between 
Svalbard an~ the man:land of Norway was crucial to the protection 
of the SoVIet Umon s lines of communication with the North 
4 Ro~ Tamnes, Sva/hard mellom fJst og Vest. Kald krig og 
lavspenmng 1 nord1947-1953, in Forsvarsstudier/Defence Studies 
No. 4, 1987, Oslo, 1987, p. 5 ' 
'Cf. the discussion in Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 
3), Vol. II. 
:Rolf Tarnnes, Svalbard mel/om fJst og Vest (cf. note 4), p. 5. 
For lack of a better term, I will use the word activist to 
characterise the attiblde of a group of bureaucraiS who made 
pers!Ste~t e~forts to _convince the foreign policy leadership of the 
need to msntute a v1gorous and offensive policy towards Norway. 
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Atlantic. Thus Svalbard was seen within the context of the problem 
of the straits linking Russian waters with the Atlantic Ocean, i.e. 
a northern pendant 10 the problem of the Baltic and Black Sea 
enttances. Despite this reference to the age-old Russian fear of 
being locked out from the High Seas, the attempt 10 initiate a 
forceful Soviet policy towards Svalbard failed when confronted 
with the harsh reality of material limitations, global and regional 
political considerations, and operational realities. 
2. The Soviet region11l approach. Soviet documents suggest that 
MoloiOv's Svalbard initiative was part of, or a scaled-down version 
of, a broader scheme for increasing the Soviet Union's presence 
and influence in the High North. More specifically, the Svalbard 
question was linked to ideas circulating within the Soviet foreign 
policy and military bureaucracies about a semi-permanent military 
presence in Northern Norway. The Soviet documents reveal that 
immediate! y after the Second World War there was massive 
support both within the General Staff and within the MID bureau-
cracy in favour of seeking some kind of "defence arrangement" for 
Northern Norway, including ttansfers of Norwegian territories to 
the Soviet Union. These ideas correspond 10 western wartime and 
postwar notions of Northern Norway, and in particular the county 
of Finnmark, as a "grey zone" where "legitimate" Soviet security 
concerns might spawn Soviet demands for a role in the defence of 
the area. In 1944-45 it was not evident that Northern Norway 
belonged to a western "sphere of interest" or responsibility. 
3. The Soviet decision-maldng process. Where did Soviet policy 
originate, and who influenced the final decisions? It is often 
assumed that the Soviet decision-making process under Stalin was 
heavily dominated by the top political level, with Stalin and his few 
key advisors themselves making decisions on even minor questions. 
Even if this were so, the origin of the information and policy 
proposals upon which the top leaders acted is a no less important 
question. Although it might be that the lOp leaders did. in fact, take 
the formal "decisions", even on questions of limited significance 
within the global context of Soviet foreign policy, it might be 
argned that the bureaucrats who supplied Molotov or even the 
instantsiia (i.e. Stalin and the politburo) with proposals for 
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decisions or policy initiatives were just as important as the handful 
of top decision makers. The study reveals that MID bureaucrats on 
all levels, with partial suppon from the military establishment, 
represented the driving force behind the attempts to "revitalise" 
post-Second World War Soviet policy on Svalbard and Northern 
Norway. The activists' ideas were rejected by the top level in the 
MID and in the CPSU, i.e. by Molotov, Stalin and the Politburo. 
4. Soviet-Norwegian interaction and perceptions. How did the two 
countries' policies influence each other's actions, and how did their 
percepttons of each other's intentions relate to reality? I will argue 
that the deliberations of the MID bureaucrats were guided by a 
number of basic misconceptions of Norwegian and Western 
attitudes_. Th~re were numerous examples of "wishful thinking" on 
the Soviet Side. The Norwegians and the "Anglo-Saxons" were 
much better at discerning Soviet policy and intentions. This study 
reveals. that T'!'gve Lle, who wanted the Norwegians 10 continue 
the policy which he himself had initiated in London, played an 
active role as an informal advisor to the Norwegian government 
after he was elected Secretary General of the United Nations in 
1946, but that he also advised the Soviets about Norwegian 
altltudes and pohcy on at least two occasions. 
5. The role of third parties. This study will also focus on the role 
of third parties, mainly the United States and Great Britain 
American policy on the Arctic regions was a decisive influence o~ 
the Soviets' Svalbard policy. 8 
8 My discussion of British and American attitudes is based on 
secondary sources. US attitudes are summarised in Rolf Tarnnes 
The Uni;ed States and the Cold War in the High North, Oslo, 1991: 
Tarnnes book contam full references 10 the literature on this and 
r~lated IOpics. Th~ evolution of British policy is most fully 
discussed m Knut Emar Eriksen, "Great Britain and the Problem of 
Bases in the Nordic Area, 1945-47", Scandinavian Journal of 
History, Vol. 7 (1982),No. 7,pp.135-163; andKnutE.Eriksen & 
Magne Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et skandinavisk for-
bund", Internasjonal Politikk, 1981, No. 3, pp. 437-511. 
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The present study is the first attempt by Russian or western 
scholars to make extensive use of documents from the former 
Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to analyse Soviet policy 
towards Svalbard. One can easily predict that material from 
other Russian archives which are for all practical purposes still 
closed, as well as further research in the Foreign Policy 
Archives of the Russian Federation, will bring to light additional 
documents to add to the present analysis and even alter some of 
the conclusions. In fact, my own research in the MID archives 
continues to bring to light new evidence about the Svalbard 
question and other aspects of Soviet policy towards Norway. 
There is also no doubt that with access to the military archives, 
and to documentation on the deliberations of the CPSU Polit-
buro, it should be possible to better answer the question of why 
the initiatives of the MlD activists and the General Staff were 
not realised.' However, I believe that the richness of the sources 
which have been collected so far justifies the publication of a 
preliminary study on a topic which has always attracted 
considerable interest beyond the limited circles of specialists on 
Russian studies, foreign policy or Arctic affairs. 
*** 
I would like to thank Knut Einar Eriksen, Tom Kristiansen, 
Helge Pharo, Olav Riste, Jakob Sverdrup and Rolf Tamnes for 
help, suggestions and advice during the writing of this study. 
Lars C. Jenssen, Irene P. Kulblik, and Amita Lovett were 
assigned the tasks of proofreading and transforming the text into 
9 The military documentation is in the archives of the Russian 
General Staff and the Archives of the Ministry for Defence. The 
most important parts of the Politburo papers are in the so-called 
Presidential Archives or in the process of being transferred to the 
former CPSU archives. They are for the time being inaccessible. 
Other parts of the CPSU archives are less relevant to this topic. 
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reada?le English. Thorstein Medhus was responsible for the 
techrtical aspects of preparing the manuscript for print. 
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2. 1920-1939: The emergence of Soviet 
interests in the High North 
On 15-16 February 1924 the Soviet trade representative in 
Norway, Madame Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai, signed an 
agreement and exchanged notes wilh the Norwegian government 
about the establishment of full diplomatic relations between 
Norway and the Soviet government After lengthy discussions 
!he two parties agreed on a quid pro quo arrangement, whereby 
the Norwegian government recognised !he Soviet government de 
jure, receiving in return the Soviet government's declaration that 
it accepted the 1920 Paris Treaty on Svalbard. The Soviet Union 
declared that it did not object to the stipulations of the Treaty, 
and the Norwegian government undenook to solicit the signa-
tory powers' agreement to Soviet adherence.'" At this point the 
Soviets had no clear perceptions of their interests on Svalbard, 
and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgii V. 
Chicherin, only hesitatingly agreed to Kollontai's idea oflioking 
the two questions. For the rest of the interwar period Svalbard 
remained largely outside the scope of Soviet military-strategic 
considerations, but gradually developed into a major source of 
coal for Russia's norlhern regions. Only the prospects of war 
prompted some MID bureaucrats to highlight Svalbard's real or 
imagined military-strategic significance. 
192D-1924: The USSR and the Svalbard Treaty 
Until the Western Powers at the Paris Peace Conference decided 
to give Norway sovereignty over Svalbard, the archipelago had 
been regarded as a no-man's-land, terra nullius. In 1871, when 
10 Cf. Trygve Mathisen, op. cit. (cf. note 3); and Egil Danielsen, 
Norge-Sovjetunionen. Norsk utenrikspolitikk overfor Sovjetunionen 
1917-1940, Oslo, 1964, pp. 108-123. 
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for the first time the Russians took part in diplomatic discus-
sions about Svalbard's international status, !he Czarist govern-
ment opposed a Swedish-Norwegian proposal to transfer !he 
archipelago to Norwegian sovereignty. From the turn of the 
century onwards interest in Svalbard's economic potential 
developed rapidly, and the need to create an administrative 
regime for the archipelago became obvious. At meetings in 1910 
and 1912 representatives from Russia, Norway and Sweden 
reached agreement on a formula for joint Russian-Swedish-
Norwegian administration of Svalbard. Czarist Russian policy on 
Svalbard was aimed at keeping the area outside the range of !he 
great powers' disputes, and making sure that the area remained 
terra nullius, or at least that any arrangement ensured that 
Russia's presence and influence in the area was equal, or 
preferably superior, to that of the other great powers. u 
The outbreak of the First World War disrupted the negoti-
ations on Svalbard's international status. The matter was 
returned to briefly at the Russian-German negotiations in Brest-
Litovsk in 1918, where a supplementary German-Russian 
protocol to the peace agreement stated !hat as soon as possible 
after the conclusion of lhe war the two parties should ask the 
Norwegian government to secure the continuation of the 
international conference on Svalbard. The protocol also stated 
that the two parties should work for a settlement which would 
give them equal rights on the archipelago.12 The clause was 
cenainly the result of a German initiative, not a Russian one. 
Finally, in the course of the peace negotiations in Paris after 
the war the Norwegians succeeded in persuading the Western 
Powers that Svalbard ought to be part of the Kingdom of 
11 Cf. Trygve Mathisen, op. cit. (cf. note 3). 
12The document in question is printed in volume I, pp. 166-183, 
of Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (DVPSSSR), a Soviet 
collection in 22 volumes of diplomatic correspondence covering the 
years 1917-1939, published in Moscow 1957-1993. 
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Norway. Russia, which at the time was excluded from the 
international diplomatic community, took no pan in the negoti-
ations and was not among the signatory powers. Under the terms 
of the Treaty on Svalbard of 9 February 1920, Norway was 
granted "the full and absolute sovereignty" over Svalbard 
(including Bear Island), although Norway's rights over the 
archipelago were subject to a number of restrictions. Among the 
most important of these stipulations was the Treaty's Article 9, 
which obliged Norway 
not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in 
the territories [covered by the Treaty] and not to construct any 
fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for 
warlike purposes. 
The Treaty further stated that 
The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall bave equal 
liberty of access and entry of any reason or object whatsoever to 
the waters, fjords, and ports of the tertitories [covered by the 
Treaty]; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, 
they may carry on there without impediment all marine, indusrtial, 
mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute 
equality. 
The Norwegian negotiators, who were acutely aware of the 
paramount importance to Norway of good relations with Russia 
notwithstanding their strong dislike of the revolutionary regime 
in Moscow, demanded the inclusion in the Treaty of a clause 
which grantedRussian nationals and companies "the same rights 
as nationals of the High Contracting Parties" until the recogni-
tion by the signatory powers of a Russian government would 
permit Russia to adhere to the Treaty (Article 10).13 
13 The text of the Treaty is printed in English in Ellen C. Singh, 
op. cit. (cf. note 3). 
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Soviet policy on Svalbard in the years leading up to the 
Norwegian-Soviet agreement of February 1924 was the outcome 
of a process offrequently confused discussions within the Soviet 
foreign policy apparatus. There was no agreement on the 
political, economic or strategic significance of the archipelago. 
This confusion and the lack of articulated policy was partly a 
reflection of physical realities: the archipelago's geographical 
remoteness, as well as its extremely adverse climatic conditions 
and its limited economic potential (and complete lack of 
revolutionary potential). Svalbard is located in a pan of the 
world which had always played a peripheral role in overall 
Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, the general orientation of 
the new Soviet regime's foreign policy necessarily left Svalbard 
outside the focus of the decision-makers' attention. Soviet 
foreign policy in the early post-revolutionary years concentrated 
on a few overriding aims of a formal nature. Foremost among 
these aims were the efforts to break the western powers' 
diplomatic blockade and restore Bolshevik Russia to the position 
Czarist Russia had enjoyed at least since the times of Aleksandr 
11 - as one of the recognised world powers. Soviet policy 
towards Norway and with regard to Svalbard was set within this 
context. It reflected, therefore, an inslrumentalist approach, 
which relegated Svalbard (as well as Norway as one of the small 
powers) to pure means in the Soviet government's efforts to 
achieve more fundamental foreign policy aims. Soviet foreign 
policy in these years was directed towards governments and 
peoples, not territories. 
In protesting against the 1920 Treaty, the new regime in 
Russia tried for a while to obstruct the implementation of an 
arrangement which had been negotiated without Russian 
participation. The motivation was largely one of prestige. Given 
the lack of strong Russian economic interests on Svalbard 
(Russia was in any case granted equal rights with the signatory 
powers), and the absence of any population with which to 
realise the early Soviet regime's dream of exporting their 
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revolution, only strategic interests could have driven the Soviet 
government to conduct a forceful Svalbard policy in their 
relations with Norway. 
The lack of efforts on the part of the Soviet foreign policy 
leadership to introduce military-strategic considerations into the 
Svalbard question, not only reflected the general preoccupation 
of the early post-Civil War Soviet regime with diplomacy rather 
than military strategy, but also reflected the almost non-existent 
state of the Russian Navy when the seven-year cataclysm of 
war, revolution and civil war finally came to an end about 1920. 
The condition of the Russian Navy was in turn just one aspect 
of the state of extreme weakness in which Soviet Russia found 
itself when the communist regime set out to consolidate its 
power. More specifically, no major Russian warships regularly 
sailed the waters of the High North; in fact, there were few such 
ships left in the Russian Navy.14 Nor did the Russians give 
much priority to the development of a naval capacity in these 
waters when the Russian Navy was slowly being reconstructed 
in the 1920s. The Baltic and Black Seas were seen as much 
more important. 15 This lack of Soviet awareness of the poten-
tial military-strategic significance of the Arctic regions was also 
reflected in the Finnish-Soviet Peace Treaty of October 1920, 
which assigned the Petsamo (Pechenga) area to Finland "for all 
times to come" (na vechnye vremena),16 although it had not 
been part of the Grand Duchy of Finland prior to 1917. An 
14 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea 
Power, London, 1974, p. 356. 
15 Discussions of Soviet policy on Svalbard do not always take 
into account the fact that the pre-eminence of the Soviet Northern 
Fleet is a phenomenon strictly linked to the post-Second World 
War period. Cf. Willy 0streng, Det poliliske Svalbard (cf. note 3), 
pp. 60-63. 
16 DVPSSSR (cf. note 12), Vol. 111, document No. 137, Finnish-
Soviet Peace Treaty of 14 October, 1920. 
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interest in the military-strategic dimensions of the Svalbard 
question would have been almost pure! y theoretical, bearing no 
relation to existing technological and operational realities. On 
the face of it there were few reasons to make the Soviet 
government pay much attention to Svalbard. 
As soon as the Soviet government learned about the signing 
of the Treaty on Svalbard, Chicherin sent protests to the 
Norwegian and Allied governments. The Soviet government 
declared that it could not recognise the Treaty, as Russia bad 
been excluded from the negotiations which led to the signing of 
the Treaty. The Soviet government had not been consulted, 
notwithstanding Russia's traditional interest in Svalbard. The 
aim of the Soviet protests of 1920, which Deputy Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov aptly characte-
rised as purely "platonic", was basically to uphold the Soviet 
government's prestige, and to keep the door open for later 
Soviet proposals for a final settlement. A further Soviet note of 
protest in early 1923 aimed at slowing down the ratification 
process in Norway and the other signatory countries. 17 The 
initial Soviet response to the signing of the Paris Treaty 
reflected the traditional Russian stance on the archipelago, i.e. 
that Svalbard's international status could be negotiated only with 
Russian participation." Only gradually did the Soviet foreign 
policy leadership realise that the dispute might serve to force 
17 A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, d. 38, I. 6, Litvinov to Surits, 6 
January, 1923. 
18 A degree of personal continuity within the Russian foreign 
policy apparatus may have played a role. Andrei V. Sabanin, a 
diplomat from 1908 and an expert on international law, had 
influenced the handling of the Spitsbergen question before the First 
World War, and continued his career in lhe NK1D after the 
revolution. From 1920 to 1937 Sabanin was lhe head of lhe 
Commissariat's Legal-Economic, from 1931 Legal, Department 
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Norway to agree to an early de jure recognition of the Soviet 
government. 
The Soviet government created an interdepartmental working 
group which was assigned the task of articulating Soviet 
interests and policy on Svalbard. As late as January 1923 the 
group had not been able to produce any concrete ideas, political 
or economic. Maksim Litvinov complained that if the Norwe-
gian government were to present proposals for a settlement, the 
Soviet government would have difficulties submitting their own 
counterproposals. Lacking guidelines for a policy to handle the 
new situation which had been created by the signing of the 
Treaty in 1920, Litvinov argued that the Treaty should be 
abrogated, and an international conference should be organised 
to settle the matter. If absolutely unavoidable, the Soviet 
government could accept Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard 
if the Soviet government could set the preconditions." 
It was uncertain, however, what these preconditions should 
be. When Jakub Surits, the Soviet trade representative in 
Norway, told Litvinov that a renegotiation of the Treaty was out 
of the question, Litvinov repeated that "it is still unclear to us 
what we could and should achieve" with regard to Svalbard. At 
the same time Litvinov was clearly moving towards accepting 
Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard, arguing that it was far 
from obvious that it would be in the interests of Russia if 
Svalbard were to revert to a no-man's-land rather than being 
under Norwegian jurisdiction. After all, Norwegian control over 
Svalbard was less injurious to Russian interests than the 
archipelago's belonging to one of the other powers.'0 
The wavering Soviet attitude towards the Svalbard question 
was highlighted in the correspondence between Georgii V asilie-
19 A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, cl 38, I. 6, Litvinov to Surits, 6 
January, 1923. 
20 A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, cl 38, l. 10, Litvinov to Surits, 3 
February, 1923. 
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vich Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the 
independent-minded Alexandra Kollontai, who had succeeded 
Surits as Soviet trade representative in Norway. From the 
summer of 1923 Kollontai argued that Soviet acceptance of the 
Paris Treaty of 1920 should be made conditional on Norwegian 
de jure recognition of the Soviet government.'' Chicherin 
argued the opposite: the Norwegians, in his opinion, were far 
from enthusiastic about the newly won "sovereignty" over 
Svalbard, which to them meant only additional costs and no 
privileges.22 To the Soviet government, on the other hand, an 
invitation to accede to the Treaty would mean a welcome 
measure of international recognition - being treated like "an 
internationally recognised Government" - and at the same time 
make it more feasible for the Soviet government to defend 
Russian interests on Svalbard. Chicherin concluded that "nobody 
would understand that we should demand compensation in the 
form of recognition de jure for a service rendered to us" (i.e. 
"From the fragments of Aleksandra Kollontai's diaries which 
were published in International affairs in 1988-89, it appears that 
the person who suggested to Kollontai that Soviet recognition of 
Norway's right to Spitsbergen should depend on Norway's de jure 
recognition of the Soviet government was Olav Scheflo, a left-wing 
socialist who one year later became one of the leaders of the newly 
created Norwegian Communist Party. According to Kollontai, 
Scheflo suggested the linkage in late November 1922. Cf. Interna-
tional affairs (Moscow), 1988, No. 12, p. 106. However, Kollon-
tai's diaries, in the printed version, are of questionable historical 
value, both because of the arbitrary cuts in the text, and because 
the original diaries were "edited" by Kollontai herself in the 1940s. 
I have not consulted any of the versions of the diary which are now 
available in Moscow. 
22 As a general evaluation of Norwegian attitudes, this was 
misleading. For examples of negative Norwegian reactions to the 
Treaty's limitations of Norway's rights, see RolfTamnes, Svalbard 
og stormaktene (cf. note 3), pp. 28-29. 
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being allowed to accede to the Treaty). The linking of the two 
questions, according to Chicherin, would "block our accession 
to the Treaty".23 Chicherin's order of preference was thus clear: 
accession to the Treaty as a means of elevating Soviet Russia's 
international position was far more important than the defence 
of potential, although undefined, Soviet "interests" on Svalbard. 
Kollontai, in her answer to Chicherin, argued that Soviet 
recognition of Norway's rights to Svalbard was of primary 
importance to Norway, while the benefits of this to the Soviet 
government would be rather dubious. Soviet willingness to 
accede to an international agreement which had been negotiated 
without Russia's participation could be intetpreted as a sign of 
weakness, rather than as a step towards international recognition. 
Kollontai concluded by emphasizing that the Svalbard question 
offered the Soviet government the possibility of pressing the 
Norwegians for early de jure recognition of the Soviet 
regime.24 
Kollontai's approach was soon adopted by Chicherin and the 
Soviet leadership as Soviet policy towards Norway with regard 
to de jure recognition and Svalbard. On 20-23 November 1923 
the Commissariat's Collegium ("Kollegiia", the highest decision-
making body of the Narodnyi komissariat inostrannykh del, 
NKID) decided to agree to a "positive solution" to the Svalbard 
question on the condition that diplomatic relations between 
Norway and Soviet Russia would be established.25 Thus the 
way was cleared for the declaration and exchange of notes in 
February 1924. However, and basically because of the United 
States' refusal to recognise the Soviet government, the Soviet 
Union was only allowed to accede to the Treaty in May 1935. 
23 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 2, p. 22, d. 266, I. 43, Chicherin to Kollon-
tai, 23 Septembet, 1923. 
24 A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, d. 44, I. 6, Kollontai to Chicherin, 
5 October, 1923. 
25 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 2. p. 22, d. 266. 
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It is clear from the Soviet documents that Alexandra Kollon-
tai was the principal architect of the Soviet Government's policy 
in the Svalbard question. Although adhering to general 
guidelines from Moscow, she herself strongly influenced these 
guidelines. Apart from that she showed a high degree of 
independence and initiative, in the end provoking reprimands 
from Chicherin for having overstepped her authority and for not 
having kept the NKID duly informed about the negotiations.'6 
From the Russian point of view the merits of her policy line 
are open to doubt. Spurred by Kollontai, the Soviet government 
conducted a policy which in the end clearly departed from pre-
revolutionary Russian policy on the Svalbard question. Prior to 
the First World War, geopoliticaf!-1 considerations had been 
prominent in Russian thinking on Svalbard. The essence of the 
26 The early years of Soviet diplomacy benefited from the 
dedicated service of a number of brilliant and highly educated 
personalities - Chicherin, Litvinov, Vorovskii, Kollontai, and 
others. The correspondence between them was lively, often arrogant 
and ironic, in stark contrast to the strong guiding role of the 
Moscow centre which characterised internal Soviet diplomatic 
correspondence under Molotov and Vyshinskii. 
21 Using the term "geopolitical" I have in mind a way of thin-
king in matters of foreign policy which is ultimately oriented 
towards the actual, potential or alleged military value of sea, land 
or air territories. Geopolitics thrives on a higher level of 
generalisation than military-strategic reasoning, which should be 
based on operational analyses or at least considerations. Geopolitics 
lends to be the favoured field of diplomats, political scientists and 
diplomatic historians. This study seems to prove that geopoliticians 
should at an early stage ask for the assistance of military pro-
fessionals when they decide to proceed from the essentially map-
based exercise of geopolitics to the complex world of military· 
strategic evaluations. For a more stringent analysis of "the geopol-
itical image of great power politics", see Rolf Tarnnes, The United 
States in the High North (cf. note 8), p. 18. 
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Czarist Russian policy had been to seek a solution which would 
secure a degree of Russian influence and control over Svalbard, 
while keeping the archipelago outside the range of great power 
politics and conflicts. During the Kristiania conferences on 
Svalbard prior to the First World War the Russian delegates 
supported the idea of joint Russian-Norwegian-Swedish admini-
stration of Svalbard, which none the less should formally remain 
a no-man's-land and neutral. 
Accepting the stipulations of the Paris Treaty, the Soviet 
government accepted the principle that Russia had no more 
rights or privileges on Svalbard than the other great powers. 
Because of her material and political weakness in these early 
post-revolutionary years, Russia was not in a position to force 
a change in the major stipulations of the 1920 Treaty. However, 
the relative ease with which the Soviet government agreed to the 
quid pro quo arrangement of February 1924 also reflected the 
absence on the Soviet side of an awareness that the archipelago 
itself offered economic or strategic assets. 
The Treaty's Article 10, which provided Russia with equal 
economic opportunities and rights on Svalbard independent! y of 
its adherence to the Treaty, excluded the possibility of convin-
cing economic arguments in favour of Soviet accession to the 
Treaty. And last but not least, at this stage the Russians mined 
no coal on Svalbard. 
Consequently, Svalbard was not considered to be of much 
interest to the Soviet Union, and both Chicherin and Kollontai, 
notwithstanding their disparate interpretation of Soviet versus 
Norwegian interests with regard to Svalbard, took the same 
basic approach. They both viewed the dispute over Svalbard 
solei y within the framework of Soviet Russia's efforts to gain 
international recognition and as a vehicle to further this aim. 
However, Kollontai's policy, which became Soviet policy, 
was of doubtful value even if one accepts her purely instrumen-
talist approach to the dispute. Wben Italy and the United 
Kingdom recognised the Soviet regime in early February 1924, 
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it was clear that Norwegian de jure recognition was only a 
matter of time. At this point, the Norwegians were keenly 
interested in establishing full diplomatic and commercial 
relations with Russia, while the importance to the Soviet 
government of Norwegian recognition was limited compared to 
the immense international ramifications of the Italian and British 
decisions. 
Thus the Soviet decision in 1924 to accept the provisions of 
the Paris Treaty on Svalbard reflected the young Soviet regime's 
fight for international recognition, while traditional perceptions 
of Russian interests in the area were disregarded or simply not 
present in the discussions. 28 The Soviet approach was purely 
instrumentalist, using the Svalbard controversy to strengthen the 
Russian bargaining position vis-a-vis the Norwegian govern-
ment. 
1925-1939: Territorial claims and economic 
interests 
While the Soviets adjusted easily to the real world and accepted 
the 1920 Treaty, other aspects of their Arctic policy in the 
interwar period gave rise to numerous Soviet-Norwegian 
disputes and conflicts. The most serious among these were 
related to Soviet decrees which excluded Norwegian (and other 
foreign) seal hunters from the White Sea and from hunting 
28 No rules without exceptions: in April 1923 Kollontai argued 
that it might be in the interest of the Soviet government to support 
Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, as a counterbalance to 
British hegemony in the area She did not, however, use this 
argument with any force, and it was not reflected in the correspon-
dence between NKID and Kollontai from the summer 1923 
onwards. A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, d. 43, I. 45, Kollontai to 
Litvinov, 9 April, 1923. 
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inside the 12-mile sea boundary which the Soviet Government 
had declared in May 1921.29 
In the mid-twenties the Soviet government gradually deve-
loped an Arctic policy which had ramifications far beyond the 
largely economic aspects of the unilateral declarations of May 
1921. The Soviet government's decision of 15 April 1926 to 
declare all territories north of Soviet territory as belonging to the 
Soviet Union was of far-reaching consequence. By thus intro-
ducing the sector line as the basis for delimitation in the Arctic 
Sea, the Soviets prepared the ground for the complex and 
difficult talks on the maritime boundary in the Barents Sea, 
which since the 1970s have been a crucial element of Soviet-
Norwegian relations. An exception was made for territories 
which were already recognised as belonging to another power, 
i.e. for Svalbard.30 The Soviet government's decree was sub-
stantiated by the publication of a small booklet called 0 n the 
right to the northern polar regions, written by V.L. Lakhtin and 
supplied with an authoritative foreword by Sabanin, the head of 
"Interested readers are referred to Egil Danielsen, op. cit (cf. 
note 10), and to KAre Valle, En oversikt over konfliktene mellom 
Norge og Russland om selfangsten i ~stisen i tidsrummet 1893-
1926, an unpublished thesis for the degree Cand.polit. in political 
science, University of Oslo, 1957. The relevant volumes of the 
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (cf. note 12) also contain some 
documents which shed additional light on the dispute and how it 
was (more or less) solved. 
"The decree of 15 Apri11926 is published in DVPSSSR, Vol. 
IX, doe. No. 130. The decree defmes the western sector line as 
32 4'35w longiwde East of Greenwich, while the Paris Treaty 
defines Svalbard between 10 and 35 Eastern longirude. The 
present Soviet sector line has been moved slightly to the West, due 
to the acquisition of the Petsarno district from Finland after the 
Second World War. Kvitlllya (White Island) is the easternmost 
island in the Svalbard archipelago. Cf. p. 140. 
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the NKID Legal-Economic Department. In July 1928 Sov-
narlcom decided to develop scientific activity in the Arctic 
regions, and to plan for the establishment of meteorological 
stations on Novaia Zemlia, Sevemaia Zemlia - and Franz Joseph 
Land." 
The April 1926 decree worried the Norwegiarts, not least 
because it meant that the Soviet Union claimed sovereignty over 
this archipelago of numerous small islands situated to the north 
of Novaia Zemlia and to the east of Svalbard.32 When in the 
summer and autumn of 1928 the Norwegian government 
received information about an increase in Soviet activities in the 
Arctic, it decided formally to notify the Soviet government that 
the Norwegian government could not accept the Soviet decree 
with regard to undiscovered islands in general, and Franz Joseph 
Land in particular." The Norwegian reservation notwith-
standing, the disputed archipelago was in January 1929 made 
pan of Arlchangelskaia oblast, and on 29 July 1929 an expe-
dition based on the ship Georgii Sedov hoisted the Soviet flag 
on one of the islands. 34 
In August 1930 the Politburo instructed the NKID to secure 
the Norwegian government's "unambiguous recognition" of 
Soviet sovereignty over the archipelago." However, the Soviets 
31 Sovnarkom's decree of 31 July, 1928. 
32 Cf. documents in the archives of the Norwegian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as NMFA), dossier P D 9 
26/16. 
33 NMFA, P 9 D 26/16, Ministry to Kollontai, 19 December, 
1928. The Norwegian rationale was purely economic. Norwegian 
fishing and hunting interests exened strong pressure on the 
government to protest against the Soviet decision. 
34 DVPSSSR (cf. note 12), Vol. XII, document No. 235. 
35 The Politburo's decision is paraphrased in AVPRF, f. 05, op. 
10, p. 67, d. 107, 11. 31-32, Krestinskii to Stalin, 14 November, 
1930. 
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were eager to reach some sort of agreement with the Norwe-
gians which would ease tension over the archipelago. 36 Several 
ideas were discussed. If the Norwegians refused to accept a 
Soviet offer of hunting and fishing rights in the archipelago for 
10-15 years as compensation for recognition, the ultimate Soviet 
position would be to accept Norwegian recognition of Soviet 
sovereignty over Franz Joseph Land only, not over the rest of 
the territories covered by the decree of 1926.37 It was also 
considered, and even hinted to the Norwegians, that a positive 
outcome to the long-standing discussions on a Soviet-Norwegian 
non-aggression treaty would facilitate a solution of the dispute 
over Franz Joseph Land,38 although it was fmally decided not 
to link the two questions.39 Thus the Soviets were still playing 
the Arctic card in order to drive home foreign policy initiatives 
related to slightly more hospitable regions. In order not to 
36 In the swnmer of 1930 the Norwegian seal hunting ship 
Isbj~rn was arrested in the waters of the archipelago, and the 
Norwegians delivered a protest on 8 August 
37 DVPSSSR (cf. note 12), Vol. xnr, docwnent No. 317, 
Stomoniakov to Kollontai, 12 September, 1930. 
38 NMFA, 40 E 99, message to legation in Moscow, 9 Septem-
ber, 1930; and DVPSSSR, Vol. XIII, N. 334, Litvinov to Kollontai, 
2 October, 1930. The idea of a Norwegian-Soviet non-aggression 
treaty was introduced by Alexandra Kollontai in February 1928. 
Despite Mowinckel' s strong desire to come to agreement with the 
Soviets, the talks came to nothing. The basic reason for the failure 
was that the Soviets wanted an agreement on non-aggression 
similar to the treaties they were in the process of concluding with 
a number of their neighbouring states, while the cautious Norwe-
gians were only interested in an agreement on mediation and 
arbitration. The talks, which never acquired the form of formal 
negotiations, were utterly undramatic and cordial. 
" A VPRF, fond: Arkhivno-spravochnaia biblioteka Skandi-
navskikh stran, op. 22, p. 1, d. 12, "Kratkij obwr sovetsko-
norvezhskikh otnoshenii 1917-1954gg", I. 18. 
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sharpen unduly the conflict with the Norwegians, the Glav-
sevmorput (Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route), 
which in the 1930s was in charge of all Soviet activity in the 
Arctic regions, was ordered to prevent the Norwegians from 
illegally hunting and fishing in the area of the archipelago, but 
never to use armed force. The NKID also instructed the 
GlavsevmOiput to supply the Norwegians with meteorological 
data from the archipelago.40 
Soviet activity on Svalbard developed in accordance with the 
general increase in Soviet activity in the Arctic regions. An 
attempt was made to start the geological exploration of Bear 
Island in the summer of 1920, but it was not until 1925 that the 
Soviets sent their first geological expedition to Spitsbergen 
proper.41 From then on the Soviet government systematically 
acquired parcels of land and existing coal mines from British, 
Swedish and Dutch interests, until they were ready to start 
mining on their own in 1931. Motivated by the task's "big 
political-economic importance for the country", the Council of 
Labour and Defence, chaired by V.M. Molotov, decided on 25 
March 1931 to launch the organisation of coal mining on 
Svalbard. 42 From its start in 1933 the Soviet production of coal 
on Svalbard, under the auspices of Arktikugol, rapidly increased 
until it equalled and even in some years surpassed that of the 
Norwegians. With a peak in 1937 of over 454,000 tonnes, the 
production gradually decreased to about 270,000 tonnes in 
1940.43 
As part of the overall development of their presence on 
Svalbard, the Soviets decided in 1931 to install a small radio 
40 1bid. 
41 L.V. Pechurov, Shpitsbergen, Moscow, 1983, pp. 92-93. 
42 A copy of the decision in the A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 
936, 11. 74-75. 
"Cf. AdolfHoel, Svalbard. Sva/bards historie 1596-1965, Oslo, 
1966, Vol. I, p. 417. 
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transmitter on one of the islands. This led to a rather sharp 
Soviet-Norwegian exchange of notes. The Norwegians 
demanded that the Soviets comply with a set of preconditions, 
while the Soviets argued that the Treaty's Article 4 (on the 
operation of "wireless telegraphy stations" on Svalbard) did not 
authorise the Norwegians to intrude into this purely Soviet 
matter.44 The Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs finally 
advised that the dispute should be resolved through direct 
contact between Arktikugol and the relevant Norwegian 
authorities." In 1936-37, Soviet request for pennission to store 
Svalbard coal in Northern Norway for the use of Soviet ships 
was turned down by Norwegian authorities, who feared that this 
might compromise Norway's neutrality in case of war between 
the Soviet Union and any of the other great powers. After the 
Norwegians delivered their official, and negative, reply on 29 
July 1937, the Soviet Minister to Norway expressed his under-
standing of the Norwegian position, and made it clear that the 
Soviet government would not insist. Iakubovich also said that he 
hoped that similar requests from other powers would be treated 
in the same way. A request from a Dutch finn in the summer of 
1938 was, in fact, also turned down.46 
The increased Soviet activity on Svalbard did not mean that 
the area had been given priority in Soviet foreign policy or 
strategic thinking. When in September 1932 Andreas T. Urbye, 
the Norwegian Minister in Moscow, tried to discuss a number 
of matters related to Svalbard with Litvinov, who by then had 
succeeded Chicherin as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he 
reported home that Litvinov had not familiarised himself with 
44 DVPSSSR (cf. note 12), Vol. XV, documents Nos. 245, 249, 
257. 
"NMFA, H 63 G 2{24, Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Ministry 
of Trade, 25 August, 1932. For more details, cf. Adolf Hoe!, op. 
cit. (cf. note 43), Vol. I, pp. 359-61. 
46 For more details, cf. NMFA, H 2 G 1/37. 
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the dispute over the radio transmitter and other questions related 
to Svalbard which worried the Norwegians.'' Soviet interests 
on Svalbard prior to the outbreak of the Second World War 
were mostly economic, and the available documentation does 
not imply that the Arctic played any important role in Soviet 
military-strategic thinking. A NKID memorandum of November 
1944, prepared in connection with Trygve Lie's visit to Mos-
cow, emphasised that the decision to accede to the Treaty in 
1_935 was based on the need to secure Soviet economic and legal 
nghts on Svalbard. Strategic considerations had apparently not 
been taken into account." Although only Norway and the 
USSR continued to pursue economic activities of some signifi-
cance on Svalbard in the 1930s, the Soviets did not attempt, and 
most likely did not intend, to fonnalise this process of "bilate-
ralisation"49 through a revision of the 1920 Treaty. 
Nonetheless, the development of the Soviet Arctic in the 
1930s laid the foundation for the later attempts to obtain a 
change in Svalbard's international status. This also involved the 
Soviet Navy. The reconstruction and expansion of the Soviet 
_Navy which started with the introduction of the five-year plans 
m_ 1929 also laid the foundation for Soviet naval activity in the 
Ht~ North. In 1933 the Baltic-White Sea channel was opened, 
and m the same year the Northern Flotilla was founded. In 1937 
the unit was renamed the Northern Fleet. Construction of the 
naval base at Poliarnoe in the Kola fiord started, and the 
established centres of Munnansk and Arkhangelsk were further 
developed. However, as late as 1936 the Northern Flotilla was 
of limited size and had no ocean-going capability. According to 
one source it comprised three destroyers, three submarines, a 
number of tankers and icebreakers, and a small number of 
:NMFA, legation in Moscow to Ministry, 21 September, 1932. 
A VPRF, f. 0116, o. 27, p. 128, d. 22, ll. 38-43, Vetrov et al. 
to Molotov and Dekanowv, 25 November 1944. 
49 ' Cf. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene (cf. note 3), pp. 36-37. 
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aircraft. 50 The naval historian in question, Dlmald W. Mitchell, 
maintains that the Arctic prior to the Second World War "had 
never been a main theatre of interest to the Russians". Although 
not completely neglected in Russian and Soviet naval thinking, 
it had been regarded as less important because of its limited 
population and poorly-developed resources.'1 Therefore, 
according to Mitchell, neither "the Russians nor the Germans 
had any real appreciation of the strategic potential of the Arctic 
theatre" before hostilities erupted between Germany and the 
Soviet Union in 1941.52 After the end of the Russian-Japanese 
war, and with the evolution of the French-Russian-British 
entente in the early years of the twentieth century, the Baltic, the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean, but not the Arctic regions, 
were at the centre of Russian naval strategic thinking. 53 
The experience of the First World War did not change this 
picture, despite the fact that more goods were delivered by 
Russia's allies along the northern route (mainly to Arldlangelsk 
and Murmansk) in the years 1914-1917 than during the Seeond 
World War. Part of the reason for Soviet Russia's lack of 
interest in developing the naval capacity in the North should be 
sought in the evolution of its relationship with Germany and the 
western powers respectively, after the revolution. The impor-
tance of securing the communication lines through the northern 
waters became apparent only when the Soviets realised that 
Hitler was not a transitional figure and that Germany, not 
Britain, would be the enemy in a coming war. The creation and 
50 Donald W. Mitchell, op. cit. (cf. note 14), p. 421. 
51 Cf. also the discussion in Jens Petter Nielsen, "0nsket tsaren 
seg en isfri havn i nord?", Historisk tidssk.rift (Oslo), 1991, No. 4, 
pp. 604-621. 
52 Donald W. Mitchell, op. cit. (cf. note 14), p. 421. 
"Jiirgen Rohwer, "Alternating Russian and Soviet Naval Strat-
egies", in Philip S. Gilette and Willard C. Frank, Jr., eds., The 
Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct, Lexington/Toronto, 1990, p. 99. 
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development of the Northern Flotilla and the Northern Fleet 
from the mid-1930s reflected, therefore, the change in Soviet 
perceptions of the nature of the threat which took place during 
Litvinov's period in office. 
Prior to the battle of Tsushima in 1905 Russia had been one 
of the world's major sea powers. Russian naval thinking had 
consequently focused on the development of a balanced high-sea 
fleet comparable, with regard to the composition of the fleet and 
the task it was assigned, to the fleets of the other great powers. 
These imperial ambitions lived on in Soviet naval thinking 
through the 1920s54, but had gradually to give way to the 
severe economic and technological limitations of the early 
Soviet period. At the end of the decade the "new school" in 
Soviet naval thinking replaced the classicists and their strategic 
concepts. From now on, and until the pendulum swung back on 
the eve of the Second World War, the role of the Soviet Navy 
was seen primarily as one of supporting the operations of the 
Army. Emphasis was put on "an active coastal defence carried 
out with simple naval weapons that could be produced without 
great indusnial expense". The new operational concepts included 
"the massive use of mines, small submarines, torpedo boats and 
aircraft". These strategic and operational concepts were reflected 
in the naval construction programmes of the first two five-year 
plans." 
54 Cf. the Soviet demands at the Rome conference in February 
1924, when the Soviet representatives demanded consent for a 
Soviet navy of 491,000 tonnes, only slightly less than the quola of 
525,000 tonnes which both the United Slates and Great Britain had 
been permitted at the Washington conference of 1921-22. See 
Jiirgen Rohwer, op. cit (cf. note 53), p. 102. 
" Jiirgen Rohwer, op. cit, pp. 102-3; see also Donald W. 
Mitchell, op. cit. (cf. note 14), pp. 370 et passim; Eric Morris, The 
Russian Navy: Myth and Reality, London, 1977, p. 19; and Bryan 
Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, London, 1983, 
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The third five-year plan which was launched in 1938 put 
heavy emphasis on the development of the Navy. The pro-
gramme reflected the return of the classicist approach in Soviet 
naval thinking. The shipbuilding programme, which has been 
compared to President Roosevelt' s naval construction pro-
gramme of the summer of 1940,56 aimed at the building of a 
"powerful and balanced surface fleet", which could "serve as a 
real extension of Soviet diplomacy". 57 However, the 1938 
programme had yielded only limited results when the war in 
Europe erupted, and the urgent need to strengthen the Army and 
the Air Force once more forced the Soviet government to 
postpone the development of a modem, balanced high-sea fleet. 
In October 1940 the building of all large ships was halted, while 
the building of destroyers, submarines and small combat ships 
was accelerated. 58 Thus at the outbreak of the war the Soviet 
Navy was limited in respect of both the quantity and quality of 
its material, and the basically defensive and shore-bound 
strategic concepts of the 1930s still dominated Soviet naval 
thinking. Within such a framework, the distant Svalbard 
archipelago was not thought to be of great interest. 
p. 85. 
"Jiirgen Rohwer, op. cit (cf. note 53), pp. 104-05. 
57 Eric Morris, op. cit (cf. note 55), p. 21. 
"Jiirgen Rohwer, op. cit (cf. note 53), p. 106. 
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3. 1939-1944: The awakeningofSoviet 
strategic interests in the High North 
The rising tension in Europe in the late 1930s brought to an end 
Svalbard's privilege of being outside the scope of the great 
powers' military-strategic considerations. The eve of the 
outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 saw the 
first of repeated attempts from various quatters to convince the 
Soviet foreign policy leadership of the need to implement a 
more vigorous policy in defence of Soviet military-strategic 
interests, real or alleged, on Spitsbergen and Bear Island. In the 
summer of 1941, and after the outbreak of the Soviet-Gennan 
war, these basically geostrategically motivated efforts finally 
resulted in a half-hearted Soviet proposal to occupy Svalbard by 
Allied forces, in order to safeguard the communication lines in 
the Arctic and to implement the Soviet idea of opening a front 
in Notthem Norway. However, even in 1941, when the first 
Western convoys to the Soviet Union forced their way through 
Arctic waters, these geostrategically motivated ideas failed _to 
convince the Allied military decision-makers. The Soviet 
population on Spitsbergen was evacuated together with ~e 
Norwegians, and for the rest of the war there was no Soviet 
activity on any of the islands. Contrary to what is often sugges-
ted the war did not demonstrate the strategic importance of the 
Svalbard archipelago including Bear Island. Quite the opposite-
Svalbard played a minor role in Allied or German strategy, ~d 
was far outside the operational range of the shore-bound Soviet 
Notthem Fleet. The key to the various Soviet wartime initiatives 
concerning Svalbard should therefore be sought in the schemes 
of a number of activist bureaucrats in the MID apparatus, whose 
geostrategically motivated arguments were not based on 
military-strategic planning or operational analyses of Svalbard's 
role in Soviet defences. 
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1939-1941: The appearance of an activist attitude 
It seems !hat the first person to try to draw the attention of the 
Soviet foreign policy leadership to the need to review Soviet 
policy on Svalbard because of the imminence of war was the 
Secretary at lhe Soviet consulate in Barentsburg, Luzanov.59 
During a meeting in late July 1939 with A. I. Plakhin, the leader 
of the Scandinavian Department, and in a subsequent memoran-
dum, he presented a number of proposals which were aimed at 
strengthening the Soviet position on lhe archipelago. 
Luzanov noted that Svalbard so far had been discussed "only 
as an additional source of coal" for Northern Russia, i.e. that 
strategic considerations had not been take~ into account. 
Deploring this state of affairs, Luzanov based his memorandum 
on 
the immensely (iskliuchitelnoe) imporlailt military-strategic posi~on 
and significance of the Spitsbergen islands as a Navy ~ase_ which 
controls the entire region [i.e. lhe Barents Sea and Soviet lmes of 
communication]. 
As the Germans were allegedly strengtherting their position in 
these northern waters, Luzanov presented a whole package of 
measures which required implementing in order to strengthen 
Soviet influence and control over Spitsbergen and Bear Island. 
These were mainly of an economic nature, but aimed partly at 
creating preconditions for the presence of Soviet personnel 
59 When the Soviet legation in Oslo in January 1939 was 
ordered to provide "spravki" on a number of ~pies for u:'e by the 
decision-makers in the Commissariat, the bst of assignments 
included infonnation about Svalbard and the work of the Ark~­
ugol. When the legation received new additional assignments m 
September and October 1939 (i.e. after the outb~ak of the war), 
questions related to Spitsbergen were not on the list. Cf. A VPRF, 
f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 398, I. 2, Bezhanov and Kobetskii to 
Nikonov, 9 January, 1939; and ibid., I. 160, Frolov's note, undated. 
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outside 1he confines of existing coal mining sites, on Bear Island 
in particular. Luzanov's memorandum contained no hints that he 
was thinking in terms of a revision of 1he basic stipulations of 
the Paris Treaty."' The Soviet consulate did not receive any 
immediate response from the Commissariat, and continued to 
argue that it was necessary to strengthen 1he Soviet presence on 
Svalbard, for both strategic and economic reasons, even after the 
publication of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement and the 
outbreak of the war. 61 
Presumably as a direct result of Luzanov's irtitiative, Pave! 
D. Orlov of the Scandinavian Department was ordered to write 
a memorandum on "Spitsbergen and its importance to 1he 
USSR", to be firtished before the end of August.62 The Com-
missariat also asked the consulate in Barentsburg and other insti-
tutions to send papers on Svalbard to the Commissariat."' and 
Plakhin warned against giving the Norwegians a pretext to 
restrict Soviet activities on Spitsbergen. 64 
Finally, in early December 1939, the Scandinavian Depart-
ment proposed a number of measures along the lines suggested 
60 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 398, 11. 83-90, Luzanov to 
Plakbin, 5 Augnst, 1939. 
61 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 397, 11. 18-21, Volnukhin 
and Luzanov to Dekanozov, 30 October, 1939. 
62 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 21 (1939), p. 121, d. 400, 11. 15-17, 
"Plan raboty ... ". 
63 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 397, I. 5, Kartashev to 
Lowvskii, 16 August, 1939; ibid., I. 13, Plakbin and Orlov to 
Luzanov, 19 October, 1939. 
64 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 395, 11. 35-36, Plakhin to 
Lowvskii, 8 September, 1939. Plakhin discussed the desirability of 
denouncing the so-called Alesund concession of 1926 which gave 
Norwegian seal hunters the right to hunt for seals in certain parts 
of Soviet territorial waters, but warned against the adverse foreign 
policy effects of a Soviet initiative to abrogate the agreement. 
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by the consulate. However, the measures aimed basically at 
improviog the working conditions and the efficiency of the 
Soviet consulate, and only indirectly reflected the military-
strategic concerns which had motivated Luzanov. It is also 
interesting to note that the Scandinavian Department proposed 
organiziog an ioterministerial conference on Svalbard without 
the participation of the military. Nor did the Skandinavskii otdel 
suggest measures which would contradict the stipulations of the 
1920 Treaty.65 
One may preliminarily conclude from the available evidence 
that the consulate's initiatives in 1939 did not produce much 
response from Moscow in terms of a profound reevaluation of 
Svalbard's sigoificance, neither economic, nor strategic. The 
emphasis in the consulate's proposals on Svalbard's allegedly 
immense "strategic imponance" reflected the civilian MID 
bureaucrats' tendency to think in geostrategic terms without 
regard to the operational and technological realities. Although 
the relevant documentation from the General Staffs of the Army 
and Navy is still inaccessible, one can safe! y assume that the 
initiatives of the consulate and the Scandioavian Department in 
1939 were independent of any deliberations which may have 
taken place within the military establishment. 
The German occupation of Norway io the spring of 1940 
brought more substance to the deliberations over Svalbard's 
actual or potential strategic significance. It is not clear who took 
the initiative to renew the question io the spring of 1940. A 
memorandum to Deputy Commissar Lozovskii of 16 May from 
Orlov, who was now acting head of the Scandioavian Depart-
ment, is the first evidence which places the strategic concerns 
at the centre of the argument at this high political level. Apan 
from stressing strongly the economic imponance to Northern 
65 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 21, p. 121, d. 397, 11. 22-25, Orlov to 
Lozovskii, 1 December, 1939. 
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Russia of the coal from Spitsbergen,66 Orlov warned that one 
of the warring parties, "in the first instance England", might 
occupy Spitsbergen. Taking into account the imponance of 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island for the defence of Soviet marioe 
communication lines and "our northern borders", Orlov con-
cluded that one should "immediately initiale the necessary 
preventive measures in order to defend our interests on Spits-
bergen, as well as on Bear Island". 67 
In early June NKID asked Viklor Plomikov, the Soviet 
Minister in Oslo," and the consulate on Spitsbergen to supply 
as much information about Svalbard as possible. On I July 
NKID received a message from the Soviet consulate, which 
concluded that Svalbard should be taken under Soviet "protec-
tion" (arkhipelag Svalbard neobkhodimo vziat pod sovetskoe 
pokrovitelstvo). The letter from Volnukhio and Luzanov was 
triggered by a question from the Norwegian Governor in 
Longyearbyen, who had allegedly asked Volnukhin "whether the 
Soviet Union would allow the Germans to occupy Svalbard, 
taking into account that the Soviet Union had also guaranteed 
Norway's sovereiguty over Svalbard".69 The Consul and his 
Secretary warned that German occupation of Svalbard would 
have grave consequences for the Soviet Union. They ended their 
66 Orlov argued that it would take approximately 800 trains to 
transpon from the Donbas to Nonbern Russia the equivalent of the 
300,000 tonnes of coal which were produced on Spitsbergen each 
year. 
"'A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 22, p. 122, d. 13, 11. 25-26, Orlov to 
Lozovskii, 16 May, 1940. 
"P1oblikov remained in Oslo after the German occupation of 
Norway, but the "polpredstvo" was transformed into a General 
Consulate, and Ploblikov assumed the title of Consul General. 
" The 1920 Treaty contains no guarantees of this kind. Maybe 
Volnukhin misunderstood; the Governor may have said "acknowl-
edged" and not "guaranteed". 
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letter by appealing to the NKID leadership to consider their 
proposal. 70 
A few days later, Molotov received a lengthy memorandum 
on Svalbard. The document was basically a presentation of the 
history of Svalbard 's international status (including Bear Island), 
tracing the Svalbard question up to the Soviet accession to the 
Paris Treaty in 1935. Molotov read the memorandum, under-
lined key issues and dates, and sent it to the archives. It sbould 
be noted that the memorandum emphasised that Bear Island, as 
opposed to Spitsbergen, had been historically regarded as 
Russian territory.71 
In the summer of 1940 the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
commissioned two additional memoranda, one on Spitsbergen 
and a separate one on Bear Island. The two documents were of 
an almost purely historical character, and from their content and 
conclusions one can only infer that the European war had led to 
a new interest in the archipelago. However, the memorandum on 
Spitsbergen refers to Bear Island in a way which points directly 
to one of the elements in Molotov's November 1944 initiative: 
It should be noted, that neither the Czarist nor the Soviet govern-
ment (until to-day) regarded Bear Island as a separate, independent 
question, but always as part of the general Spitsbergen question. 
This, no doub~ was a mistake." 
Vice-Commissar Lozovskii's assistant Novgorodov, who wrote 
the memorandum, was not the first to criticise NKID for not 
having instituted a separate Soviet policy on Bear Island. A 
70 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 22, p. 122, d. 13, I. 16, Volnukhin and 
Luzanov to Lozovskii, 17 June, 1940 (received in NKID on 1 
July). 
71 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 22, p. 122, d. 4, ll. 1-7, "Spravka po 
voprosu o Shpitsbergene", without signature, 5 July, 1940. 
72 AVPRF, f. 06, p. 22, d. 266, "Spravkao Shpitsbergene",l. 35. 
The memorandum on Bear Island is in the same dossier. 
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memorandum from December 1922 made a similar point, 
arguing that "Bear Island, in contrast to Spitsbergen" used to be 
regarded as Russian territory. The Soviet protests of 1920 
against the Paris Treaty should have pointed to the particular 
status of Bear Island as compared to the general Spitsbergen 
question. 73 
The Soviet Consul in B arentsburg continued to argue for a 
more offensive Soviet policy on Svalbard. In letters to Lozovskii 
of 12 and 26 July Volnukhin repeated and further developed the 
previous arguments. By now the Consul's arguments had 
became predominantly military-strategic. Volnukhin argued that 
a power possessing military bases on Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island would be in control of the exit from Northern Russia to 
the Atlantic. The inlportance of this had been enhanced by the 
closing of the straits between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. 
Volnukhin argued that either Germany or Great Britain could be 
expected to take effective control over Svalbard at any time, 
thereby creating a serious threat to Soviet communication lines 
and Northern Russia in general. Volnukhin concluded that the 
Soviet Union should dispatch naval units to Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island and take the whole of Svalbard "under its protec-
tion". The Norwegians on Spitsbergen should be transported to 
mainland Norway immediately upon the arrival of the Soviet 
vessels. 
Although Volnukhin's letters referred to the current military 
and political situation in Europe, he added a geological argu-
ment in order to prove that the entire archipelago was, as a 
matter of fact, part of Russia (from the geological point of view, 
so to speak). He also mentioned the mood of Soviet workers on 
Spitsbergen, who allegedly felt that "Spitsbergen ought to be 
73 A VPRF, f. 0116, p. 102, d. 43, I. 85. 
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Soviet", and were confused and depressed by the lack of 
decisive Soviet action.74 
Volnukhin's urge for more "decisive" action was given 
suppon from the NKID's Scandinavian Depanment. ln early 
August Orlov and Androsov, a senior official in the Depanment, 
sent a strongly worded message to Deputy Commissar Lozov-
skii, indicating the possibility that Germany migbt create 
military bases on Spitsbergen. Orlov and Androsov also called 
attention to the Gennan military buildup which had started in 
Nonhem Norway, implying that the presence of Gennan 
military bases in both mainland Nonhem Norway and Spits-
bergen/Bear Island would present an acute danger to the security 
of Nonhem Russia. Warning against unsatisfactory "half 
measures", Orlov and Androsov recommended that the Svalbard 
archipelago should be occupied "by units of the Red Anny" for 
the duration of the war and until the "period of complete 
nonnalisation of international relations". Like Volnukhin, the 
representatives of the Scandinavian Depanment went beyond 
arguments of a military-strategic nature, reminding Lozovskii 
that Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard was the result of the 
"Versailles system", which in turn was an "element of Anglo-
French and American imperialism" .75 
The documentation about the reaction of Molotov and his 
deputies to the advice from their subordinates is still inadequate. 
However, one may assume that Molotov, whose overriding 
priority at tbis time was not to disturb relations with Gennany, 
was unwilling to complicate matters by taking action on 
Svalbard which would undoubted! y give rise to Gennan 
irritation. One can also assume that NKID employees on the 
74 A VPRF. f. 0116. op. 22, p. 122, d. 13, 11. 40-44, Volnukhin 
to Lowvskii, 12 July, 1940; ibid., 11. 45-49, Vo1nukhin to Loz-
ovskii, 26 July, 1940. 
75 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 22, p. 122, d. 13, ll. 50-52, Orlov and 
Androsov to Lozovskii, 3 Augus~ 1940. 
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level of Volnukbin or even Orlov were not well-infonned about 
the subtleties of Soviet policy and intentions towards Gennany. 
The Gennan attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 
meant that for the first time Svalbard's military-strategic 
potential became the subject of serious examination by the 
Allied military leaders.76 On the Soviet side, arguments of the 
kind which had been forcefully but vainly presented by the 
consulate in Barentsburg and by the Scandinavian Depanment 
finally managed to command the attention of the top political 
and military leadership. 
1n June and July 1941, i.e. immediately after the Gennans 
launched their attack, the Soviet government proposed to their 
British Allies a joint expedition to Spitsbergen, in order to 
establish an Allied military· presence on the archipelago. The 
Spitsbergen expedition was presented as part of a broader Soviet 
scheme to create a new theatre of war in the Higb Nonh, which 
would also include military operations on Norwegian terri-
tory.77 
The idea of an Allied expedition to Spitsbergen was first 
raised by Molotov himself on 15 July 1941 during a conver-
sation with Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in 
Moscow. The available evidence, which unfonunately is 
somewhat limited, suggests that the Soviet initiative did not 
grow out of a carefully executed strategic and operational 
analysis of Svalbard's strategic potential. 1n a telegram about the 
conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps to Ivan M. Maisky, the 
Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Molotov paraphrased himself as 
having told Cripps that 
76 The most thorough discussion of Svalbard in Allied strategy 
during the Second World War is in the two volumes of Olav 
Riste's "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3). 
77 For more derails, cf. ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 134-37; and Sven G. 
Holtsmark, Mellom "russerfrykt" og '"brobygging". Sovjetunionen 
i norsk utenrikspolitikk. 1940-45. p. 72 et passim. 
43 
it would be desirable if the English together with us took control 
over Spitsbergen, where at the moment there are 1500 Soviet 
workers, and also over Bear Island. This would be useful for 
Anglo-Soviet military operations in Northern Norway. It would also 
significantly facilitate air communications between the USSR, 
England and the USA. 
In a later telegram Molotov told Maisky that 
during the negotiations we discussed the possibility that the English 
take Spitsbergen with their own forces, as a convenient point for 
military action in Northern Norway." 
The version contained in Molotov's published minutes of ltis 
conversation with Cripps puts the emphasis on the defence of 
the lines of communication. In tltis version, Molotov told Cripps 
that the creation of naval and air bases on Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island "would secure the creation of reliable communications 
between the USSR and England and between the USSR and the 
USA" .79 I van Maisky underlined the same points when the 
Spitsbergen expedition in mid-August was discussed at a British-
Soviet-Norwegian meeting of diplomats and officers. Maisky 
wanted an assurance from the British that the lines of communi-
cation with the West would be kept open, otherwise, he said, 
"we will have to find another route". 80 
It is still too early to draw more than tentative conclusions 
about Soviet motives and long-term aims in tltis early phase of 
the war against Germany. However, the fact that the Soviets 
proposed a joint Allied expedition, and the evolution of the 
"A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, I. 39 (?), "Spravka 0 
Shpitsbergene i os trove Medvezhem (po materialam 10 Otdela)", 
i.e. extrncts from telegrams of July 1941. 
79 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechest-
vennoi voiny 1941-1945, Vol. I, Moscow, 1983, document No. 22. 
80 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. I, Skylstad's minute from the 
tripartite conference on 12 August 1941. 
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Soviet position during the discussions wltich took place in the 
summer of 1941, seem to support the view that the Soviet 
proposals did not primarily reflect long-term strategic plans 
wltich could be seen as expressing the annexationist elements of 
the 1939 and 1940 recommendations, or as preceding Molotov's 
initiative of November 1944. In fact, the Soviets quickly 
dropped the initial idea of sending Soviet troops to the arcltipe-
lago, proposing instead to supply weapons to the Soviet miners 
on Spitsbergen. At the beginning of the discussions, Anthony 
Eden told Lie that Maisky had authorised ltim to say that the 
Soviet government had "no territorial claims of any kind upon 
Norway, nor would they ever have them". 81 
Nothing emanated from tltis less ambitious idea, and in the 
autumn of 1941 the Soviets agreed to and took part in the 
evacuation of Norwegian and Russian. civilians from Spits-
bergen. 82 The Russians may have been convinced by British 
arguments that an Allied occupation of Svalbard would have 
limited or no relevance for the question of keeping open the 
lines of communication with Russia, and that the islands 
themselves, as a matter of fact, were of no great strategic 
importance. 83 For the remainder of the war the Soviets made 
no attempts to establish themselves on the arcltipelago. 
" Olav Riste, Svalbardkrisen 1944-1945, in Forsvars-
studier!Defence Studies 1981, Oslo, 1982, p. 32. 
82 Volnukhin's report about the evacuation is in the AVPRF, f. 
Oll6, op. 23a, p. 123a, d. I, ll. 1-12. Cf. also Martin Kitchen, 
British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World 
War, London, 1986, p. 87. 
83 Cf. the British position as discussed in Riste' s works quoted 
above. This view was stated clearly by the British participants at 
the meeting on 12 August 
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1942-1944: Svalbard again at the periphery 
Although the Geffilan occupation of Norway and the Soviet 
Union's entry into the war had brought Northern Norway, and 
even Svalbard, into focus, a number of factors tended to 
diminish the strategic and operational relevance of the archipe-
lago as the war continued. 
The Soviet Navy's expansion programme, launched in 1938, 
had not fundamentally changed the strictly shore-bound role of 
the Soviet Northern Fleet Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov was 
from 1939 Commissar of the Commissariat of the Navy (which 
had been independent since 1938), and Commander of the 
Soviet Navy during the war. He has recalled that as late as the 
summer of 1940 discussions about the role of the Northern Fleet 
focused on the defence of the coastline and the Kola inlet. 84 
When the Geffilans attacked the USSR in June 1941 the strength 
and capabilities of the Northern Fleet, which was commanded 
by Rear Admiral Arsenii G. Golovko, were strictly limited. 
Operating from bases in Muffilansk and Poliarnoe (and with 
summer bases at Arkhangelsk, Molotovsk and Belomorsk), it 
consisted according to one source of not more than eight 
destroyers, three torpedo boats, a somewhat larger number of 
motor torpedo boats, subchasers and icebreakers, and 27 
submarines. 85 Tills was hardly a fleet which could make any 
meaningful use of bases on distant Spitsbergen or Bear Island. 
During the war the Northern Fleet never operated as a unit 
under the direct command of the supreme naval authorities. It 
was regarded as a supporting leg of the Army, subordinate until 
late August 1941 to the Northern Front, and from then on 
84 
Mary Dau, Sovjetumonen og Danmark, 1944-1949, 
Copenhagen, 1969, p. 270, note 2. 
"Donald W. Mitchell, op. cit. (cf. note 14), p. 423. 
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operating under the command of the Karelian Front.~ It was 
not supposed to conduct operations on its own on the Htgh Se~. 
The fact that in the March 1940 cease-fire agreement With 
Finland the Soviets were so willing to evacuate the Soviet troops 
from Pechenga and return the area to Finland, can only be 
understood as reflecting a Soviet conviction that the High North 
would not become a vi tal theatre of operations for Soviet forces 
if the Soviet Union were to become involved in the ongoing 
great power war. . 
From June 1941, the Soviets concentrated on supplymg and 
developing the Affily and the Air Force, and most of the 
decisive battles were fought on the huge plains in the depth of 
the Russian and Ukrainian land mass. In tltis perspective 
Scandinavia and Norway were at the periphery, and not until the 
summer of 1944, when Soviet forces were already rapidly 
moving towards the Soviet western borders, did the So~i~t 
leaders turn their attention to the far northern flank. Stalin s 
ideas from December 1941 about Norway's position after the 
war as part of a British zone of influence suggest th~t ~s 
ambitions in Norway, and probably the rest of Scandmavta 
proper, were strictly limited. The basically defensive. Soviet 
approach to Scandinavia at tltis time was ~er ~derlm~d by 
his hint that he would like to see some kind of mternattonal 
guarantee that the outlets from the Baltic Sea would .be kept 
open." In January 1942, when President ~oos~velt ~ted to 
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington that it might be neces-
sary" and "just" for the Soviets to have an ice-free port in 
"Jacob W. Kipp, "The Second Arm and the Problem of Com-
bined Operations: The Russian-Soviet Experience, 1853-1945", in 
Philip S. Gilette and Willard C. Frank, Jr., eds., op. Cil. (cf. note 
53) p. 149. 
87 Mary Dau, op. cit. (cf. note 84), pp. 13-14. Molotov had 
brought up the matter of the Baltic Straits in his November 1940 
talks in Berlin. 
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Northern Norway, "maybe at a place like Narvik", which could 
be connected to Soviet tenitory by a "conidor", the Soviet 
answer was prompt and unambiguously negative. On 18 January 
Molotov instructed Ambassador Litvinov to tell Roosevelt that 
the Soviet government interpreted the President's suggestion to 
mean that the Soviet Union should "occupy" Narvik. Litvinov 
should further tell the American President: 
In connection with this the Soviet Government deems it necessary 
to inform the President that the Soviet Union does not have, and 
has never had, tenitorial demands of any kind on Norway, and that 
it therefore cannot accept the proposal to occupy Narvik with 
Soviet forces. 118 
The imminence of war in Europe in the summer of 1939, then 
the German occupation of Norway, and finally the German 
attack on the Soviet Union, had forced the Soviets for the first 
time to discuss Svalbard seriously within a military-strategic 
framework. However, it was ouly the prospect of peace and a 
radically altered postwar balance of power which produced the 
first and ouly serious Soviet attempt to draw the Svalbard 
archipelago into the Soviet Union's defence perimeter. Contrary 
to widespread opinion, the experiences of the Second World 
War had largely demonstrated the military-strategic irrelevance 
of Svalbard under the prevailing political and technological 
conditions. 89 Only the immensely increased international 
prestige and ambitions of the victorious USSR, and future 
"Sovetsko·anu:riktmskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Ote· 
chestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945: Dokumenty i materia/y, Vol. I, 
Moscow, 1984, documents Nos. 66, 67, 73. Cf. also Olav Riste, 
"An Idea and a Myth: Roosevelt's Free Pon Scheme for Norway", 
in Americana Norvegica W: Norwegian Contributions to American 
Studies, Oslo, 1973. 
" Cf., however, Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing 
Arctic, Oslo, 1954, pp. 44-45. 
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military, technological and political prospects, brought Svalbard 
for a time closer to the centre of Soviet global interests. 
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• I 
4. 1944-1945: Molotov stakes his 
claims on Svalbard 
Molotov's proposals for a fundamental change in the inter-
national status of the Svalbard archipelago, which he presented 
to Trygve Lie in the early hours of 12 November 1944, came as 
a bolt from the blue. Molotov's initiative, which appears to have 
been the result of a last-minute decision, reflected efforts by his 
subordinates in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and by the 
head of the Glavsevmorput to introduce a more "active" policy 
towards Norway. The MID bureaucrats linked the Svalbard 
question to a need to review the Soviet-Norwegian border and 
to establish a Soviet military presence in Northern Norway. 
Although military-strategic concerns were prominent in Molo-
tov's argnments and in internal MID documents, it appears that 
the initiative did not originate with the military authorities. It 
seems even likely that the General Staff was not informed about 
Molotov's dernarche. 
Having recovered from the initial shock, the Norwegian 
government attempted to define the terms of the ensuing 
negotiations, and presented its own counterproposals for a 
solution. By appearing forthcoming and full of understanding for 
Molotov's proposals, the Norwegians hoped to appease the 
Soviets and"avoid even harsher Soviet demands. The Norwegian 
strategy culminated on 9 April 1945, when Ambassador 
Aodvord sent to Molotov the draft for a Soviet-Norwegian 
declaration on Svalbard. The draft document declared inter alia 
that the defence of Svalbard should be the joint responsibility of 
Norway and the Soviet Union. 
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Molotov's demarche of 12 November 1944 
At noon on 18 October 1944, soldiers of the Red Army's 45th 
Division, !31st Infantry Corps of the 14th Army, crossed the 
Norwegian border at Grense Jacobselv, east of Kirkenes. One 
week later units from General Shcherbakov's 14th Army 
liberated Kirkenes as part of the Karelian Front's general 
offensive in the High North. The battle for Kirkenes was the last 
big battle of the Karelian Front's offensive, and the fighting 
subsided when the Soviet troops reached the river Tana. The 
Red Army established itself only in the north-easternmost part 
of the country, although there was no clear understanding among 
the Allies that the liberation of Norway should be the task of the 
western powers'" Nor did the agreements on jurisdiction and 
administration in liberated territories, which the Norwegian 
government concluded with the western Allies and the Soviet 
Union, define or limit the territory which might be liberated and 
administered on a preliminary basis by Norway's Allies?' 
A more than tentative evaluation of the motives behind the 
Soviet decision to cross the Norwegian border must await 
9
° For a brief discussion of general aspects of Northern Nor-
way's place in the wanime strategy of the great powers, see Olav 
Riste, "Nord-Norge i stormaktspolitikken, 1941-1945, in Forsvars-
studier. Arbok for F orsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, Oslo, 1987, 
pp. 40-58. Cf. the sanie author's more comprehensive discussion in 
his "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. 11, p. 157 et passim. In 
a memorandum from early May 1944 Christopher Warner in the 
British Foreign Office noted that "there is no agreement with the 
Russians as to Norway being an Anglo-American sphere of 
operations [ ... ]". Cf. Sven G. Holtsmark, op. cit (cf. note 77), p. 
106, note 8. 
91 The text of the agreements is printed in Riste, "London-
regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. 11, pp. 401-10. 
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additional Soviet archival materials.92 Soviet studies on the 
topic, and the memoirs of the Front commander Meretskov and 
other leaders of the operation, not surprisingly conclude that the 
crossing of the border on 18 October was dictated by operational 
necessity. Western analyses have tended to suppon this view, 
arguing that there are no signs that the crossing of the border 
was linked to any funber political designs with regard to 
Nonbem Norway." Stalin's suggestion to Churchill in October 
1944 that the Soviets and the British might cooperate in 
operations in Nonbem Norway (the British would presumably 
92 So far I have not been able to locate much material of direct 
relevance in the A VPRF. Most likely the archives of the General 
Staff and the Russian Ministry of Defence hold the answer to the 
questions about the political background to the Soviet liberation of 
Eastern Finnmark in October-November 1944. 
93 A number of authors have dealt with various military and 
political aspects of the "Petsamo-Kirkenes operation". The follo-
wing are just a few imponant works, but these also give references 
to further reading. The historian A.M. Noskov provides a fairly 
detailed picture of the planning of the operation in his Norvegiia vo 
Vtoroi mirovoivoine, Moscow, 1973. K.A. Meretskov discusses the 
operation in his memoirs and in various articles, for instance in 
''Voiska perekbodiat granitsu", in Cheres fiordy, Moscow, 1%4. 
Jarnes F. Gebhardt provides a piclllre of the military operations in 
his The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation: Soviet Breakthrough and 
Pursuit in the Arctic. October 1944, issued by the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College as No. 17, 1990, of the series 
Leavenworth Papers. Yehlel Rapopon summarised available Soviet 
and western literature in his study Soviet operations in North-
Norway in 1944-45: Plans and Motives, unpublished M.A. thesis 
from the Department of Russian Studies of the Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem, 1978. The fullest piclllre of the operations as seen by 
the Norwegian government-in-exile in London and by the western 
Allies is provided in Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa (cf. note 3), 
Vol. II. 
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provide naval suppon) has been seen as an additional sign that 
at this stage the Soviet leader did not intend to make all of 
Nonbem Norway an exclusive Soviet area of operations ... 
Trygve Lie, although aware of the possibility that Soviet 
troops might pursue the Germans into Norwegian territory, was 
informed about the presence of Soviet troops in Norway only on 
25 October.95 He was then already en route via Stockholm to 
Moscow where he hoped to finalise a set of agreements on 
Soviet-Norwegian military cooperation in the Nonb. In the 
following months, the presence of Soviet troops on Norwegian 
territory heavily influenced the Norwegian government's 
reactions to Molotov's initiative. Soviet documents imply that 
the fear among the Norwegians that the Soviet government 
might use their troops to ex en pressure on them was not entire! y 
unfounded. 
At 1 a.m. on 12 November 1944 Trygve Lie was asked to 
come to Molotov's office in the Kremlin. 96 After an exchange 
of remarks on various topics in world politics, Molotov said that 
"at the moment the Soviet government is more interested in 
another element of our mutual relations", i.e. the 1920 Paris 
Treaty on Svalbard. The Treaty had been negotiated "without 
and against the Soviet Union", and this "discriminating" 
situation was no longer tolerable. The Treaty, therefore, could 
not remain in force. Until 1920 Spitsbergen had been a no-
94 0lav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note3), Vol. II, pp. 229· 
230. Cf. also Nils Morten Udgaard, op. cit. (cf. note 3), pp. 62-63. 
"Trygve Lie, Hjemover, Oslo, 1958, p. 148. 
96 The following is based on the minute from the conversation 
in the Molotov files in the A VPRF, f. 06, op. 6, p. 41, d. 538, ll. 
12-19. See also Lie's own version in Trygve Lie, op.ci~ pp. 155-
173. Lie's and Andvord's notes from the conversations are in the 
archives of the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dossier 
36.6/10 A, Vol I. 
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man's-land, and Bear Island had been "practically" Russian 
tertitory. 
Molotov's arguments were economic and strategic. Prior to 
the war, coal from Spitsbergen had been of immense importance 
to Northern Russia. Apart from that, "the Soviet Uttion's only 
exit to the sea in the west passes Spitsbergen". The Soviet 
Uttion had an obvious interest in the archipelago, while some of 
the signatory powers, such as Italy and Japan, had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the area. 
Only two countries, Norway and the Soviet Union, have real 
interests in the waters of this area, and they should reach an 
agreement on this, and throw the Treaty into the wastepaper basket. 
Arguing that the Soviet government had been "forced" to agree 
to the Treaty in 1924, Molotov continued: 
The Soviet government will in due course raise before those 
interested the question of reviewing and abrogating the Treaty. But 
he [i.e. Molotov] would inform Lie in advance, so that the 
Norwegian government should be the first to know. This is because 
the Soviet government is of the opinion that this question concerns 
primarily two countries -Norway and the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
government want to reach an agreement with the Norwegian 
government. The role of other countries will be a passive one. 
Thus Molotov made it quite clear that the problem of Svalbard's 
international status should be solved primarily on a bilateral 
basis. The western Allies should be presented with a fait 
accompli, althougb their consent would be needed in order to 
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achieve the formal abrogation of the Treaty." Molotov then 
went on to present the Soviet proposals: 
[ ... ] the Soviet government proposes that the Spitsbergen Islands, 
which until 1920 were no-man' s-tand, should be administered after 
the abrogation of the Treaty jointly by the two countries as a 
condominium (v poriadke kondominiuma). Bear Island should 
belong to the Soviet Union, because since long before 1920 it had 
in practical terms been a Russian island. If Norway and the Soviet 
Union can solve this question on this fair basis, it would corre-
spond to both countries' security interests in the Nonh, as well as 
satisfy our countries' economic interests. It would also remove the 
discrimination against the Soviet Union, which was inherent in the 
ill-conceived (zlopoluchennaia) Treaty. 
On Lie's remark that it would be impossible to deal with this 
question without "our Allies", Molotov answered that he would 
not "hurt" (obidet) Great Britain (typically, he did not mention 
the Uttited States!), but that he was absolutely certain the Allies 
would not object if the Norwegian and Soviet governments 
agreed between themselves. 
At the end of the conversation, Lie said that he would have 
to discuss the matter with the other members of the Norwegian 
government. He would then give his instructions to the Norwe-
gian Ambassador in Moscow, Rolf Andvord. 
The Soviet minutes from the conversation with Lie and 
Andvord, written by Molotov's interpreter Pavlov and thereafter 
approved by Molotov himself, are close to the version which 
was presented by Lie and Andvord in their reports on the 
"It appears that Gromyko was instmcted on 16 November to 
inform Stettinius about the conversation, but that this instmction 
was recalled due to Molotov's intervention. AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 
28, p. 131, d. 28, 11. 1-2, handwritten comment on Zhdanova's 
"spravka" of 22 April 1946. For a partially diverging interpretation 
of Molotov's initiative, see Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. 
note 3), Vol. II, pp. 318-19. 
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conversation. and by Lie in his memoirs!' Parts of the Soviet 
and Norwegian minutes are almost identical; both the Soviet and 
Norwegian versions, for instance, include Molotov's statement 
that the Treaty deserved to be thrown "into the wastepaper 
basket". The only somewhat significant difference seems to be 
the absence in Molotov's minutes of the reference to the 
connection between the Soviet Union's situation in the North on 
the one band, and the problem of the Dardanelles on the other. 
According to Lie's colourful description in his memoirs Molotov 
said: 
We must reach an agreement, because as the siruation is now, the 
Soviet Union is locked in. He [i.e. Molotov] stood up and got a 
map, put his clenched fist on the Dardanelles and said: Here we are 
locked in. He moved his hand to Oresund: Here we are locked in. 
Only in the North is there an opening, but this war bas demon-
strated that the supply lines to North-Russia can be broken or 
hindered. This will not repeat itself in the future." 
Andvord's minute, which he set up immediately after the 
conversation, does not explicitly say that Molotov made the 
comparison to the Dardanelles or 6resund, although Molotov 
allegedly made the statement that the USSR "is locked in" ."JO 
Nor do Trygve Lie's supplementary comments to Andvord's 
minutes from late December 1944 contain references to the 
Black Sea and Baltic Straits. Lie, on the other hand, implies that 
Molotov hinted at the existence of American bases on Iceland 
and Greenland.101 
98 Trygve Lie, op. cit (cf. note 95), pp. 155-159. 
"Ibid., p. 159. 
""NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. I, Andvord's minutes from conversa-
tion on 12 November 1944. 
101 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. I, Lie's memorandum of29 Decem-
ber, 1944. 
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Although the strategic parallel is obvious -- in both cases it 
was for the Soviet Union a matter of securing the exit to the 
open seas -- the available Soviet documentation of Molotov's 
initiative does not contain explicit references to the issue of the 
Dardanelles. There was also a striking discrepancy between the 
tough Soviet policy towards Turtcey from the spring of 1945 
onwards and the lack of determination which characterised 
Soviet policy on Svalbard. This is not all that surprising: while 
there were severe and indisputable military-strategic implications 
for the Soviet Union regarding the question of who controlled 
the entrances to the Black Sea, the relevance of Svalbard in the 
matter of securing the waters of the High North was questio-
nable. A memorandum of October 1944, which will be discussed 
extensively below, draws a parallel with "the much more 
complicated question of the 'Danish' straits", but does not 
propose linking the two questions. 102 
The bureaucratic foundation of Molotov's initiative 
Although the Soviet documentary evidence is not conclusive, it 
appears that the decision to raise the Svalbard question was 
made shortly before the conversation took place. The general 
circumstances of the conversation -- Lie was called to Molotov 
in the middle of the night, a few hours before he was scheduled 
to leave for Stockholm -- suggest that this was a last-minute 
decision. When Stalin was presented with the plan for Lie's visit 
in the early days of November, he was informed for instance 
that the NKID planned to discuss with Lie some minor problems 
of cooperation between Soviet and Norwegian authorities in the 
102 AVPRF, f. 116, op. 28, p. 20, d. 5, 11. 1-18, Zhdanova's 
"Kratkaia spravka. ... " of 27 October, 1944. 
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parts of Finnmarlc county which were being liberated by the Red 
Army. But Svalbard was not mentioned. 103 
Molotov's initiative, on the other hand, should be seen 
against the background of ideas under consideration in the 
NKID apparatus and in other government offices. 
In a letter dated 11 November 1944, the head of the Glav-
sevmorput (the Northern Sea Route Directorate), Rear Admiral 
Ivan D. Papanin, reminded Molotov of the economic and 
scientific importance of Spitsbergen prior to the war. Papanin 
concluded: 
I strongly urge you, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, to secure Spitsbergen 
Island for the Soviet Union (ostavit o. Shpitsbergen za Sovetskim 
Soiuzom) during the talks with Norway, as a base for scientific 
activity in the exlreme points (v laainikb tochkakh) of the western 
sector of the Arctic and in order to exploit the [natural resources 
on the island], which are of great economic importance to the 
USSR.104 
Thus, Papanin 's reasons were economic and scientific. Strategic 
considerations were apparently absent from his mind. It seems 
likely that Molotov read Papanin's letter only after his meeting 
with Trygve Lie on 12 November. It is quite possible, on the 
other hand, that Papanin had raised the topic with Molotov or 
people in the NKID apparatus before he wrote his letter. 
Glavsevmorput was much more than an organisation in 
charge of the Northern Sea Route: it was in fact involved in all 
kinds of economic and scientific undertakings in the Arctic 
regions. Ivan Papanin, who directed the organisation from 1939 
to 1946, was one of the foremost leaders in Soviet Arctic 
development. 
103 AVPRF, f. 012, op. 5, p. 64, d. 152, ll. 5-7, "Tovarishchu 
Stalinu I. V.". 
104 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, I. 53, Papanin to 
Molotov, 11 November, 1944. 
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Molotov read the letter, and forwarded it to his deputy 
Dekanozov without any written comments. Dekanozov, who was 
present at Molotov's meeting with Lie together with Molotov's 
interpreter Pavlov, sigoed his own memorandum on Svalbard on 
11 November. Io all likelihood this document constituted 
Molotov's main background support during the discussion with 
the Norwegian Foreigo Minister. 
As usual in NKID background briefings, a lengthy historical 
argument formed the major part of Dekanozov's memorandum. 
Dekanozov emphasised Russia's strong historical links with 
Spitsbergen. Bear Island, according to Dekanozov, had "from the 
earliest times been regarded as Russian territory". Prior to the 
First World War Russia had supported the principle that the 
Spitsbergen archipelago (i.e. except Bear Island) was terra 
nullius, and the Soviet government had therefore from 1920 to 
1923 repeatedly protested against the Paris Treaty of 1920. 
Dekanozov also indicated the economic importance of the high-
quality Spitsbergen coal for Russia's northern regions and Soviet 
shipping in the North. 
Taking into consideration the Soviet Union's economic 
interests on Spitsbergen, and "Bear Island's extreme (iskliu-
chitelnoe) strategic importance both for the security of the 
Soviet mines on Spitsbergen, and in order to safeguard Soviet 
communications in the North", Dekanozov presented a number 
of recommendations. The Soviet government should reestablish 
its legal rights on Spitsbergen as soon as possible. 
At the same time one should reach an agreement with the Norwe· 
gian government that the Soviet Union should have the right, if it 
deems it necessary. to organise one or more naval and air bases 
[ ... ] on the main Spitsbergen archipelago [ ... ]. 
It would also be necessary to agree on 
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the building of a naval base on Bear Island in order to defend our 
rights on Spitsbergen and to safeguard the movements of Soviet 
ships of the Northern Fleet"" 
Dekanozov also proposed to reopen the Soviet consulate as soon 
as possible. This last recommendation indicates that Dekanozov 
still thought in terms of Spitsbergen as Norwegian territory.'06 
Finally, a senior staff member in the 5th European Depart-
ment, Tatiana Zhdanova, concluded at the end of October a 
lengthy treaty "On the question of the Russian-Norwegian 
border" .101 This memorandum, even more than the one written 
by Dekanozov, is fundamentally an example of "applied 
history". Starting with Aleksandr Nevskii, lhe great Novgorod 
ruler in the 131h century who won battles against lhe Swedes 
and the Germans, Zhdanova organised her materials in order to 
prove !hat lhe present Soviet-Norwegian (i.e. until October 1944 
the Soviet-Finnish) border was the result of complex historical 
circumstances and not entirely satisfactory to lhe Soviet Union. 
She discussed in detail the Treaty between Russia and Sweden-
Norway of 1826 which forms the basis of the present border, 
and quoted the Czar's Minister for War, who in the year 1900 
stated that Russia's border with Norway in the Norlh "was 
artificially drawn not to our benefit", and lhat !here was "a 
natural wish on our part to correct this part of our border". 
In her concluding remarks, Zhdanova linked the Svalbard 
question to lhe Soviet Union's interests in norlhem Scandinavia: 
"'Most likely he had in mind both the merchant fleet and the 
Navy. 
'"'A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, Il. 40-48, "Po voprosu o 
Shpitsbergene i Medvezhem oslrove". 
"" A VPRF, f. 116, op. 28, p. 20, d. 5, Il. 1-18, "Kratkaia 
spravka k voprosu o russko-norvezhskoi granitse", signed by 
Zhdanova on 27 October, 1944. 
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Of course, the question of our exit to the Atlantic Ocean and the 
entrance to us from the Atlantic includes the Spitsbergen question 
[Zhdanova's underlining], together with the much more compli-
cated problem of the "Danish" straits. The first of these, i.e. the 
Spitsbergen question, is historically and, what is much more 
important, practically linked with the Lapland question. One can 
say that Spitsbergen constitutes one side of the channel which 
connects the Atlantic Ocean with our arctic regions. This channel 
used to be a very broad one, but it has to a significant degree been 
"squeezed" by the evolution of aviation. In this way, the question 
of reviewing our border with Norway is closely lioked with the 
review leading to a decision on the Spitsbergen question. 
The fact that Petsamo (Pechenga) was returned to the Soviet 
Union from Finland, did not, in Zhdanova's opinion, solve the 
problem of the "channel" to the Atlantic. Thus Zhdanova argued 
along the lines which had been introduced by the Soviet Consul 
in Barentsburg in 1939 and 1940, but introduced the develop-
ment of modem aviation as an additional reason to alter the 
status quo in the High North. 
Zhdanova was aware, however, lhat raising lhe Soviet-
Norwegian border problem would adversely influence the 
discussions in progress wilh the Allies over, inter alia, Poland 
and the Balkans. It would also "automatically" lead to a 
resurgence of the idea of "Norlhem Unity", i.e. "the creation in 
one form or another of a bloc directed against us, which would 
be practically led by England". 
Zhdanova concluded: 
Taking into account the foreign policy benefit which the Red 
Anny's participation in the liberation of Northern Norway has 
brought us, it would be appropriate to exploit the Norwegians' need 
for a counterweight, through friendship with the USSR, to the 
English attempts to achieve a "portugalisation" of Norway. In the 
course of the war England has gained almost complete conlrol over 
Norway. i.e. it appears that it would not be difficult for us to reach 
an agreement with the Norwegians on joint [sic] cooperation on the 
defence of Northern Norway; on the building of naval and air 
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bases, necessary railways etc. Otherwise the English will do this. 
The creation of this kind of close postwar Soviet-Norwegian coope-
ration, which would ensure for the Soviet Union appropriate 
permanent influence in Norway, would leave the possibility of 
raising the problem of a correction to the Soviet-Norwegian border 
at a more suitable moment. 
The most astonishing part of Zhdanova' s proposal is her 
assumption that it would be easy to reach an agreement with the 
Norwegian government on the joint defence of Northern 
Norway. This was certainly a basic misinterpretation of Norwe-
gian attitudes. Although members of the Norwegian government 
and other influential people were extremely careful about airing 
their anxiety over Soviet expansionism in the North, their 
propagation of the idea of "bridge building" was balanced by a 
solid dose of traditional "russophobia", reinforced to a certain 
degree by the Soviet military presence in Finnmarlc Trygve Lie 
was basically distrustful of Soviet long-term intentions, despite 
the Soviets' high opinion of him which reflected his pragmatic 
understanding of the need to accommodate Soviet interests.'"' 
Even cautious hints along the lines proposed by Zhdanova 
would certainly have alarmed the Norwegians, and immediately 
led to a reevaluation of the Norwegian foreign and security 
policy doctrine. 
Zhdanova was not alone in arguing that Soviet participation 
in the liberation of Northern Norway should not only serve the 
common goal of victory over Germany. Mikhail S. Vetrov, the 
dynamic functioning head of the 5th European Department, i.e. 
Zhdanova's immediate superior, argued against the participation 
of Norwegian "police troops" from Sweden in the liberation of 
Norwegian territory. Such participation, according to Vetrov, 
""The intetaction among Norwegian governing circles between 
the ideology of "bridge building" and the ingrained "russophobia" 
is one of the central theses of my earlier quoted work, M ellom 
"russerfrykt" og "brobygging" (cf. note 77). 
62 
would give these troops an opportunity "to repress possible 
revolutionary [and anti-government] sentiments in the Norwe-
gian population". 109 On the other hand Vetrov did support the 
idea of transferring Norwegian troops from Britain to the Soviet 
Union, on the precondition that these troops should come under 
Soviet operational control, and also be trained and "educated" by 
the Soviets. The presence of such Soviet-controlled Norwegian 
military formations on Norwegian territory "might prove to be 
of positive value to us" .110 
Zhdanova's highly optimistic, from the Soviet point of view, 
interpretation of Norwegian attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
was reflected in the Soviet evaluations of the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister, Trygve Lie. At this point, and for some years after he 
became Secretary General of the United Nations, Lie was one of 
the Soviets' favourite politicians in the West. In a briefing paper 
prepared for his visit in November 1944, Lie was praised for his 
staunch opposition to the idea of Nordic cooperation, and for his 
positive attitude towards the Soviet Union. According to this 
paper, Lie understood that close relations with the Soviet Union 
were the only way Norway could avoid being completely 
politically and economically dominated by Britain. 111 
One can conclude, therefore, that Molotov's initiative was set 
in the context of attempts by his subordinates and other inte-
rested authorities to introduce an ambitious scheme of close 
'"' It is interesting to note that A.M. Noskov has a similar 
argument in his book on Norway in the Second World War. Cf. 
Noskov, op. cit. (cf. note 93), p. 160. Noskov implies that the 
police troops from Sweden were planned to be sent to the areas 
liberated by the Red Army in order to prevent any anti-govern-
mental movements among the population. 
110 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 26, p. 126, d. 10, 11. 42-44, Vetrov to 
Dekanozov, 18 October, 1944. 
111 A VPRF, f. 012, op. 5, p. 64, d. 152, 11. 3-4, "Kratkaia 
spravka". 
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Soviet-Norwegian cooperation, including the joint defence of 
parts of Northern Norway and Svalbard. Apart from the outsider 
Admiral Papanin, this activist lobby included Mikhail S. Vetrov, 
functioning head of the 5th European Department, and Tatiana 
Zhdanova, responsible referent for Norwegian affairs. Of even 
greater significance at this point, however, was the participation 
of Vladimir Dekanowv, one of Molotov's deputies who was in 
charge of Norwegian affairs at this time. 112 
Molotov, nevertheless, was apparent! y no more prepared to 
discuss the details of the matter than Lie. Both Lie and Andvord 
argued that Molotov gave the impression of being poorly 
prepared to discuss the matter. Apparently unable to understand 
his predecessors' motivations, he asked his subordinates 
immediately after the meeting with Lie to find "all documents" 
which could explain why the Soviet Union had decided in 1935 
to sign the Paris Treaty; "the result [of the inquiry] to be 
reported to me" .113 
Norway searches for a solution 
Rolf Andvord's first advice to the Norwegian government was 
to attempt to make the Soviets accept a multinationalisation of 
the issue. In his analysis of the probable reasons for Molotov's 
initiative, Andvord stressed the strategic factor, arguing (like 
Zhdanova) that modem aviation had radically enhanced the 
strategic significance of the Svalbard archipelago for the defence 
of the Soviet Union's maritime activity in the North. Andvord 
warned against leaving Molotov's initiative without an accom-
modating and prompt response: this could lead to even more far-
112 Dekanowv was closely connected to the security appararus, 
and had been Soviet Ambassador to Gennany on the eve of the 
Soviet-German war. 
113 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, I. 48. 
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reaching Soviet demands. Andvord also stressed the paramount 
importance of having friendly relations with tbe USSR, and a 
negative Norwegian response or further Soviet demands would 
certainly undermine the relationship. Andvord proposed, 
therefore, that the Norwegian government should declare that a 
f"mal solution could only be reached after the conclusion of the 
war, when the government was back in Norway. This solution, 
however, should be the result of international rather than 
bilateral negotiations. The issue could, for instance, be referred 
to the forthcoming general peace conference. Andvord hinted 
that the Norwegian government would have to accept some 
version of the Soviet proposals, but that Norway should be 
given compensation in the form of equivalent territories and 
hunting opportunities. 114 
After Lie's return to London, a special group was appointed 
to formulate the Norwegian government's response to Molotov's 
initiative. 115 Amold Rrestad, a specialist on international law 
and an advisor to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, agreed to the 
Soviet view that the war had demonstrated that the Treaty's 
Article 9 (that Svalbard should not be used "for warlike 
purposes") could not be upheld. Rrestad further suggested that 
a defence arrangement for Svalbard could be linked to the kind 
of regional security systems under international (Security 
Council) control which had been discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, 
although he was far from clear about what Svalbard's status 
would be within the system. 116 It is important to note that 
Rrestad and Andvord agreed on the need to revise Article 9, i.e. 
114 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Andvord's P.M. of 21 November, 1944, 
with additions of 26 November. 
115 Cf. Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. II, for a 
more detailed discussion of the deliberations of the Norwegian 
government 
"'NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Ra:stad's memorandum of 5 December, 
1944. 
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they were from the outset inclined to accept the military-
strategic rationale of the Soviet proposal. Andvord in particular, 
but also Rrestad, was prepared to accept the legitimacy of the 
Soviet demand for the inclusion of the Svalbard archipelago, in 
one way or another, into the postwar Soviet defence system. 
They both rejected the alternative of leaving the Soviet de-
marche without a response or of refusing to enter into dis-
cussions with the Soviet government. 
The special working group met on the weekend of 9-ll 
December to formulate a Norwegian response. The results of 
their deliberations were sent to Andvord on 12 December, in the 
form of a detailed expost! which he should present orally to 
MolotovY' 
Acting on these instructions, Andvord was received by 
Molotov on 29 December and presented the Norwegian 
response. Andvord appeared forthcoming and cooperative: he 
stressed at the outset that the Norwegian government understood 
that the Soviet Union had "special interests" on Svalbard. 
Andvord further told Molotov that his government agreed that 
events during the war had shown that the neutralisation of 
Svalbard did not satisfy the interests of "the two primarily 
interested powers", Norway and the Soviet Union, and that the 
other signatory powers would supposedly agree to a cancellation 
of Article 9 (the demilitarisation clause) of the Treaty. This 
would clear the way for the use of the archipelago for military 
pm]Xlses, within the framework of "a global or regional system". 
Emphasizing that any agreement on Svalbard would need the 
consent of the Norwegian Storting, Andvord concluded: 
The Norwegian government is ready to discuss with the Soviet 
government the possibility of concluding an agreement between 
Norway and the Soviet Union on military utilisation of the 
117 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, draft of telegram to Andvord, j.nr. 
27819/44. 
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Spitsbergen Islands, including Bear Island, taking into account the 
security interests of the Soviet Union. 
However, any such agreement would come into force only if the 
other interested powers declared their consent to an abrogation 
or reformulation of Article 9. In order to achieve this, the 
Norwegian government would be willing to make with the 
Soviet Union a joint appeal to the other powers as soon as the 
Soviet and Norwegian governments had reached an agreement. 
Molotov's response was noncommittal. Repeating his 
historical arguments from the previous conversation, he empha-
sised even more ftrmly the strategic importance of Spitsbergen 
with regard to the Soviet Union's lines of communication in the 
northern waters. He also made a short reference to the fact that 
German soldiers had attacked the Soviet Union from Norwegian 
territory. He did not, however, suggest that Northern Norway 
should be included in the discussions. 
Molotov stressed that the Soviet government was not 
interested in a solution "based on the Paris agreement". He 
reiterated the main Soviet demands: joint control of the Spits-
bergen islands and the trartsfer of Bear Island to the Soviet 
Union.118 
Molotov's cold reaction to Andvord's declaration prompted 
the Norwegians to take one more step towards accommodating 
the Soviet demands. Andvord was instructed to say that the 
Norwegian government would be willing to discuss a revision 
of the entire Treaty after Norway and the Soviet Union had 
reached an understanding on a defence arrangement. Thus the 
Norwegians suggested a two-step approach: first the Soviet and 
Norwegian governrnents should agree on a defence arrangement, 
"' AVPRF, f. 06, op. 6, p. 41, d. 536, 11. 12-16, minutes from 
Molotov's conversation with Andvord on 29 December, 1944. 
Andvord's statement as recorded in Molotov's minutes was in 
accordance with the instructions he had received from London. 
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and thereafter they should notify the signatories of their desire 
to revise the entire Treaty. The renegotiated treaty would 
incorporate the Soviet-Norwegian understanding on the defence 
of the archipelago.119 
The next meeting between Molotov and Andvord took place 
on 25 January 1945, apparently on Andvord's initiative. The 
Norwegian Ambassador continued to underline that the Norwe-
gian parliament, after the liberation of Norway, would have the 
fmal word on any change in the status of Svalbard, and that a 
Norwegian-Soviet agreement on cancellation of or a change in 
the Paris Treaty would need the consent of the other interested 
powers. Andvord continued to talk about the need to reach an 
agreement on "safeguarding the security needs of both coun-
tries", which should then be presented to the other interested 
powers for approval. Did this mean, Molotov asked, that 
the Norwegian government proposes to start negotiations about 
joint defence of Spitsbergen and Bear Island [but that prior to] the 
signing of the agreement [ ... ] one would have to consult the 
interested powers [ ... ]? 
Andvord confirmed that this was a correct interpretation of the 
Norwegian government's point of view. He made it clear, 
however, that the Norwegian government would find it difficult 
to agree to bring into the negotiations the idea of a "condo-
minium", i.e. joint Soviet-Norwegian administration and sovereignty.'"' 
Andvord's report to London about the conversation departs 
sigrtificantly from the Soviet version. According to Andvord, 
119 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, instruction to Andvord approved by the 
government on 10 January, sentto Moscow on the same or one of 
the following days, without date or journal number. Cf. also Ame 
Ording's memorandum of 20 January, and a telegram to the 
embassy in Moscow of the same day. 
120 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 38, d. 573, 11. 2-6, minutes from 
Molotov's conversation with Andvord on 25 January, 1945. 
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what he did was basically to confirm the Norwegian proposal of 
29 December. According to Andvord, Molotov understood that 
the Norwegian government was willing to discuss "a security 
arrangement". Thus Andvord's report did not mention that the 
idea of "joint Soviet-Norwegian defence" of Svalbard had been 
brought into the discussions, and that Molotov had been given 
reason to believe that the Norwegian government supported this 
approach. 121 
On 29 January Andvord was asked to come to Molotov's 
office, where Molotov read to the Norwegian Ambassador a 
prepared statement. Referring to Andvord's "proposals" of 25 
January, the statement opened by reiterating the now well-
known Soviet arguments about the bias of the Paris Treaty and 
the strategic and economic importance to the Soviet Union of 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island. The statement concluded:122 
The Government of the U.S.S.R. have studied with great attention 
the Norwegian statement conveyed to the People's Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, M.V.M. Molotov, on the 25th January this year by 
M. Andvord, to the effect that: 
I. The Norwegian government propose to negotiate on joint 
military defence123 of the Islands of Spitsbergen and Bear Island, 
and. [sic] 
m NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Andvord to NMFA, 25 January 1925 
(received in London in March?); Andvord to NMFA, 29 January 
1945. 
122 In the following I quote from a version in the English 
langnage which is printed in Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. 
note 3), Vol. II, pp. 417-18. 
123 A more precise translation of the Russian phrase in Molo-
tov's statement would be "propose to agree on joint military 
defence". Cf. AVPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 38, d. 573,11. 11-16, minutes 
from conversation with Andvord on 29 January, 1945. 
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2. The Norwegian Government propose to consult the Allied 
Governments concerned about proposals worked out by the two 
Governments. 
The Government of the USSR announce their agreement to the 
proposals submined by the Norwegian Government and wish to 
propose on the basis mentioned above that negotiations should at 
the same time be carried out concerning the exploitation by the 
USSR and Norway of the coal and other resources on Spitsbergen, 
as well as concerning the necessity of abrogating the Treaty of the 
9th February, 1920. 
When Andvord said that the expression "joint military defence" 
had not been used in the instruction he had received from the 
Norwegian government124 , Molotov quoted Andvord's own 
statement from 25 January. Andvord then agreed that this did 
not deviate from what he had actoally said. Andvord also told 
Molotov that he thought that the Norwegian government was 
thinking in terms of a Norwegian-Soviet military arrangement, 
without third country participation, but that he must consult his 
government about this. 
Molotov told Andvord that the Soviet government still 
supported the idea of a "condomirtium", but that for the time 
being it would be satisfied if the two countries could agree on 
the need to cancel the Treaty without raising the question of a 
"condominium" or the kind of arrangement that should replace 
the present regime. Andvord told Molotov that he would do his 
best to convince the Norwegian government of the need to 
accept the Soviet proposals. The Norwegian Ambassador also 
said that he felt that his government would not object to a 
cancellation of the Treaty as such, but that one should bear in 
mind the need to consult other interested powers. 
Andvord made it clear, however, that the Norwegian 
government did not want to raise the issue of cancelling the 
""i.e. the instructions he had received prior to his meeting with 
Molotov on 25 January. 
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Treaty while negotiating a joint defence arrangement with the 
Soviets. In that case the Norwegian government "would have to 
approach the interested powers. This was exactly what the 
Norwegian government wanted to avoid".125 This was in line 
with the Norwegian government's strategy of reaching an 
agreement with the Soviets on the defence of the archipelago 
before the signatories were notified about the USSR's and 
Norway's desire to abrogate the Treaty. 
As was the case after the 25 January meeting, Andvord's 
reports to London about the conversation were not entire! y 
accurate. The first telegraphic report, which was written and sent 
immediately after the meeting, did not quote the essence of 
Molotov's statement. According to that message, the Soviets 
accepted "our proposition about a security arrangement followed 
by an approach to certain Allied powers" .126 The written 
report, which Andvord brought with him when he came to 
London in late February, quoted Molotov's statement in full. In 
that version, Andvord objected to the inclusion of the expression 
"joint military defence", although he agreed that this might have 
been what the Norwegian government actually had in mind. 
Andvord did not, however, make it clear in his report that the 
idea was in fact his own, and that he had accepted Molotov's 
version of what had been said on 25 January. 127 
The report about his conversation with Molotov which 
Andvord brought with him to London spawned hectic activity 
in the Norwegian foreign policy apparatus. The result of these 
deliberations was a set of instructions, agreed by the Norwegian 
government, which were then sent to Andvord. Acting on these 
instructions, Andvord was received by Molotov on 31 March, 
125 Cf. note 123. 
126 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Andvord to NMFA, 30 January 1945, 
j.nr. 2791/45. 
1Z7NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Andvord's minutes from the conversation, 
dated January 29, 1945. 
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and presented an oral statement which had been prepared in 
London. In this statement the Norwegian government accepted 
the Soviet proposition of 29 January as the basis for further 
talks. The oral statement contained a number of "observations" 
concerning the organisation of the joint Norwegian-Soviet 
defence of Spitsbergen and Bear Island, the exploitation of coal 
mines, and procedures for the future abrogation of the 1920 
Treaty .128 Andvord also suggested that the two parties could 
sign a declaration based on what had been agreed and on 
Andvord's statement including the "observations". 
Molotov expressed his satisfaction with the Norwegian 
message, which could serve as a basis for further negotiations. 
He promised to scrutinise Andvord's statement and give an 
answer. 
Trygve Lie, however, had instructed the Ambassador to 
"keep the initiative" ,129 and on 4 April Andvord received 
telegraphic instructions to deliver to the Soviets the Norwegian 
government's proposal for a joint declaration. On 9 April 
Andvord sent the document to Molotov. In a letter accom-
panying the declaration, the Norwegian Ambassador emphasised 
that Trygve Lie would leave London for San Francisco on April 
15, and that he hoped the declaration could be signed before 
then. 1"' The decision not to await the formal Soviet reaction 
to Andvord's statement and "observations" of 31 March 
reflected the Norwegians' intention of not letting the Soviets 
1
"' For an English version of Andvord's statement, see Riste, 
"London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. !I, pp. 417-18. 
1
"' This was underlined in the insbUclions Andvord received 
before he left London for Moscow in mid-March. NMFA, 36.6/10 
A, Vol. I, Skylstad to Andvord, 16 March, 1945. 
130 An English version of the proposed declaration is printed in 
Riste, ''London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. !I, p. 419. The 
following quotes are according to this version. Andvord's accom-
panying note is in A VPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 42, d. 687, 1.1. 
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dictate the terms of an agreement Andvord was of the opinion 
that a joint declaration along the lines of the 31 March statement 
was "the absolute minimum" of what the Soviet government 
would accept.131 
Because the Norwegian proposal of 9 April 1945 formed the 
basis for the future discussions, it is necessary to present its 
content in some detail. 
In the document's preamble it was declared that Norway and 
the Soviet Union had agreed that the neutralisation of the 
Svalbard archipelago was "impractical" and "in direct conflict 
with the interests of the two countries". It was further stated that 
the two countries wanted to make 
an arrangement with regard to the use of the Archipelago for 
military pwposes which may serve both to promote the security of 
the two countries and to be a regional link integrated in an 
international security organisation. 
The agreement should be made pending consultations with the 
governments of France, Britain, the United States, Canada, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, and it should be "subject to the 
approval of a final arrangement by the Norwegian Starting". 
The Declaration's Article 1 stated that the "defence of the 
Archipelago of Svalbard is the joint responsibility of Norway 
and the Soviet Union". 
According to Article 2, the defence measures should be 
in accordance with arrangements which may be made by an 
international security organisation of which both parties are 
members. 
131 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. !I, Andvord to Lie, 3 April, 1945. 
It appears that Lie received this letter only post factum, i.e. after 9 
April. 
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Article 3 declared that all permanent installations should be 
situated on land "belonging to or which will be expropriated by 
the Norwegian Government". 
According to Article 4, the two parties should "observe the 
principle of equality on all points" with regard to their relations 
in military affairs. 
Article 5 stated that the two parties 
will make agreements on the nature, extent and equipment of 
the permanent installations and on the composition of the 
forces which are to man them, on the question of command, 
on war establishment etc. 
Article 6 stated that the distribution of the costs should be 
agreed. 
Article 7 declared that 
the fact that defence is undertaken in the particular interest of either 
Norway or the Soviet Union, will not in itself imply that the other 
party is to be considered a belligerent. 
Finally, the 8th and last Article stated that the abrogation of the 
1920 Treaty, "concerning which negotiations will later take 
place", would eventually take place in accordance with the rules 
of international law. States which had fought against the Soviet 
Union, Norway or their Allies, should not be consulted. 
Thus, the Norwegian government declared its readiness to 
make an agreement on the joint Soviet-Norwegian defence of 
Svalbard, although the idea of joint possession, "condominium", 
was rejected. 
Although the Norwegians received no response to their 
proposal, 132 the draft declaration was scrutinised by the group 
132 On the same that Andvord sent the note with the declaration, 
Velmv sent Vyshinskii his drafts for a joint declaration and an 
answer to the Norwegian declaration of 31 March. I have not been 
able to locate these documents (I hope to.fmd them in the Vyshin-
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of MID personnel which dealt with Norwegian affairs. On 16 
April Vetrov and Bazarov forwarded to Deputy Commissars 
Vyshinskii and Dekanozov their comments on the Norwegian 
text. Vetrov and Bazarov argued that the declaration should 
contain a statement to the effect that the Paris Treaty could no 
longer be considered valid, and that Norway and the Soviet 
Union should declare the Treaty abrogated. They objected to the 
expression "for military purposes" in the preamble, and proposed 
to insert a statement that "the promotion of security in the area 
of the Spitsbergen archipelago is the common task of Norway 
and the Soviet Union". They wanted to delete the paragraph in 
the preamble about the agreement being made pending consul-
tations with the signatories, and to replace it with a statement 
that the Allied signatory powers had been informed about the 
Norwegian-Sovietdeclaration. Articles 2 and 3 should preferably 
be omitted, "in so far as it has been decided, that the Declaration 
should not mention the question of who will have the right of 
sovereignty over Spitsbergen". 
Bazarov and Vetrov proposed the exclusion of the last two 
Articles, because the declaration itself would have the effect of 
declaring the Treaty invalid. There is a certain logic in this 
argument with regard to Article 8, which stipulated future 
multilateral negotiations about the abrogation of the Treaty. The 
exclusion of Article 7, however, could not reasonably be 
justified by reference to the abrogation of the Treaty. It seems 
likely that what Vetrov and Bazarov had in mind was the need 
to keep open the question of the Archipelago's international 
status, cf. their comments on Articles 2 and 3. Finally, they 
proposed to add a paragraph about the exploitation of coal on 
Spitsbergen, "which in the future should be carried out by 
skii file). 
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Norwegian and Soviet owners on the basis of absolute equa-
lity" _133 
The Norwegian draft declaration of 9 April 1945 marked the 
culmination of the Norwegian government's efforts to "keep the 
initiative" and accommodate the Soviet demands on Svalbard. 
From April 1945 until Molotov raised the matter again in the 
summer of 1946, the Russians made no serious efforts to finalise 
a Soviet-Norwegian agreement on Svalbard. This did not mean, 
however, that the Soviet foreign policy establishment ceased to 
take an interest in the matter. It only meant that Molotov felt 
that the Norwegian response had been fundamentally satisfac-
tory, and that the Norwegian government had gone a long way 
towards committing itself to a far-reaching accommodation of 
Soviet interests on the arcltipelago. In this situation, there was 
no need to complicate the more important questions related to 
the peace settlement in Central and Southern Europe by bringing 
Soviet ambitions on Svalbard to the formal attention of the 
western great powers. After 9 April, therefore, the Soviets were 
in no hurry to finalise the talks with the Norwegians. The 
Norwegian government had agreed to the most important Soviet 
demand, i.e. a Soviet military presence on the islands. 
133 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, 11. 1-4, Vetrov and 
Bazarov to Vyshinskii and Dekanozov, 16 April, 1945; and 
Vetrov's draft declaration of the same date. 
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5. 1945-1947: Foreshadows 
of the Cold War 
From April 1945 to the summer of 1946 there were no Soviet-
Norwegian talks on Svalbard. When the Soviets returned to the 
matter in August and November 1946, they were prepared to 
accept the basic principles of the Norwegian draft declaration of 
9 April 1945. In early 1947 the Soviets were on the point of 
beginning formal negotiations with the Norwegian government 
based on that document. However, the extensive speculation in 
the international press about Soviet intentions towards Svalbard 
wltich followed an inspired article in The Times on 10 January, 
and finally the Norwegian Starting's decision of 15 February not 
to accept further negotiations on the basis of the April 1945 
draft declaration, forced the Soviets to postpone a final settle-
ment of the matter. 
The same Commissariat bureaucrats who had presented part 
of the original rationale for Molotov's initiative in November 
1944, continued throughout 1945 and 1946 to encourage the 
foreign policy leadersltip to conduct a more offensive policy 
towards Norway. Apart from encouraging the decision-makers 
to seek a solution to the Svalbard question, they continued to 
argue the need for the establishment of Soviet military bases in 
Northern Norway, and for changes to the Soviet-Norwegian 
border. Their efforts were endorsed by the General Staff, but 
were ultimately rejected by Molotov. Soviet policy towards 
Norway became ever more caught up in lhe evolution of East-
West relations, and the Soviets gradually realised that their room 
for manoeuvre was strictly limited. 
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Summer 1945: Soviet bureaucrats on the offensive 
Andvord had delivered his note on 9 April 1945. From 25 April 
to I 0 May Molotov participated in the negotiations in San 
Francisco. In the ensuing months international conferences and 
pressing global issues apparently removed the Svalbard question 
and Norwegian affairs in general from the Soviet decision-
makers' main agenda. Molotov was compelled to leave the 
Svalbard question to his subordinates. It is not clear whether 
Molotov mentioned the issue when he met Trygve Lie in San 
Francisco. Although there is no trace of this in the minutes of 
his talk with Lie on 7 May/34 a document from the British 
Foreign Office implies that Lie asked for Molotov's opinion of 
the draft declaration. In this version, Molotov answered that he 
would return to the matter when he went back to Moscow. 135 
Although strategic considerations were prominent in the 
Soviet efforts to get a revision of the Svalbard Treaty, there are 
few indications in the documents from the Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs of any cooperation between Molotov and his 
subordinates, and the General Staff or other military bodies. The 
military authorities were apparently much more interested in 
arrangements which would give them a permanent foothold on 
the mainland of Norway. In a letter to Dekanozov of 24 January 
1945, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Aleksei I. 
Antonov, detailed the expenses which the Red Army had 
incurred in Norway. According to General Antonov, the 
Norwegian government ought to compensate the Soviet govern-
ment by deliveries-in-kind, or with gold, or 
134 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 2, d. 30, I. 146, minutes from 
Molotov's brief meeting with Lie on 7 May, 1947. A memorandum 
from July, 1945, which will be discussed later, presents the 
evolution of the negotiations up to 9 April, implying that no new 
authoritative instructions had been issued since that date. 
135 0lav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. 11, p. 330. 
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by giving to the Soviet Union on long-term lease territories which 
are necessary and important from the military point of view, with 
the right [for the Soviet Union] of erecting military constructions 
and creating bases. 
The list of such "territories" included Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island, and the sea ports of Kirkenes, Tromsll), V adSII), Vardl/l and 
Hammerfest.136 
Apatt from documenting that the highest Soviet military 
authorities were not averse to the idea of a permanent Soviet 
military presence not only on Svalbard but also on mainland 
Norway, the letter gives the impression that General Antonov 
was not informed about the discussions underway on revisions 
to the Svalbard Treaty. It is impossible to know, without access 
to the files of the General Staff, to what degree an elaborate and 
authoritative analysis of the political and military aspects of an 
attempt to create Soviet bases in Notthern Norway, Spitsbergen 
and Bear Island underlay the General's suggestion. 
Dekanozov sent Antonov's memorandum to Vetrov, who 
then forwarded it to the Commissariat's Economic Depattment. 
At this stage, at least, the document was apparently not sent to 
Molotov, and it is unclear how the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs reacted to it. The General Staff's initiative was nevetthe-
less in line with ideas which were very much alive among the 
foreign policy bureaucrats. While Molotov was concentrating on 
the more impottant European and global questions, his subordi-
nates continued to press for a more offensive Soviet policy 
towards Norway. From early June 1945 onwards, a number of 
interrelated initiatives revived Zhdanova's October 1944 
proposal to create a permanent or semi-permanent Soviet 
military presence in the notthern parts of mainland Norway. A 
letter of 4 June from Rear Admiral Stepan G. Kucherov, the 
136 A VPRF, f. 012, op. 6, p. 81, d. 168, 11. 6-9, Antonov to 
Dekanozov, 24 January, 1945. 
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Chief of the Navy Staff (Glavnyi morskoi shtab Voenno-
Morskogo Flora), provided Vetrov with an opportunity to press 
for a more active Soviet policy. In his letter, which was 
addressed to Dekanozov, Kucherov expressed concern about the 
presence of a significant number of German troops in Northern 
Norway. The Germans were only gradually being disarmed, and 
they were under no strict control. German vessels under German 
command were taking part in the mine-sweeping of Norwegian 
waters. German naval officers stationed in Troms!ll were handing 
over German operational documents to the British, while Soviet 
members of a Soviet-Norwegian military delegation which had 
visited Troms!ll had been unable to learn anything of inte-
rest 137 Kucherov also stressed that the Norwegian military 
authorities were completely subordinated to the British, and 
were simply carrying out British requests. The Norwegians and 
the Allies, on the other hand, had a number of requests for the 
Soviets. They pressed, inter alia, for fast repatriation of the circa 
45,000 Russian former PoWs who were in camps in the area 
around TromS!II; they requested Soviet ships to transport the 
prisoners home, etc. 
Kucherov proposed that the Soviet government should "create 
a special staff in Norway, which could then immediately start to 
work on the problems which have been accumulating there". 
This staff should include representatives from the Commissariat 
for Defence, from the Navy Commissariat. from the Commissar-
iat for Foreign Affairs, and from General Golikov's Repatriation 
Commission. Admiral Kucherov stressed that the group should 
be sent to Norway as soon as possible, in order to arrive in 
Troms!ll while the German Navy staff elements were still 
"' The unexpected arrival of the group created some concern 
among the allies. Cf. General Thornes rapport am frigj~ringen av 
Norge, Oslo 1955, pp. 4142. 
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there. 138 It should be noted, however, that Admiral Kucherov 
did not suggest that the Soviet Union, for strategic or other 
reasons, should expand its military presence in Northern Norway 
by establishing military bases or by expanding the area con-
trolled by Soviet troops. 
Vetrov, who was asked to comment on Kucherov 's letter, 
repeated Kucherov's description of the situation in Northern 
Norway. His conclusions, however, were more far-reaching. 
Arguing that the Norwegian-Soviet agreement of 16 May 1944 
on jurisdiction and administration in territories liberated by 
Allied troops "does not limit the areas which can be occupied by 
one or other of the Allied powers", he supported Kucherov's 
plan to create a group of Soviet representatives in Norway, but 
also suggested that the Soviet government 
give instructions 10 the General Staff of the Red Army 10 immedi-
ately move troops of the 14th Independent Army which are 
stationed in Northern Norway into the north-western part of 
Norway, up 10 and including Narvik.'" 
Deputy Commissar Lowvsk:ii supported Vetrov's irtitiative and 
sent an almost identical letter to Molotov. Repeating Vetrov's 
recommendations, he ended the letter by suggesting that the 
Norwegian government and the Allied Command in Norway 
should be informed about the movement of Soviet troops into 
north-western Norway only when the operation was under 
way. 140 
On the same day that Vetrov gave his recommendations to 
Lozovsk:ii, based on Admiral Kucherov 's letter, he sent Molotov, 
138 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d 11, 11. 234-236, Kucherov 
to Dekanozov, 4 June, 1945. 
139 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 10, I. 15, Vetrov to 
Lozovskii, 8 June, 1945. 
140 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 11, p. 239, Lozovskii to 
Molotov, 11 June, 1945. 
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on his own initiative, a separate memorandum about Svalbard. 
Characterising his initiative as necessary to "protect our pro-
perry" after the German surrender in Norway, he proposed 
sending to Spitsbergen and Bear Island not only an expedition 
to examine the state of Soviet coal mines and equipment, but 
also "to prepare [ ... ] the reconstruction of the mines and the 
organisation of naval bases". Units of the Navy should be sent 
to Spitsbergen and Bear Island with this expedition, bringing 
with them "whatever is needed to create garrisons" to protect 
Soviet propeny. The Norwegian government should be informed 
of the dispatch of the expedition, and about the stationing of 
Soviet garrisons. Asking for Molotov's instructions, Vetrov 
concluded: 
If the proposed measures are carried out they will to a significant 
degree help to finally resolve the Spitsbergen question.'" 
A letter to Molotov from the Commissar for the coal industry, 
V asilii V akhrushev, strengthens the impression of a lack of 
effective coordination between the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs on the one hand, and other commissariats and authorities 
dealing with Svalbard on the other. Vakhrushev, who sent his 
letter on 8 June, i.e. the day that Vetrov wrote his two memo-
randa to Lowvskii and Molotov, asked for Molotov's approval 
of his plan to send a group of specialists to Spitsbergen to 
prepare the reopening of the coal mines. Molotov gave his 
approval, and Vetrov was instructed to take the necessary steps 
to implement the plan.142 
Although Molotov had received and added his comments to 
the revised version of the Norwegian draft declaration prepared 
141 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, p. 5, Vettov to 
Molotov, 8 June, 1945. 
142 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 23, p. 123, d. 13, I. 6, Vakhrushev to 
Molotov, 8 June, 1945. 
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by Vetrov and Bazarov on 16 April,143 he did not respond to 
Vetrov's letter of 8 June. Vetrov, ordered to implement a 
decision which might conflict with his own more ambitious 
scheme, made a further attempt to move the decision-makers in 
his direction. In a letter to Lozovskii of 19 June, Vetrov 
emphasised that his initiative had been taken independently of 
Vakhrushev's letter, and that it had "political" rather than 
"economic" aims. Measures to secure Soviet interests should be 
used "to implement on Spitsbergen and Bear Island initiatives of 
a political and military-strategic nature". Vetrov warned against 
separating the Soviet economic interests "from the question of 
creating a naval base on these islands and of establishing our 
garrisons", and concluded that the implementation of Vakhru-
shev's plan should be postponed.144 
However, Vetrov did not succeed in stopping Vakhrushev's 
expedition. Lozovskii himself sent the necessary letters to 
Vakhrushev and the Navy Commissariat, and the expedition left 
for Spitsbergen in mid-September 1945. The tasks organised for 
the expedition, and also its composition in terms of personnel, 
seem to imply that this was, in fact, primarily a civilian 
affair. 145 The result of the expedition's work on Spitsbergen 
provided the basis for the Sovnarkom 's decision on 29 August 
1946 to rehabilitate the Soviet mines on Spitsbergen. 
Molotov's failure to respond did not discourage his subordi-
nates from taking further initiatives. In early July Vetrov and 
Zhdanova wrote two memoranda to the Deputy Commissars who 
143 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 42, d. 687, I. 9, Vettov to Podtserob, 
25 June, 1945; ibid., 11. 27-28, version of 16 April draft with 
Molotov's comments. 
144 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 22, ll. 7-8, Vetrov to 
Lozovskii, 19 June, 1945. 
145 The names and assignments of the participants, together with 
the list of tasks to be carried out, are included in A VPRF, f. 0116, 
op. 23, p. 123, d. 13, 11. 12-14. 
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dealt with Norway, Vyshinskii and Lozovsk:ii, trying once more 
to link a solution to the Spitsbergen question with the question 
of Soviet bases in Northern Norway. The first of the memoran-
da, called "Memorandum on the creation of naval and air bases 
in Northern Norway as a link in a general security system" and 
signed on 3 July, repeated (literally) Zhdanova's arguments from 
Octuber 1944. The conclusion was also the same: it would be 
easy tu reach an agreement with the Norwegian government on 
the common defence of Northern Norway and the creation there 
of Soviet military bases, strategic railways, etc. Once perma-
nently established in Norway, the Soviet government could raise 
the need tu revise the Soviet-Norwegian border at an appropriate 
time.146 The memorandum on Spitsbergen and Bear Island, 
written by Vetrov and Zhdanova and signed on 4 July, reiterated 
the arguments which Dekanozov had presented tu Molotov prior 
to the meeting with Trygve Lie in November 1944. Vetrov and 
Zhdanova emphasised the strategic importance of Spitsbergen 
and Bear Island, and concluded that the agreement with Norway 
on joint defence of the archipelago should be finalised. The 
1920 Treaty should be abrogated, albeit through consultations 
with "the main Allied powers", and only Norway and the Soviet 
Union should have the right tu exploit the natural resources on 
Svalbard. 147 
At this point Vetrov received welcome support from the 
General Staff on the matter of necessary changes tu the Soviet-
Norwegian border. On 14 July and in response to a request from 
146 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 5, 11.33-35, "Spravka. K 
voprosu: 0 sozdanii voenno-morskikh i vozdushnykh baz SSSR v 
Sevemoi Norvegii, kak zvena v obshchei sisteme bezopasnosti", 3 
July, 1945. 
147 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 22, ll. 16-18, "Spravka. 
K voprosu: Ob otmene Parizhskogo Dogovora o Shpitsbergene i o 
sovmesmoi zashchite Shpitsbergena i ostrova Medvezhii Sovetskim 
SoillZom i Norvegiei", 4 July, 1945. 
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Vetrov, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lt. General N. 
Slavin, set out in a letter the Army leadership's "ideas (soobra-
zheniia) on the Varanger fjord region and the Varanger penin-
sula". The letter had been approved by General Antonov, the 
Chief of the Red Army's General Staff.148 
The memorandum opened by stating that the experiences of 
the war had shown "the necessity (neobkbodimost) of improving 
our strategic situation" in the northern border region. The 
General Staff then proposed solutions to this basic security 
problem which would have the effect of moving the Soviet-
Norwegian border westwards, away from the important Pe-
chenga and Murmansk regions. One possibility would be to 
reach an agreement with the Norwegians on "long-term leasing" 
of Bear Island and the parts of Northern Norway which bordered 
the Pechenga oblast. The alternative would be to receive 
Norwegian territory as compensation for the Soviet efforts to 
liberate Eastern Finnmark. 149 The need tu "improve" the Soviet 
strategic position in the High North being "obvious", the 
General Staff suggested that the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs should broach the tupic with the Norwegians through 
diplomatic channels. 
From the military point of view, the optimum solution would 
be to move the border to the river Tana and the Tana fjord, i.e. 
to transfer the whole of the V aranger peninsula and the area 
south of the Varanger fjord (Varanger and S!<lr-Varanger 
municipalities) to the Soviet Union. In addition tu the presence 
of the Soviet military on Bear Island, this would create the 
preconditions for the establishment of a "huge land and sea 
based strategic defence area" (bolshaia sukhoputnaia i morskaia 
148 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 20, I. 9, Slavin to Deka-
nozov, 14 July, 1945. 
149 A peculiar argument: the Soviets should be compensated by 
receiving territories bigger than the small part of Norway which 
was liberated by the Soviet troops! 
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strategicheskaia zona prilaytiia), reaching from the Spitsbergen 
islands to the Kola peninsula. The minimal solution would be to 
lease the Varanger area from Norway for a term of 25-50 
years.150 
Vetrov, together with Bazarov, the head of the Commis-
sariat's Legal Department, also sent to Lozovskii a version of 
the Norwegian draft joint declaration, with comments. The 
proposed text was in several respects closer to the original 
version than Vetrov's earlier draft of 16 April. Vetrov and 
Bazarov no longer objected to the idea that the joint Soviet-
Norwegian defence measures should be a link in the "Inter-
national Security Organisation". They also accepted the original 
Norwegian proposal that the declaration should be of a tempor-
ary character, pending consultations with those of the original 
signatory powers which had not been at war with the Allies. 
However, the new version of the declaration omitted those pans 
of the original Norwegian proposal which implied that Svalbard 
was to remain under Norwegian sovereignty. On the other hand, 
Vetrov and Bazarov accepted the principle that an abrogation of 
the Paris Treaty must be agreed "in accordance with the rules of 
international law" and should be the object of future nego-
tiations.151 Thus, Vetrov and Bazarov implicitly accepted that 
Norway and the Soviet Union could not unilaterally declare an 
annulment of the Treaty. 
Bazarov sent a separate memorandum on what had been done 
"to secure Soviet economic interests on Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island" to Lozovskii. He concluded with a number of proposals, 
aimed at resuming Soviet economic ventures on the islands as 
soon as possible. With regard to Bear Island, Bazarov presented 
an ambitious economic programme. The creation of Soviet 
economic activity here, according to Bazarov, deserved "special 
150 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 20, 11. 10-12, Slavin's 
memorandum of 14 July, 1945. 
'"A VPRF, f. 116, op. 28, p. 21, d. 11, 11. 2-5. 
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attention" .152 In addition the Commissariat for the Coal Indu-
stry had emphasised the economic importance of the Spitsbergen 
coal in letters to Lozovskii and Vetrov. Apparently unaware of 
the process which was under way in the Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs, Vakhrushev and his subordinates presented a 
number of recommendations "in case" the 1920 Treaty were to 
be revised. A new regime on Svalbard should secure for the 
Soviet Union the right to conduct economic activity according 
to Soviet law, and without having to pay taxes and duties to 
Norway.'" 
Vetrov also received welcome support from the Soviet 
Ambassador to Norway, Nikolai D. Kuznetsov, and from the 
TASS news agency, who reported that the Norwegians were 
rapidly developing their activity on Spitsbergen, and that a 
Norwegian garrison was stationed on the island.154 According 
to these reports, the Norwegians were planning a large expe-
dition to Spitsbergen. The worlcers hired for employment on 
Spitsbergen had allegedly been warned that the conditions would 
be "as in a military campaign" (oni budut nakhoditsia v uslo-
viakh voennogo pokhoda). Vetrov sent a message to Lozovskii, 
arguing that this was even more alarming when seen in the 
context of developments in Northern Norway, where the British 
had forbidden the Norwegians to continue clearing German 
minefields in Finnmarlc and Troms, and had stopped the removal 
152 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, 11. 44-49, "Spravka o 
merakh, napravlennykh k zashchite ekonomicheskikb interesov 
SSSR na Shpitsbergene". 
153 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, I. 19, Novikov to 
Vetrov, 9 July, 1945; I. 23, Vakhrushev to Lozovskii, 9 July, 1945. 
154 A small Norwegian garrison had remained on Spitsbergen 
after the end of the war. Kuznetsov's letter, and other evidence in 
the A VPRF, clearly contradicts the theory that the Soviets thought 
that the British, not the Norwegians, were stationed on the island. 
Cf. Willy 0streng, Det politiske Svalbard (cf. note 3), pp. 68-73. 
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from towns of "military warning mechanisms in the windows 
and doors and in the shops' display windows".155 In addition, 
150,000 Germans were still in the Trom~ region, and no date 
had been set for their withdrawal. 
Vetrov reminded Lorovskii of his message of 8 June to 
Molotov, to which he had not received any response, and argued 
that the Soviet Union should "immediately return to Spits-
bergen", in view of the "Soviet-Norwegian negotiations under 
way on a new status for Spitsbergen" and also because of what 
was going on in Spitsbergen and Northern Norway. This 
"return" should include the despatch of naval units, in order to 
set up garrisons and prepare the creation of naval bases. At the 
same time preparations should be made to reopen the Soviet 
coalfields. Finally, it was necessary to reach agreement with the 
Norwegians as soon as possible "about publication of the joint 
Soviet-Norwegian declaration on the abrogation of the Paris 
Treaty on Spitsbergen". The Norwegian government should be 
informed about the despatch of the Soviet expedition, "in order 
to avoid unwanted incidents which might take place because of 
the presence[ ... ] of a Norwegian garrison on Spitsbergen".156 
155 This is an interesting case of misinterpretation of the other 
party's intentions. According to General Thorne, the Allied Com-
mander in Norway, the Soviets did not help to clear mines in the 
area of reSPOnsibility of Colonel A.D. Dahl, the Norwegian 
Commander in Finnmark. Colonel Dahl consequently requested 
assistance from the Allied Command in Oslo. The request was 
declined, "in order not to create frictions with the Russian Head· 
quarters in Kirl<enes". However, in the end the Soviet Commander 
in Kllkenes agreed that German PoWs under Allied supervision 
should do the mine clearing in the Soviet area. Cf. General 
Thornes rapport omfrigj(Jringen av Norge (cf. note 137), p. 49. 
156 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, 11. 27-28, Velrov to 
Lozovskii, 21 July, 1945. 
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The next day, i.e. on 22 July, Lozovskii sent a letter to 
Molotov. In this he supported Vetrov 's proposal, although he 
did not say anything about publication of the joint declaration. 
Molotov, in turn, apparently agreed in general terms with 
Lozovskii 's proposals, but asked for further study of the 
matter. 1" Molotov was not prepared to make a decision on the 
joint declaration on Spitsbergen or on the military-strategic 
elements of the various proposals which had been put forward 
by his subordinates. On 6 August Vetrov brought to Lozovskii's 
attention a list of "unresolved questions" which needed Molo-
tov's decision, among them Vetrov 's earlier proposals for 
Spitsbergen. Molotov apparently responded by giving his 
agreement to the Spitsbergen expedition proposed by Vakhru-
shev and the Commissariat for the Coallndustry.158 
Thus, up to July-August 1945 the bureaucrats in the Commis-
sariat for Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Commissars dealing 
directly with Norway had produced a number of proposals 
aimed at a more active Soviet policy in respect of Svalbard and 
Northern Norway. Their efforts had received strong support 
from the Soviet military authorities. More surprisingly, in their 
efforts to revitalise the Svalbard negotiations they had found an 
ally in Trygve Lie, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. In late July 
Lie brought up the Svalbard question on his own initiative in a 
conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo. 
Lie told Kuznetsov that he wanted to discuss with him "a 
very secret and very important question", i.e. Svalbard. As the 
Soviet government had not responded to the Norwegian draft 
declaration of 9 April, the text apparently "did not satisfy Mr. 
Molotov". Because he understood that this question was "very 
157 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, I. 29, Lozovskii to 
Molotov, 22 July, 1945, with Molotov's comments added. 
158 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, I. 30, Velrov ID 
Lozovskii, 6 Angus~ 1945; and I. 31, Vetrov ID Lozovskii, 9 
August, 1945. 
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important to the Soviet Union", Lie proposed to resume the 
"negotiations" which had been initiated during his stay in 
Moscow in November 1944. Lie also agreed with Kuznetsov 
that the talks should be held in Moscow .159 Lie's own version 
of this conversation is different. According to the memorandum 
he put on paper some days after the conversation, Lie had 
limited himself to telling Kuznetsov that the matter was being 
discussed in the Storting, and that the British and American 
Ambassadors had been informed.'"' Assuming Kuznetsov did 
not invent his own version of Lie's remarks, it is no wonder that 
in Moscow Lie had a reputation for "understanding the need for 
Soviet-Norwegian cooperation", and "sympathising" with the 
Soviet Union.'61 
Despite this pressure from several quarters, the Soviet 
decision-makers were unwilling to take any further action over 
Svalbard or Northern Norway. This hesitation suggests that the 
Soviets were increasingly beginning to understand that there 
could be international repercussions if they took action to renew 
negotiations over Svalhard. On 7 August, after the 5th European 
Department had sent Molotov a draft Soviet-Norwegian decla-
ration, "the final solution of the problem was postponed to a 
politically favourable moment". 162 On the border question, the 
Norwegians themselves proposed in August 1945 that the 
demarcation process should be postponed to the following year, 
"' AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 8, 11.52-53, Kuznetsov's 
minute from conversation with Trygve Lie on 25 July, 1945. 
160 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. IT, Lie's minutes of 30 July 1945. ~ . ' A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 34, p. 136, d. 6, 11. 65-66, Abramov to 
Dekanozov, October 1945. 
162 This according to a MID memorandum from April 1946. 
A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, 1. 110, "Kratkaia spravka 0 
prokbozhdenii voprosa ob Arkhipelage Shpitsbergen", 22 April, 
1946. I have not been able to locate the draft mentioned in the. 
memorandum. 
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thus relieving the Soviets of the necessity of taking a decision 
on this issue. 
Western perspectives on the High North 
Allied policy since the summer of 1944 showed that there was 
general agreement among the western Allies that Northern 
Norway was of more immediate strategic importance to the 
Soviet Union than to the western powers. In order not to 
antagonise the Soviets, it was therefore decided that as far as 
possible Norwegian forces, not British and American, should be 
sent to the North. This was also in accordance with Soviet 
preferences which were signalled from Moscow in the late 
autumn of 1944 and in the winter of 1945. In the summer of 
1944 it was decided in SHAEF that the Allied Commander in 
Northern Norway should be an experienced British officer, but 
that the forces under his command should as far as possible be 
Norwegian. Even this decision was revised in March 1945, when 
the Norwegian Colonel O.H. Munthe-Kaas was appointed Allied 
Zone Commander for Nordland and Trams counties. It was 
further decided to exclude Colonel AD. Dahl, the Norwegian 
Commander in Finmnark, from the British-led Allied command 
structure which was being established for the rest of Nor-
way.163 
However, in the spring of 1945 the Soviet press staned to 
criticise the allegedly slow and hesitant disarmament of the 
Germans in Northern Norway. In late May, when General 
Thorne decided to replace Colonel O.H. Munthe-Kaas with the 
British Brigadier F.W. Sanders as Allied Zone Commander in 
Tromsfl!, and to send a British brigade and a Royal Navy cruiser 
to the town, this reflected his fears that the Soviets would send 
163 Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. II, pp. 
233-34. 
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their own troops to the area to exercise control over the 
Germans. The Soviets continued to express their dissatisfaction 
with Allied policy in Northern Norway. At the end of July the 
Soviet Government raised the topic of the Germans in Northern 
Norway in a note which was delivered to the British and the 
Americans during the Allied summit meeting at Potsdam. The 
note pointed to the presence of a large number of armed 
Germans in Northern Norway, and asked the Allied Command 
in Norway to look into the matter.164 The British answer may 
have served to allay Soviet concerns. The British informed the 
Soviets that there were about 170,000 German Po Ws in the 
whole of Northern Norway. The Germans were concentrated in 
specific areas, and they were all disarmed, except for two per 
cent who had been allowed to keep their weapons in order to 
maintain internal order and discipline. 165 
In the summer of 1945 the British in Oslo, among them the 
British Ambassador, Sir Laurence Collier, started to worry about 
Soviet long-term intentions in Northern Norway. British 
intelligence indicated that the Soviets had plans to occupy the 
whole of Northern Norway after the German collapse. There are 
indications that General Thome, the Allied Commander in 
Norway, shared that concern. The British Ambassador was of 
the opinion that when they arrived in Finnmarlc the Soviets had 
had no intentions of moving beyond the positions they had 
established in November 1944, but he did not exclude the 
possibility that they might have changed their plans when the 
German resistance collapsed. 166 It certainly did not ease the 
western Allies' concern when in mid-June 1945 a Soviet 
Colonel reported to their headquarters in Oslo, indicating that he 
, .. A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 2, 11. 3-4, note addressed 
to Strang, 25 July, 1945. 
165 Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. I!, p. 235. 
""Ibid., pp. 234-35; General Thornes rapport omfrigj~ringen. 
av Norge (cf. note 137). p. 42. 
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was the forerunner of a group that wanted to be attached to the 
military command in Norway. When Eisenhower ordered that no 
official relationship should be established, the Soviets did not 
revert to the matter. 167 
There was a widespread tendency among the western Allies 
to view Norway, and Northern Norway in particular, as a "grey 
zone" where the western powers would be forced to acquiesce 
if the Soviets decided to demand a more prominent role for 
themselves as supervisors of the country's political and military 
affairs. In a September 1944 analysis of Soviet intentions 
towards postwar Europe, US Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle concluded that the Soviets would want to have govern-
ments "acting in substantial compliance" in a number of East 
and Central European countries, and "possibly also [ ... ] Norway 
and Denmark although the degree of influence in both places 
will be far less than in the other countries mentioned" .168 
Another American analysis from about the same time was 
close to reality in its description of possible Soviet intentions 
towards Northern Norway. The report, which was commissioned 
by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and finished in 
February 1945, portrayed Western Europe as an area where the 
United States and Great Britain would have stronger influence 
than the Soviet Union. However, the situation in Norway, and 
in particular Northern Norway, would resemble that of Eastern 
Europe: heavily dominated by the Soviets. The report concluded 
167 Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 
1945-1949, Oslo, 1980, p. 45; cf. also Vojtech Mastny, Russia's 
Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of 
Communism, 1941-1945, New Yorlc, 1979, pp. 288-289. Not having 
access to the Russian military archives, I have not been able to 
establish the relationship between these Soviet moves and the 
initiatives of the Commissariat bureaucrats discussed on the 
preceding pages. 
168 Geir Lundestad (cf. note 167), p. 39. 
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that, despite the lack of any indications of aggressive Soviet 
designs on Nonhern Norway, 
the acquisition of a common frontier with that counuy [Norway] in 
the Far North and the proximity of Norwegian territory to Mur-
mansk, Russia's ouly ice-free port opening directly on the high 
seas, give Norway a very special place in Russian eyes. 
The Soviet Union would most likely recognise the primacy of 
British influence in most of Norway, but 
it appears quite possible that the Russians will seek a pact with 
Norway which will provide for joint Norwegian-Soviet defence of 
northern Norway against any third power. 
The idea that the nonhern part of Norway in particular would be 
an area of stronger Soviet influence than the rest of Western 
Europe was also reflected in a message from Under Secretary of 
State Joseph Grew to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and 
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard on 20 February 
1945.169 In May 1945 the Nonhern European Division of the 
State Department undertook its first comprehensive report on the 
situation in Norway. Referring to Norwegian uneasiness 
about Soviet intentions in the Nonh, it stated: 
it is quite possible that as a minimum concession they [the Soviets] 
will request free port privileges at Kirkenes and the right to 
construct a rail-road to Petsamo.170 
Although unaware of the discussions which had been going on 
in the Soviet bureaucracy since October 1944, Norwegian 
government circles were constantly worried that the Soviets 
would use their armed presence in Norway for political or more 
far-reaching military purposes. Their fears were allayed only 
when the Soviet troops left Norway in September 1945. Colonel 
"'Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
170 Ibid., p. 46. 
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A.D. Dahl, the Norwegian military Commander in Finnmarlc, 
repeatedly warned that there were indications that the Russians 
were preparing to move funher into Nonhern Norway, possibly 
with the aim of taking Narvik.171 In November 1944 he gave 
an evaluation of Soviet intentions which was not too far 
removed from the arguments presented by Tatiana Zhdanova the 
previous month, and subsequently repeated in reports and 
documents of the 5th European Department and in letters from 
the General Staff. Noticing signs that the Soviets were esta-
blishing themselves permanently in Eastern Finnmark, Colonel 
Dahl concluded: 
There is a great danger that they [i.e. the Soviets] will never move 
out, and that they regard S0r-Varanger to the end of the Varanger 
fjord and the River Tana as their sphere of interest, and plan to 
move their border to this line. 
In April 1945 Dahl reported to the Norwegian High Command 
that the Russians "without doubt" planned to move towards 
Troms county .172 
The western powers continued to conduct a policy of non-
provocation in Norway. American plans in 1945-46 to establish 
bases for the US Air Force in Norway, were shelved partly 
because of the fear that the Soviets might institute 
countermeasures in Finnmark and demand a quid pro quo in the 
form of their own air bases in the country.173 
The Soviets, obviously aware of the Norwegians' anxiety, 
tried to relieve their fears on at least two occasions. During his 
stay in Moscow in November 1944, Lie was told by Dekanozov 
171 Cf. Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3), Vol. II, pp. 
203,230. 
112 Sven G. Holtsmark, op. cit (cf. note 77), pp. 201-202. 
173 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the 
High North (cf. note 8), p. 36; Geir Lundestad, op. cit (cf. note 
167), pp. 65-66. 
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that the new Soviet-Norwegian border would be identical with 
the previous Norwegian-Finnish border. Then, in March 1945, 
P.D. Orlov, the fonner head of the Scandinavian Department 
and the 5th European Depanment who was now attached as 
political advisor 1D the Chainnan of the Allied Control Commis-
sion in Finland, reportedly told Ambassador Andvord that the 
Soviet-Norwegian border should be demarcated as soon as 
possible, to counteract "Gennan propaganda". 174 
On 19 October 1945 Aleksandr N. Abramov, the new head 
of the 5th European Depanment, sent a message 1D Dekanozov 
warning against new Soviet initiatives on Svalbard. According 
to Abramov, the international press had published "inspired" 
reports about alleged Soviet plans to "take" Spitsbergen. There 
were also press rumours that the question had been raised by the 
Soviet Union during the Potsdam Conference. The obvious aim 
of these reports, Abramov argued, was "to force us to declare 
our point of view (rochka zreniia) on Spitsbergen at the present, 
for us unfavourable, moment". The Americans, who were 
negotiating the acquisition of military bases on Greenland and 
elsewhere, would try 1D present their actions "as a 
countenneasure against Soviet intentions rowards Spitsbergen". 
The announcement of the Norwegian-Soviet declaration on 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island should therefore be postponed until 
a more appropriate moment, which could be "when the Ameri-
cans have agreements on the long-term lease of military bases 
on Greenland".175 Another memorandum from October 1946 
mentions that "the question of a Soviet-Norwegian declaration 
on Spitsbergen was postponed until the f'malisation of US (sic) 
174 Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" (cf. note 3). Vol. II. pp. 
201,234. 
175 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, 1. 50, Abramov to 
Dekanozov, 19 October, 1945. 
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negotiations about bases on Iceland" .176 Despite this lack of 
precision, these documents provide strong evidence that Soviet 
policy on the Svalbard question was directly linked 1D their 
perception of American efforts to create military bases on the 
North Atlantic islands. The Soviets also kept a close eye on the 
Norwegian-American discussions about the withdrawal of 
American personnel from Jan Mayen, and Ambassador Kuznet-
sov was instrocted to verify whether the Americans had hon-
oured their pledge to leave the island. 177 
From the very beginning of their discussions with the 
Russians the Norwegians had been aware of the potential link 
between Soviet policy on Svalbard and the question of American 
or British postwar military bases on Iceland and Greenland. In 
December 1944 Amold R:estad had argued that the Soviet 
rationale would be weakened if the United States withdrew from 
their bases on Iceland and Greenland after the war. 178 It was 
apparently not until late 1944 that the Soviets began to develop 
a policy to counter possible American demands for an extension 
in some form of the wartime agreements with Iceland, and with 
Denmark about Greenland.179 
176 A VPRF, f. 116, op. 29, p. 23, d. 15. ll. 1-2, "Po voprosu o 
Shpitsbergene. Spravka", 1 October, 1946. 
m AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d 11,ll. 313-14, Abramov 
to Dekanozov, 7 December, 1945; and ibid., d. S,ll. 90-91, Kuznet-
sov's minutes from his conversation with Trygve Lie on 30 
November. 
178 Cf. note 116. 
179 It seems that the Soviet leadership became aware of the 
Soviet-Danish agreement on Greenland of 9 April, 1941. only in 
late December 1944, when Gromyko sent to Moscow a copy of the 
agreement, together with information about the US-Icelandic 
agreement. Dekanozov ordered his subordinates to produce a report 
on the topic, and also suggested writing a suitable article to be 
printed in The War and the Working Class, which served as the 
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The Americans did indeed intend to secure their military 
presence in Iceland and on Greenland after the war. In the 
summer of 1945 the American government had still not formally 
raised the question of renegotiating the two agreements with a 
view to create permanent military bases on Greenland and 
Iceland. However, in August 1944 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
had already concluded that the United States should attempt to 
acquire military facilities on Iceland, preferably on a long-term 
lease. 180 During the war Greenland had been regarded as one 
of the places where the United States might want to have 
military bases after the war, and it was not only the Soviet 
government which expected the Americans to seek a permanent 
arrangement on the island. Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish 
Minister in Washington and the one who had negotiated and 
signed the 9 April 1941 agreement, remarked in late October 
1945 that "he had always assumed that we [i.e. the United 
States] would do so".181 
In October 1945 the United States finally presented to the 
Icelandic government their request for the long-term lease of 
three base areas on lceland.182 The Soviet government was 
informed about the American dernarche. However, there was 
strong opposition in Iceland to allowing a permanent American 
military presence, and in November of the same year the 
Icelandic government informed the Americans that it was not 
mouthpiece of the NKID in foreign policy matters. A VPRF, f. 085, 
op. 29, p. 122, d. 19,1. 1, Gromyko to Dekanozov, 2 January 1945, 
with enclosures and handwritten comments. 
180 Thor Whitehead, "Icelandic security policies, 1945-1951", 
paper presented to the XX Nonlic Historical Conference in 
Reykjavik 10-14 Augnst 1987, p. 5. 
181 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, Vol. 
IV, p. 580. 
182 Tor Whitehead, op. cit. (cf. note 180), p. 6; cf. also FRUS, 
1945, Vol. IV, p. 953. 
98 
ready to enter negotiations on the proposed terms. Exchanges 
were resumed in 1946, and resulted in the US-Icelandic agree-
ment of October 7, 1946. This terminated the defence agreement 
of 1941 but allowed for the interim use of Keflavik airport by 
American forces."' However, it was not until 1951 that the 
American and Icelandic government signed a permanent 
agreement which regulated the presence of United States forces 
on Iceland. 
The Soviets made it quite clear that American efforts to 
acquire postwar bases in Iceland might trigger off similar Soviet 
demands. An article in March 1946 in Red Fleet, the official 
newspaper of the Navy Commissariat, referred to international 
press reports about American efforts to acquire the right to 
establish permanent naval and air bases on Iceland. In accor-
dance with the time-honoured practice in the Soviet press of 
letting third parties formulate Soviet concerns, the Navy journal 
emphasised that public opinion in Iceland felt that "if the USA 
were permitted to establish the bases, other powers might put 
forward claims to bases in this region." Rolf Andvord, the 
Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow, immediately linked the 
article to the Svalbard question, and wondered "to what degree 
the State Department is aware of the link between these two 
questions, and what weight the United States in general assign 
to Soviet aspirations in the Svalbard archipelago".184 In 1945-
46 the Soviets also tried to buttress Icelandic opposition to a 
base agreement by dramatically increasing their purchases of 
fish, Iceland's main export. 
With regard to Greenland, matters developed differently. 
When Kauffmann informed the Danish government in October 
1945 that the United States might request rights to postwar bases 
on Greenland, he was instructed to tell the Americans that the 
"'Tor Whitehead, op. cit., p. 12; FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV, p. 953. 
184 Krasnyi Flot, 3 March 1946; and NMFA, 36.6/10 A, 
Andvord to Lie, 8 March, 1946. 
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Danish government was "horrified" at the prospect of receiving 
such a request from the United States government. The main 
reason was that the Danes feared that such a request would 
immediately be followed by Soviet demands for bases on Born-
holrn.185 After this rather strong Danish message, both parties 
let the matter rest, and formal negotiations on Greenland 
between the Danish and American governments were not 
resumed until 1947 when the Danes took the initiative to 
terminate the agreement of April 1941.186 However, in May 
1946 the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gustav Ras-
mussen, allegedly told Molotov that the Danish government had 
conducted negotiations with the Americans on the transfer to 
Denmark of all US military· establishments on Greenland. 
Rasmussen also informed Molotov that the Americans wanted 
to establish a station at Thule, in the extreme north-west of 
Greenland, and also to take over British facilities on the Faroe 
Islands.187 The American proposal to buy Greenland from 
Denmark, presented in December 1946 as one alternative in a 
message from the Americans to the Danish government, was 
noted in the Soviet press in the following months. In 1951 
Denmark and the USA signed an agreement which forms the 
basis for the present American military presence on the island. 
'" FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV, p. 581. The Soviets had occupied 
Bomholm on the last day of fighting in Europe. The British were 
of a similar opinion, mainlaining that the American demands for 
bases in the Northern Atlantic would induce the Soviets to request 
military bases in Northern Europe. The evolution of the British 
position is discussed in delail in Knot Einar Eriksen, op. cit. (cf. 
note 8). Cf. also Mary Dau's book, op. cit., (cf. note 84). 
186 See pp. 133-134. 
187NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Rolf Andersen's minutes from his conver-
sation with Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Guslav Rasmussen 
on 8 July, 1946. 
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With regard to Jan Mayen, the Americans declared in March 
1945 that they intended to withdraw their personnel as soon as 
the war was over. However, the Soviet demands for Svalbard 
apparently made the Americans change their mind, and instead 
of evacuating, additional American forces were sent to the 
island. The withdrawal of United States personnel from the 
island was deferred "pending settlement of the question of 
proposed Soviet bases in the North Atlantic". However, after 
Norwegian pressure the Americans succumbed, and their forces 
left the island in February 1946.188 
Spring 1946: Molotov under pressure 
Despite the gradual realisation among Soviet foreign policy-
makers of the international repercussions of renewing the 
Svalbard negotiations, or of Soviet initiatives aimed at some son 
of defence arrangement including parts of Northern Norway, 
Molotov and his deputies continued to receive proposals for a 
more decisive Soviet policy on Norway from the group of 
"activist" bureaucrats. Despite his warnings on 19 October 
against a renewal of the Svalbard talks, in November (possibly 
December) 1945 Abramov sent a new message to Dekanozov, 
which basically repeated his well-known recommendations on 
Svalbard and Northern Norway. Discussing the outcome of the 
Norwegian general election of 8 October 1945, which had 
brought in a majority Labour Party government, Abrarnov 
concluded that the Norwegian government's foreign and 
domestic policy would "have to take seriously into account the 
fact that Norway and the USSR are direct neighbours with a 
common border". Although Norway would be heavily oriented 
towards Britain and the United States, in view of "the Norwe-
gian-English and Norwegian-American contradictions" the 
18
' Geir Lundeslad, op. cit. (cf. note 167), pp. 67-68. 
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Norwegians would feel the need to seek a counterbalance 
through "the development of economic and cultural cooperation 
with the Soviet Union". Although there were anti-Soviet 
tendencies in the ruling circles of the Norwegian Labour Party, 
Trygve Lie would continue as Foreign Minister in the new 
government. All these factors, Abramov concluded, "no doubt 
provide the preconditions for a solution of a number of basic 
practical questions which exist between the two countries". He 
continued: 
First of all, we have questions like the demarcation of the Soviet-
Norwegian border, the Spitsbergen and Bear Island question, the 
possible creation of Soviet-Norwegian naval and air bases in 
Finnmarlc etc., Soviet-Norwegian cooperation in securing the peace 
in the north-western corner of Europe. 
According to Abramov, it was necessary to bear in mind 
Norway's military-strategic importance: on the one hand as a 
possible bridgehead for aggression against the Soviet Union in 
the North-East and as Britain's eastern defence line ("forpost"), 
and on the other hand as a link in the lines of communication 
between the Soviet Union, England and the USA.189 
In October 1945, after the Norwegian government on a 
number of occasions had presented proposals to the Soviets for 
189 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 34, p. 136, d. 6, U. 65-66, Abrarnov to 
Dekanowv, November (December), 1945. It is interesting to note 
that at his lime Abrarnov and Vetrov brought up the idea of starting 
talks with the Danish government on "common safeguarding of the 
security in the western part of the Baltic Sea (the creation of 
military bases on the island of Bornholrn and the establishment of 
a regime for the straits)". A VPRF, f. 085, op. 29, p. 121, d. 8, I. 2, 
Abrarnov and Vetrov toNovikov, 9 October, 1945. However, there 
is a striking contrast between the cautious deliberations in respect 
of Denmark and Norway and the strong pressure in respect of the 
Dardanelles which the Soviets had been exerting on Turkey since 
the spring of 1945. 
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a final demarcation and regulation of the new Soviet-Norwegian 
border, Abramov argued that a Soviet-Norwegian Border 
Convention could not simply perpetuate the conditions of the 
various agreements which had regulated the Norwegian-Finnish 
border. According to Abramov, a Soviet-Norwegian agreement 
should include "the question of common defence (okhraoa) and 
safeguarding (obespechenie)" of Norwegian territory bordering 
on the Soviet Union. In these areas there should be agreement 
on the creation of Soviet naval and air bases, surrounded by 
"neutralised zones". An agreement on Soviet bases could be 
included either in "secret articles" of the Soviet-Norwegian 
Border Convention. or in a separate secret protocol. The Soviet 
Union should receive the territories on which the bases would 
be established on a 20-25 years' lease, as compensation for 
"Soviet support for the Norwegian government in the fight 
against the Germ arts". Trygve Lie should be invited to Moscow 
for the negotiations. 190 
The idea of linking the creation of the new Soviet-Norwegian 
border regime to broader talks about joint defence arrangements, 
was supported by Novikov in a letter to Molotov in mid-
February 1946. Novikov wanted these talks to take place in 
Moscow between the Commissariat and the Norwegian embassy, 
with the aim of negotiating a comprehensive Border Convention 
and an agreement on the defence of Norwegian territory 
bordering the Soviet Union. Molotov ordered Novikov to discuss 
the matter with Dekanozov.191 However, ultimately Molotov 
decided not to follow the advice of his subordinates. In the 
spring of 1946 the decision was taken to agree to the Norwe-
giarts' proposal to create a mixed Soviet-Norwegian Commis-
190 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 5, 11. 4345, Abrarnov to 
Dekanowv, 28 December, 1945. 
191 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 6, p. 42, d. 692, I. 2, Novikov to Molotov, 
9 November, 1946, with Molotov's annotation. 
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sion, with the task of demarcating a border based on the 
previous Finnish-Norwegian border. 
With regard to Svalbard, the available Soviet documents 
suggest that Soviet policy from then on was strongly influenced 
by their perceptions of the American efforts to establish perma-
nent bases on Iceland and Greenland. The Soviets had postponed 
finalising their talks with the Norwegians so as not to give the 
Americans additional arguments in their negotiations with the 
Danish and Icelandic governments. 
However, in March 1946 Molotov reverted to the matter, 
giving the 5th European Department instructions to prepare for 
a reopening of the discussions "after the conclusion of the First 
General Assembly" of the United Nations. The Department gave 
Molotov a revised version of the Norwegian draft declaration of 
9 April 1945. This was basically the same text which had been 
sent to Molotov in early August 1945.192 A memorandum 
prepared by Zhdanova suggests that no substantial action had 
been taken since the decision in August 1945 to postpone 
finishing the negotiations with the Norwegian governmenL 193 
Although in March Molotov briefly mentioned to the Norwegian 
Ambassador that the negotiations should be concluded.'94 the 
Soviets did not make any move until the summer of 1946. In 
fact, in the spring of 1946 the Soviets feared that the N orwe-
gians wanted to finalise the discussions. In March an_ off~r from 
a Norwegian citizen to the Soviet Trade Represental1ve m Oslo 
to buy a parcel of land on Spitsbergen195 was interpreted as 
m AVPRF, f. 116, op. 29, p. 23, d. 15, 11. 11-13, Novikov to 
Molotov, 11 March, 1946, with text of the declaration enclosed. 
193 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 131, d. 28, ll. 1-2, Zhdanova's 
spravka of 22 April, 1946. 
1
" According to Norwegian documents. I have found no trace 
of this conversation in the A VPRF. 
"'A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20, 1. I, Kumykin to 
Novikov, 23 March, 1946. 
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pan of a subtle Norwegian plan to renew the talks which had 
ended in Aprill945. On Abramov's recommendation, the Trade 
Representative was instructed not to "force" (forsirovat) the 
matter.196 In July 1946 Trygve Lie reportedly advised the 
Soviets to leave the Svalbard question in abeyance, if they 
wished to avoid American countermoves in Iceland. 197 
In the meantime Molotov's subordinates in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (the Commissariat was renamed in March 1946) 
became increasingly worried by the development of Norway's 
relations with the western powers. In early June 1945 a number 
of reports and memoranda initiated by the Soviet Ambassador 
to Norway, Nikolai D. Kuznetsov, presented a broad analysis of 
Norway's political and economic international relations, and 
indicated the need for a more active Soviet policy towards the 
Norwegian government. As this assessment provides an addi-
tional clue to the hesitant Soviet attitude on the Svalbard 
question, I will outline its main contents. 
In the Soviet view, the Norwegian government conducted its 
foreign policy within the following framework: on the one hand, 
it was restricted by an exceedingly strong British influence 
based both on British strategic interests and on the close Norwe-
gian-British political and military cooperation which had 
continued after the war, and on the other hand, by genuine 
Norwegian efforts to continue the policy of "bridge building" 
and to develop relations with the USSR. Kuznetsov in particular 
stressed the fact that the Norwegian government was struggling 
to avoid becoming involved in political schemes which might 
196 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20, 1. 2, Abramov to 
Novikov, 25 March, 1946; ibid., letter from NKID to the Ministry 
for External Trade (ME1) of 4 April, and from the MET to the 
NKID of 6 May. 
197 According to a document from the British Foreign Office, as 
paraphrased in Knut Einar Eriksen, op. cit. (cf. note 8), p. 153, note 
53. 
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compromise its effons to develop relations with all the great 
powers. For this reason the Norwegians were for instance 
allegedly resisting British and Swedish pressure to support the 
creation of an anti-Soviet Scandinavian bloc. Despite the need 
to accommodate strong British interests, the Norwegian govern-
ment was perfectly aware of the role of the USSR in interna-
tional politics: 
the Norwegian government strives to strengthen relations with the 
Soviet Union, but in a way which will not produce dissatisfaction 
on the part of other states, primarily the United States and England. 
In Kuznetsov's opinion, the "struggle for Norway" was at the 
core of the efforts of the western powers to increase their 
influence in the whole of Scandinavia.198 
Kuznetsov also argued that Norwegian conservative politi-
cians and business circles were of the opinion that the Soviet 
Union would be of increasing importance as a market for 
Norwegian expons. There was allegedly "a wide feeling" that 
the Soviet Union would eventually take over the role which 
Germany had played before the war, politically and economical-
ly.',. 
The Norwegians, according to Kuznetsov, were perfectly 
aware that Norwegian independence could only be secured if 
there were good relations between Norway and_ the Soviet 
Union. Even in military questions, therefore, the Norwegians 
"' AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 41, d. 681,11. 83-85, Kuznetsov to 
Molotov, 25 July, 1946. 
199 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 11, p. 119, d. 311,1. 1, "Spravka. Vne~h­
niaia politika Norvegii", signed by Kuznetsov on 8 June, 1946. 
This is part two of the Ambassador's general report for 1945. 
Kuznetsov had presented the same argument in late 1945, urging 
the Soviet government to respond positively to the declared desire 




wanted to balance their close cooperation with the British by 
developing ties with the USSR. This could mean Norwegian 
procurement of Soviet weapons, the sending of Soviet instruc-
tors to Norway and Norwegian officers to Soviet military 
training institutions, and the development of closer contacts 
between the Soviet and Norwegian military leaderships. 
Although the Norwegians would not, according to Kuznetsov, 
agree to participate in a "military bloc" with the Soviets 
(Kumetsov did not specify what kind of military bloc he had in 
mind), one conld initiate forms of direct cooperation, such as 
joint mine sweeping in North-Norwegian waters.200 
Kuznetsov did not include a solution to the Svalbard question 
in his recommendation on steps which should be taken to 
strengthen the Soviet Union's position in Norway. Implying that 
too strong a pressure might jeopardise the fundamentally 
friendly attitude of the Norwegian government, he argued that 
this matter [i.e. the S valbard discussions] has become much wider, 
having already outgrown the framework of Soviet-Norwegian 
relations. The Norwegians, who want to keep these islands for 
themselves, have made the Svalbard case a topic of concern to all 
the great powers, and in particular to England and the USA. 2m 
Kuznetsov's evaluation of the Norwegian government's attitude 
was based partly on information provided by the new Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange""' at a closed session of the 
200 A VPRF, f. 07, op. 11, p. 19, d. 308, I. 9, "Dokladnaia 
zapiska o neobkhodimykh meropriatiakh po ukrepleniiu olnoshenii 
s Norvegiei", signed by Kuznetsov on 6 June, 1946. 
201 Ibid. 
202 On 30 January 1946 Lie accepted the nomination to become 
the first Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, and 
Halvard Lange succeeded him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The 
Soviets were initially uncertain about Lange' s political profile. In 
February 1946 Kuznetsov argned that Lange was committed to 
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Storting on 14 May. In his speech, which had somehow been 
reported to Kuznetsov, Lange suggested that lhe question might 
be considered from a new angle as bolh Norway and the Soviet 
Union were members of lhe United Nations, an approach which 
had been suggested by lhe British in November 1945. Lange 
also said, however, lhat according to Rolf Andvord this would 
be unlikely to satisfy the Russians, who continued to see the 
Svalbard question as primarily a Soviet-Norwegian affair. 
Lange's presentation to lhe Storting also documented lhe fact 
that the Norwegian government was acutely aware there might 
be a direct link between the Svalbard question on the one hand, 
and lhe American proposals on Iceland and Greenland on the 
olher.Z03 
Kuznetsov's report was read by Molotov, who forwarded it 
to Vyshinskii, Dekanozov and Novikov.204 The document 
prompted lhe new head of lhe 5111 European Department, 
Aleksandr Abramov, and his subordinates Vetrov and Maevskii, 
continuing Lie's foreign policy line, "i.e. to do everything to avoid 
Norway becoming an additional factor contributing to the disaccord 
between lhe great powers". A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 132, d. 39, 
ll. 4-5, Kuznetsov's "spravka" on Lange, 1 February, 1946. The 
Soviets rapidly became highly critical of the new Norwegian 
Foreign Minister. In a lengthy evaluation from mid-1948 ofLange 
the politician, he is characterised as a "convinced anglophile" and 
an enemy of the Soviet Union. Cf. A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 148, 
d. 37, ll. 39-46, Afanasiev to Abramov, 16 August 1948, enclosing 
Loginov's spravka on Lange. 
"" The verbatim reports were received in the NKID from 
Kuznetsov on 17 and 18 June, 1946. They are strictly in accord-
ance with what Lange actually said in the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on 8 May, and at the closed session of the Storting on 14 
May. AVPRF, f. 012, op. 7, p. 112, d. 329, ll. 10-11, exttact from 
Lange' s declaration of 14 May, 1946. 
204 Cf. Molotov's signature on a copy of the document in 
AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 41, d. 681, I. 61 et passim. 
108 
to compose for Molotov an alarming report on developments in 
Norway. The first sentences of the document read: 
The question of strengthening our position in Norway demands an 
immediate solution. We cannot accept that Norway, which has a 
common border with us and which is of great significance with 
regard to safeguarding our security in Northern Europe, should be 
completely included in the sphere of influence of the anglo-saxon 
powers, Britain in particular. 
However, British efforts to press the Norwegians into partici-
pating in the British anti-Soviet schemes met resistance in 
Norway, wher.;: the Soviet Union still occupied a strong position 
in public opinion and in influential political circles. In March 
1946, therefore, the Norwegian government had allegedly 
decided "at a secret meeting" to strengthen political and 
economic ties with the Soviet Union in order to counterbalance 
the British influence. Halvard Lange had reportedly told the 
Storting that the Norwegian government wanted to develop ties 
with the Soviet Union, but that the Soviet government's policy 
vis-a-vis Norway hindered these efforts. 
In view of all this, according to Abramov, the Soviet govern-
ment should consider initiating a whole series of new political, 
economic and cultural moves in order to exploit the Norwegian 
desire for closer relations with the Soviet Union. First of all, 
Ambassador Kuznetsov should be instructed to sound out lhe 
attitude in political and governmental circles 
towards the possibility of concluding an agreement of alliance and 
friendship (dogovor o soiuze i druzhbe) between Norway and the 
USSR, exploiting for this purpose the agreement with Norway on 
common defence of the Spitsbergen islands and Bear Island.'"' 
205 A VPRF, f. 07, op. 12, p. 26, d 339, 11. 1-7, "0 nashei 
politike po otnosheniiu k Norvegii", signed by Abramov, Maevskii 
and Vetrov on 2 July, 1946. The document bears Molotov's 
commen~ dated 7 July, "To be discussed" (Nado obsudit). 
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It seems therefore to have been assumed within the Ministry 
apparat in the summer of 1946 that there already existed a de 
facto agreement between Nmway and the Soviet Union on the 
common defence of Svalbard, despite the absence of a Soviet 
reaction to the Norwegian draft declaration of 9 April 1945. 
Among the group's ideas there was also a proposal to open 
Soviet consulates in Kirkenes, "Tromsl<} or Yard!<}", Trondheim 
and Bergen, "in order to strengthen our ability to control (v 
tseliakh usileniia kontrolia za) Norway's western coastline", and 
to reach agreement on leasing an airport "for use by our civil 
aviation" _206 
Mikhail A. Silin, the head of the personnel department and 
a member of the Collegium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
supported the idea of exploring the "desire in political and 
government circles in Norway" for an "agreement on alliance 
and friendship" with the Soviet Union. He objected to the idea 
of opening additional Soviet consulates, because this would lead 
to Norwegian requests for permission to open a number of new 
consulates in the Soviet Union. Apart from these measures, and 
in line with the traditions in Soviet foreign policy, Silin believed 
strongly in the effect of "correct information" and "cultural ties" 
as vehicles for strengthening the Soviet Union's position in 
Norway.Z07 
206 Ibid., Abramov, Maevskii and Velrov, 2 July, 1946. 
2lfl A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 129, d. 5, I. 34, Silin to Lozov-
skii, 11 July, 1946. There is a certain similarity to contempor-
aneous American evaluations of Soviet intentions in Norway. In a 
letter of 25 January 1946 to Under Secretary of State Acheson, the 
United States Ambassador in Oslo talked about the "ideological 
slruggle" which was going on in Norway as well as in other 
countries, and he also made recommendations for measures to be 
taken. Among the most important were the slrengthening of the 
information service at the embassy and the gathering of intelligence 
on the Soviet Union and on local communists. Osborne, just like 
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Molotov read the memorandum, and signalled that he would 
discuss its ideas with his subordinates. However, he became 
occupied with a number of more urgent tasks, such as the Paris 
Peace Conference and the first General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and it appears that the memorandum was never 
discussed.'"' 
Autumn 1946: Molotov makes his move 
When Molotov met Halvard Lange in Paris on 2 August 1946, 
he expressed the hope that the two governments would "find the 
time to conclude the talks on Spitsbergen". He did not, apparent-
ly, remonstrate when the Norwegian Foreign Minister made the 
point that "there was no need to hurry", and that it might be 
appropriate to consider the idea of joint defence "in the light of 
the demands of the Military Staff Committee of the United 
Nations". Molotov made it clear, however, that it was now up 
to the Soviet government to produce a response to the Norwe-
Kuznetsov, argued that Norway's position was important A study 
from the North European Divisior; of the State Deparlrnent from 
July 1946 described Soviet policy towards Scandinavia as 
"designed to slrengthen its [i.e. the Soviet Union's] relations with 
the countries in that area, to increase their economic dependence on 
the USSR and thereby make them less likely to oppose Soviet 
proposals in the United Nations, to weaken the influence of the 
western powers in Scandinavia, particularly that of the UK, and to 
prevent the establishment of a close political relationship among 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden which might lead to the creation of 
a northern bloc." Cf. Geir Lundestad, op. cit. (cf. note 167), pp. 58-
59. 
""This is according to a later letter from Novikov to Molotov; 
A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 5, ll. 5-6, Novikov to Molotov, 
5 January, 1947. 
Ill 
gian draft declaration of 9 April 1945.""' When Lange and 
Molotov met a few days later they discussed only matters 
relating to the Peace Conference. 210 Mikhail Vetrov concluded 
a few days later that Molotov and Lange had discussed "the 
publication of the declaration about joint defence of the Spits-
bergen archipelago",211 and that the Soviet side had left in 
abeyance the idea of a "condominium".212 
The renewed Soviet interest in Svalbard was related to the 
Soviet government's decision of 29 August 1946 to resume coal 
mining on Spitsbergen. The Council of Ministers approved an 
ambitious programme for the development of Soviet economic 
entetprises in Barentsburg, Grumant City and Pyramiden, 
including the establishment of housing for workers and a radio 
communications network. This decision was the outcome of the 
exploratory work of the expedition sent to Spitsbergen in 
September 1945, and was motivated by the need to produce coal 
for the northern fleet and Russia's northern regions.213 The 
Soviet decision to step up its activities on Spitsbergen also 
apparently reflected its growing concern over an alleged rapid 
expansion of the Norwegian presence on the island. The officials 
""AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 2, d. 11, U. 10-16, minute from 
Molotov's conversation with Lange on 2 August, 1946. There is no 
significant discrepancy between this document and Lange' s version, 
in NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Lange's minutes of 2 August, 1946. 
210 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 2, d. 11, U. 31-34, minute from 
Molotov's conversation with Lange on 7 Augnst, 1946. 
211 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20, I. 8, Vetrov to Deka-
nozov, 4 September, 1946. 
212 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, <l 20, I. 14, Vetrov to Deka-
nozov, 5 September, 1946. 
213 A VPRF, f. 116, op. 29, p. 23, d. 15, Council of Ministers' 
decision No. 1951 of29 Augnst, 1946. The decision also contained 
a secret addition. This, however, is not included in ihe copy I was 
allowed to consult. 
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of the 5th European Department were however not well versed 
in the state of Soviet economic affairs on Spitsbergen, and in 
late July they asked the Ministry for the Coal Industry for 
information.'14 It turned out that nothing had been done since 
the return of the September 1945 expedition sent to Spitsbergen 
to investigate the state of Soviet installations.215 
It was evident there was great concern for Soviet economic 
interests on Spitsbergen when Molotov discussed the whole 
question with Halvard Lange and Telje Wold, the chairman of 
the Storting Committee on Foreigu Relations, on 16 and 18 
November. Apan from Molotov and his intetpreter Pavlov, the 
head of the Second European Department and member of the 
Ministry's Collegium, Kirill V. Novikov, was present during the 
conversations in New York. 
Molotov began by reminding them that he had told Andvord 
that the Norwegian draft declaration of 9 April 1945 was 
acceptable in its main features (v osnovnom priemlem). Stress-
ing that he wanted to discuss the whole problem "informally" 
before the "written negotiations" commenced, Molotov then 
presented the Soviet government's point of view. 
1. Spitsbergen and Bear Island should be treated as a whole, i.e. 
any agreement should relate to Bear Island as well as to the 
main Spitsbergen archipelago. 
2. The Soviet Union was not only interested in the military 
aspects, but also in the economic ones, i.e. the regulations for 
the exploitation of coal on the islands. Molotov emphasised that 
the northern districts of the Soviet Union, and in particular 
Soviet merchant shipping in the North, could not manage 
without coal from Spitsbergen. Any alternative source would be 
214 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 131, d. 28, I. 5, Abrarnov to K.l. 
Pochenkov, 25 July, 1946. 
215 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 131, d. 28, I. 6, Pochenkov to 
Abrarnov, 26 Augnst, 1946. Cf. p. 82. 
113 
further away. Molotov did not specify exactly what he had in 
mind - he only wanted to tell the Norwegians that "the Soviet 
governmem is interested in the question of the coal on Spits-
bergen and wants a corresponding paragraph to be included in 
the draft declaration". 
3. In respect of the Norwegian proposals of March-April 1945 
for the joint defence of the archipelago, Molotov apparently 
wanted the Norwegians to confinn the various elements. He did 
not object to the stipulations in the Norwegian draft about the 
Soviet-Norwegian defence arrangement being a link in the 
security system sponsored by "the International Security 
Organisation", although he argued that the original wording 
should be retained, i.e. to avoid identifying the United Nations 
as this "International Security Organisation". He also wanted the 
Norwegians to confirm that the arrangement would be a regional 
red b th "0 . . 11 216 link in the system sponso y e rgarusauon . 
4. Molotov wanted to exclude the paragraph in the Norwegian 
draft which stated that all military installations should be on 
ground which was to be expropriated by the Norwegian 
government. Molotov argued that this paragraph was superflu-
ous, "in so far as the question of sovereignty is not brought up 
216 In a letter to Vetrov of 29 December 1946 the functioning 
head of the Legal and Treaty Department, Pereterskii, argued that 
the Declaration should not link the Soviet-Norwegian defence 
arrangement to the "International Security Organisation", because 
matters relating to the defence of the archipelago should be 
"independently" decided by the USSR and Norway, i.e. a reflection 
of the original Soviet attempt to bilateralise the issue. A VPRF, f. 
0116, op. 28, p. 131, d. 28, 11. 11-15, Pereterskii to Vettov, 29 
December, 1946. 
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in this document". He did not respond when Wold reminded 
him of his first idea of Spitsbergen as a "condominium" .211 
5. Finally, Molotov returned to the procedures for a 
renegotiation of the 1920 Treaty on Svalbard. He did not object 
when Lange emphasised that abrogation and renegotiation of the 
Treaty would have to be done in accordance with the rules of 
international law and taking into account the views of the 
signatory powers (apart from Japan and Italy, which both the 
Norwegians and the Soviets wanted to exclude from the 
process). 
However, Molotov proposed that the declaration should not 
mention which countries should take part in future negotiations 
on a new Treaty. Some countries which had not taken part in 
the negotiations in 1919-20 could be invited to the talks, such 
as Finland, while some of the original signatory powers (in 
addition to Japan and Italy) might be excluded. Although 
pressed by Wold, Molotov refused to specify which countries he 
had in mind (except Finland). One is tempted to conclude that 
Molotov was strongly disposed to obtain the Norwegians' 
consent to an international conference on Svalbard not limited 
to the signatory powers, at which countries of the emerging 
socialist bloc would support the Soviet view. 
Wold and Lange did not define their position on any of the 
points which Molotov raised. They did, however, signal that the 
Norwegian government, and even less the Starting, could hardly 
agree to the inclusion of Bear Island in the talks, and they also 
underlined the importance of Spitsbergen coal to the Norwegian 
economy. They tried, in vain, to force Molotov to explain the 
reasons for his suggestion that the Norwegian-Soviet declaration 
should not mention by name the countries which should take 
217 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 2, d. 13, 11. 25-29, Molotov's minute 
from conversation with Lange and Wold on 16 November, 1946. 
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part in a renegotiation of the Svalbard Treaty. Lange also 
suggested that the talks could start in the latter half of January 
1947. The Norwegian government would then have the oppor-
tunity of consulting the Storting, which would convene on 11 
January. Molotov, not surprisingly, preferred the venue of the 
talks to be Moscow.218 
On the same day as his first meeting with Lange and Wold, 
i.e. 16 November, Molotov sent telegraphic instructions to 
Moscow to present a revised version of lhe Norwegian draft 
declaration of 9 April 194 5 for Stalin's consideration. The 
document, which reflected the Soviet view presented by 
Molotov during his conversations with the two Norwegians, was 
approved by Stalin a few days laterY' 
When Molotov met Trygve Lie on I December, lhe latter 
told Molotov, apparently on his own initiative, that he had been 
informed about Molotov's conversations with Lange and Wold. 
Lie added that he had "strong! y advised Lange to continue 
[Lie's] line [ ... ], i.e. continue the talks wilh the Soviet govern-
ment". Molotov once more confirmed !hat the Norwegian draft 
declaration could be accepted with some minor changes, and 
that Norway and the Soviet Union "had nothing to quarrel 
about".120 
218 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 2, d. 13, ll. 30-37, Molotov's 
minutes from a talk with Lange and Wold on November 18, 1946. 
Lange's and Wold's version of the talk, in NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. 
III, does not significantly deviate from the Soviet miniltes. 
219 AVPRF, f. 012, op. 7, p. 112, d. 329, 11. 13-14, Dekanozov 
to Stalin, 16 November, 1946, with enclosure. 
""A VPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 2, d. 13, 11. 54-60, Molotov's minute 
from conversation with Lie on 1 December, 1946. It appears that 
there were two meetings between the two on this day, as there are 
two sets of minutes, only one mentioning Svalbard. 
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February 1947: Norway turns the tables 
Having established lhe preliminary Norwegian reactions to the 
Soviet proposals, Novikov presented Molotov with a paragraph-
by-paragraph discussion of lhe Norwegian draft of 9 Aprill945, 
outlining the amendments and changes to the original text which 
he hoped would be adopted during the forthcoming negotiations. 
According to Novikov, the conversations with Lange and Wold 
had made it clear that the Norwegian government was prepared 
to continue negotiations on the common defence of Svalbard. 
The basis for the negotiations should be lhe Norwegian docu-
ment of 9 April 1945. Novikov argued that the text was 
basically acceptable, and that only minor changes ought to be 
made in order to reach a final agreement. 
On the question of whether Bear Island should be included 
in the declaration and the defence arrangement, Novikov argued 
(correctly) that according to Norwegian usage and the 1920 
Treaty the expressions "Svalbard" and "Spitsbergen archipelago" 
which were used in the Norwegian text, included both the main 
Spitsbergen archipelago and the isolated Bear Island. The 
separate mention of Bear Island could, therefore, be omitted in 
the joint declaration, although "the future Agreement on 
Common Defence" must define what was meant by the express-
ions used. 
With regard to lhe inclusion of the Soviet-Norwegian defence 
arrangement in the system of the "International Security 
Organisation", Novikov argued that 
our active panicipation in the UNO and the obligations we have 
accepted with regard to this organisation, makes it impossible for 
us to object to the inclusion in the Declaration of a reference to the 
United Nations Organisation. 
The Soviet Union, according to Novikov, wanted to exclude 
Canada and the Netherlands from future talks on a Svalbard 
Treaty. The Norwegians, on the other hand, wanted to include 
Sweden, and for this reason could not accept the formulation 
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that talks should be held between "the interested Allied powers". 
Novikov suggested that the Soviet negotiators should propose a 
compromise solution, whereby the talks would include (apart 
from the USSR and Norway) France, Britain, the USA, Sweden, 
and other "directly interested powers". 
The Soviet Union would have to accept continued Norwegian 
sovereignty over Svalbard, and should even be prepared to 
accept the inclusion of a statement to this effect into the 
declaration.221 The paragraph in the Norwegian draft declar-
ation stating that military installations should be built on 
Norwegian government land or on territories to be expropriated 
by the Norwegian government, would have to be omitted or 
reformulated in order to make sure that the erection of military 
constructions on Soviet-owned land would not lead to the 
expropriation of these sites by the Norwegian government. 
Concerning the safeguarding of Soviet economic interests on 
Svalbard, the declaration should state that Soviet citizens and 
organisations should enjoy the same rights and privileges as 
their Norwegian counterparts. These Soviet demands, Novikov 
argued, did not contradict the stipulations of the existing Treaty. 
The Soviets should also, however, demand that Soviet citizens 
and organisations should have exclusive rights to coal-mining on 
their own land plots. Although the Norwegians would object to 
this (it also contradicted the stipulations of the 1920 Treaty), the 
Soviet negotiators should not yield on this point.222 
Thus, the Soviets were willing to accept the Norwegian text 
as the basis for the joint declaration. In early January 1947 
Molotov agreed to Novikov's proposal to reopen the Soviet 
"'Bear Island, nevertheless, was still tteated somewhat sepa-
rately. On 27 January 1947 Zhdanova signed a memorandum "On 
Bear Island as part of the Russian Empire", which argued that the 
island historically belonged to Russia. 
222 AVPRF, f. 116, op. 31, p. 26, d. 17, 11. 1-7, Novikov to 
Molotov, undated, probably late December, 1946. 
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consulate on Spitsbergen, thereby implying that he accepted 
Norway's sovereignty over the archipelago.= 
At the same time Novikov reminded Molotov of the memor-
andum of 2 July 1946 from Vetrov, Abramov and Maevskii,224 
i.e. on the need to end "the degree of passivity" which had 
characterised Soviet policy towards Norway since the end of the 
war. Arguing that the "Anglo-Saxons" continued to increase 
their influence in, and even their control over, Norwegian 
political, military and economic affairs, he proposed a set of 
measures aimed at strengthening the Soviet Union's position in 
Norway. Foremost among these was his recommendation that 
the negotiations on "common defence of the Spitsbergen 
archipelago and the abrogation of the Paris Treaty" should be 
fmalised. When this matter was concluded, the Soviet Ambas-
sador should be instructed to explore the possibilities for a 
Soviet-Norwegian treaty of "friendship and alliance". Novikov 
included with his letter to Molotov the draft of a Central 
Committee (i.e. Politburo) decision incorporating his ideas.225 
While the discussions with the Norwegians were in progress, 
various Soviet ministries were considering a number of propo-
sals from Norwegian owners of land on Spitsbergen who were 
offering their land for sale to the Soviet government. The 
economic branch ministries recommended the purchase of two 
of these plots, while the third, which was offered for sale by 
Norwegian citizen Artur S. Levin through an intermediary in 
New York:, was considered to be of predominant! y military-
strategic interest. Asked by the 5th European Department to 
223 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, l. 39, Novikov to 
Molotov, 3 January, 194 7, with Molotov's handwritten comment of 
5 January. 
224 Cf. pp. 108-109. 
225 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 5, 11. 5-6, Novikov to 
Molotov, 5 January 1947, with enclosed draft Central Committee 
decision. 
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evaluate its military value, Marshall Vasilevskii, the Chief of the 
General Staff, concluded that the plot would "be of great value" 
to the Soviet Navy. Although the location was far from ideal, it 
could be used to establish a "mobile naval base" (manevrennaia 
voenno-morskaia baza),226 an air-base for seaplanes in the 
summer months, and a landing strip on the ice during the 
winter. This would create "an advantageous operational regime" 
in the western parts of the Barents Sea and the Arctic. It would 
also improve the defence of Soviet communication lines, and 
extend the striking distance of the Soviet air force. Without 
mentioning the demilitarisation clause of the 1920 Treaty, 
Vasilevskii recommended starting negotiations to acquire the 
plot.227 
Commenting upon V asilevskii' s letter, Pereterskii, the 
temporary head of the Ministry's Legal and Treaty Department, 
reminded Vetrov that Svalbard was demilitarised, and that the 
Soviet Union had acceded to the Svalbard Treaty in 1935. His 
Department had not been involved in any discussion about an 
abrogation of the Treaty.'28 Despite this, Vetrov and Deka-
nozov subsequently recommended to Molotov that negotiations 
on the acquisition of all three plots should be started. 229 In 
mid-January Novikov informed Molotov about the offers. Con-
cerning the two which were of economic interest, Novikov 
226The interpretation of this phrase caused me some difficulties. 
It was explained to me by Russian naval officers that the word 
"manevrennaia" suggests a degree of mobility, but that in this 
context it is not part of standard Russian military termi.nology. 
m AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20,U. 17-18, Vasilevskii 
to Dekanozov, 12 October, 1946. 
m A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20, ll. 19-20, Pereterskii 
to Vetrov, 18 October, 1946. 
2J9 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 28, p. 130, d. 20, ll. 23-24, Vetrov to 
Dekanozov, 24 October 1946, with Dekanozov's handwritten 
comments. 
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recommended the Ministry for Foreign Affairs not to object to 
their acquisition. With regard to Levin's plot, Novikov referred 
to the General Staff's recommendation. He concluded never-
theless that there was no need to accept the offer "in view of the 
forthcoming Soviet-Norwegian agreement on common defence 
of the Spitsbergen archipelago" .230 
Thus, in late January 1947 Molotov and his subordinates in 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were ready to propose to Stalin 
reopening of the negotiations with the Norwegians. In a letter of 
28 January 1947 Novikov reminded Molotov of the matter, and 
proposed starting negotiations with the Norwegians in early 
February. At this point Novikov was aware that the Norwegian 
government, allegedly under British pressure and influence, was 
in the process of changing its attitude towards the idea of 
common defence. According to Novikov, the Norwegian 
government had decided to resume the talks, but to decline 
participation in a defence arrangement which might be inter-
preted as a sign that Norway was heading towards participation 
"in the eastern bloc of states". Novikov proposed making an oral 
statement to the Norwegian Ambassador that the Soviet govern-
ment wanted to renew the negotiations, in Moscow, "on the 
basis of the Declaration on common defence of the Spitsbergen 
archipelago which had been presented by the Norwegian 
side11 ?31 
On 29 January Molotov signed a letter to Stalin, repeating 
the arguments and propositions of Novikov's message of 27 
January. It is unclear, however, whether Stalin actually received 
this letter. In any case, Molotov apparently decided in the early 
230 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936,1. 1, Novikov to Molotov, 
20 January 1947. From other documents it appears that Molotov 
asked for additional information from the General Staff. 
231 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, ll. 8-9, Novikov to 
Molotov, 27 January 1947, with enclosed draft of oral statement to 
the Norwegian Ambassador. 
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days of February to make some further inquiries before imple-
mentation of the plan. 232 
The decision of the Norwegian Storting during a closed 
session on February 15 to reject the idea of a Norwegian-Soviet 
common defence of Svalbard preempted the Soviet initiative. 
However, the Norwegian parliamentarians agreed to start 
negotiations on the 1920 Treaty in order to make it more 
"satisfactory". Despite the extremely polite wording of the 
Storting's resolution, it was absolutely clear in its rejection of 
discussions with a foreign power "about the defence of a region 
under Norwegian sovereignty".233 On 17 February the Norwe-
gian Ambassador to Moscow, H.C. Berg, delivered to Novikov 
a letter from Lange to Molotov containing the resolution. In his 
letter Lange also suggested that Norwegian-Soviet talks on a 
revision of the 1920 Treaty should start in Oslo, and he made it 
clear that the Norwegian government would publish the Star-
ting's resolution in the near future. 234 
It seems likely that the Soviet delay, which gave the Norwe-
gians sorely needed time to conclude their internal deliberations, 
was caused by developments set in motion by an article in The 
Times on January 10. This reported that the Soviet government 
had "requested facilities from the Norwegian government for 
military bases on Spitsbergen Island". The international press at 
once linked the Soviet demands to American efforts to secure 
232 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d 936, 11. 111-112, Molotov to 
Stalin, 29 January 1947, with Molotov's handwritten note of 3 
February "Predvaritelno prozondirovat". So far I have not been able 
to establish what Molotov's intention was: to informally sound out 
the position of the Norwegians, or to get Stalin's opinion before 
sending him the prepared letter. 
"'The resolution is printed in Johan Jf/lrgen Holst,Norsk sikker-
hetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv, Oslo 1967, Vol. 11, pp. 63-64. 
234 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 61, d. 923, 11. 7-8, RIISsian transla-
tion ofl..ange's letter to Molotov of 15 February, 1947. 
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bases on Iceland and Greenland. On 15 January TASS published 
the official Soviet version of the talks,'35 much to the dis-
pleasure of the Norwegian government, which published its own 
version a few days later.236 The Danish press and Danish 
politicians at once drew the parallel between Svalbard and 
Greenland and Iceland, and the Danish government was forced 
officially to deny rumours that it planned to sell Greenland to 
the United States. On 10 February Krasnaia Zvezda, the 
newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, published an 
article on the "Grenlandskaia problema" by the authoritative 
commentator P. Rysakov. The article, not surprisingly, attacked 
the rumoured US plans to buy Greenland, and stressed the 
strategic importance of the arctic regions.237 This renewed 
focus on Greenland finally compelled the Danish government to 
deliver a note to the United States government requesting 
negotiations on the abrogation of the war-time defence arrange-
ment.238 Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that 
Molotov left Lange's letter without a reply, waiting for the 
"appropriate moment" to arrive. 
235 Printed in Norwegian translation in Johan Jl!rgen Hoist, op. 
cit. (cf. note 233), Vol. I!, p. 58. 
236 Printed in ibid., pp. 59-61. 
231 Mary Dau, op. cit. (cf. note 84), p. 154. 
238 Cf. pp. 133-134. 
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6. 1947-1953: The return to status quo 
After the Norwegian Stoning's decision of 15 February 1947, 
and Lange's letter to Molotov which followed two days later, 
the Soviets made no serious attempts to revive the Norwegian-
Soviet negotiations on a change in Svalbard's international 
status. Although MID bureaucrats continued to argue the need 
for a more "active" Soviet policy towards Norway, including a 
solution to the Svalbard question and some form of Soviet-
Norwegian defence arrangement or treaty of alliance, Soviet 
foreign policy makers were rapidly moving towards a defence of 
status quo as the mainstay of Soviet policy on Svalbard. This 
general trend notwithstanding, the idea of a bilateral arrange-
ment on Svalbard proved to be rather resilient. Only Norway's 
entry into the Atlantic Pact put an end to Soviet efforts to 
fmalise the negotiations begun in November 1944. Moreover, 
the decision effectively ruined any hopes that still existed for a 
separate Soviet-Norwegian defence or alliance arrangement for 
mainland Norway. The Soviets thereafter concentrated on 
thwarting the establishment of allied bases in Norway, basing 
their efforts on the Norwegian government's declaration on that 
issue of 1 February 1949.239 The Soviet notes of October and 
November 1951 embodied the formal departure from the attempt 
to revise the Svalbard regime which had been initiated by 
Molotov in November 1944. The notes also reflected genuine 
Soviet fears that the western powers were in the process of 
establishing a permanent military presence in mainland Norway. 
At this point the Soviets may have realised that their attempts 
from 1944 to 1947 to create a separate Soviet-Norwegian 
agreement on Svalbard were largely misguided, in that they 
supplied further ammunition to the pro-western camp in 
Norway. 
239 Cf. note 282. 
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Soviet reactions to Norway's preemption 
In his March 194 7 message to Molotov the Soviet Ambassador 
to Norway, Nikolai Kuznetsov, argued that the Norwegian 
government's change of mind stemmed from American and 
British pressure. He quoted Teije Wold, the chairman of the 
Storting' s Committee on Foreign Relations, who had asked 
Kuznetsov to tell Molotov that "we try as best as we can to 
solve the Spitsbergen question to the mutual satisfaction of both 
governments", but, unfortunately, in this case Norway was under 
"the influence of the other great powers" .2AO 
Although Kuznetsov felt that for the time being the Norwe-
gians would not agree to the idea of joint defence of Svalbard, 
he strongly advised Molotov to accept the invitation inherent in 
Lange 's letter to start negotiations on revising the 1920 Treaty. 
The aim of such negotiations should be to secure Soviet 
economic interests on Svalbard, and to get the Norwegians to 
agree that a revised treaty should provide the legal basis for a 
"regional agreement on the defence of the Spitsbergen archipe-
lago" between Norway, the USSR, Finland and Sweden, in 
accordance with Article 43 of the UN Charter. A Soviet-
Norwegian declaration, and Norwegian acceptance of the need 
to revise the Treaty, would "make it possible for the Soviet 
Union, with Norway's help, to strengthen its position in the area 
240 This is Kuznetsov's version. Did Wold actually say this? He 
actively took part in the phrasing of the Starting's decision, and 
gave his support to the new policy line, although he had supported 
Lie's policy. On the other hand, Wold may have wanted to lake the 
sting out of the Starting's decision by blaming the western powers. 
He was not always discriminating in his choice of words. 
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of the Spitsbergen archipelago, and to shield itself (ogradit 
sebia) from the Anglo-American bloc in this area".241 
Contrary to what the Soviets thought, the British and the 
Americans had from the very beginning adopted a rather 
ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet attempts to reach an 
agreement with the Norwegians on Svalbard. The Norwegian 
Starting's decision in February 1947 was not the result of 
American and British pressure. Although both the British and 
the Americans had been informed about Molotov's demands 
soon after his initiative in November 1944, the Norwegians did 
not involve the western Allies in the discussion, and did not 
request any kind of diplomatic or political support.242 In fact, 
as late as July 1945 prominent Americans were sympathetic to 
the Soviet demands. The Acting Chairman of the State-War-
Navy Committee, John D. Hickerson, pointed out that the 
"interest of the Soviet Union in acquiring military bases" on 
Svalbard "is natural" in view of its wartime experience of 
safeguarding the convoys to Murmansk. The Joint Chiefs were 
of a similar opinion.243 Although the American delegation to 
the Potsdam Conference had been instructed to oppose Soviet 
demands for military bases on Svalbard if the matter were 
brought up during the talks, the Americans were inclined to 
accept an arrangement which included exclusive rights for 
United States bases on Iceland and Greenland as the price for 
Soviet bases on Svalbard. The underlying American attitude was 
highlighted by the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral William 
D. Leahy, who stated that 
241 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d 936, 11. 121-124, Kuznetsov 
to Molotov, 10 March, 1947; and the embassy's report for the year 
1947, in f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 9, ll. 43-44. 
242 Cf. Knut Einar Eriksen, "Svalbardsp0rsmAlet fra krig tilkald 
krig" (cf. note 3), pp. 143-144. 
243 Geir Lundestad, op.cit (cf. note 167), p. 67. 
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it was difficult for him to see that there were any military implica-
tions in the acquisition by Russia of bases in Bear Island and the 
Spitsbergen Archipelago."" 
The British took even less interest in Svalbard, and from the 
beginning did not show very much anxiety over Molotov's 
demands. They could in any case not prevent the Russians from 
establishing themselves there if Moscow found it expedient to 
do so.245 In November 1945 the British suggested to the 
Norwegians that the Soviet demands could be diluted by 
proposing that a defence arrangement would have to be in 
accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, i.e. it 
would be a link in a regional defence system under Security 
Council control.246 In March 1951 the British Chiefs of Staff 
concluded that Svalbard was of no strategic value to Great 
Britain.247 
In January and February 1947 when the Soviet demands on 
Svalbard were being discussed by the international press, both 
US and British government spokesmen declared that they took 
it for granted that their governments would be consulted before 
Norway and the Soviet Union made an agreement. They also 
rejected the Soviet argument that the Paris Treaty could no 
longer be considered valid. This did not mean, however, that the 
Americans at any rate were totally against a Norwegian-Soviet 
arrangement. Following the discussions in the international press 
""!bid, p. 67. 
245 Rolf Tarnnes, The United States and the Cold War in the 
High North (cf. note 8), p. 37; Knut Einar Eriksen, "Great Britain 
and the Problem of Bases in the Nordic Area" (cf. note 8), p. 140. 
246 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Lie's minutes from conversation with Sir 
Laurence Collier on 5 November 1945. 
247 The evolution of the British position is conveniently summar-
ised in Knut Einar Eriksen, ibid., pp. 158-163. Cf. also Rolf 
Tarnnes, Svalbard mellom @st og Vest. Kald krig og /avspenning 
i nord 1947-1953 (cf. note 4), p. 18. 
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and the publication of the Soviet and Nmwegian official 
statements, the Norwegian Ambassador in Washington reponed-
ly talked to "a senior official in the State Department". who said 
that no decision had been taken with regard to the anitude of the 
United States government. The same source suggested, on the 
other hand, that it might be in the interest of the United States 
if the Soviet Union and Norway were to agree on the defence of 
Svalbard. The Soviet government would not then be in a 
position to protest against similar US effons on Greenland and 
elsewhere in the Arctic. 248 This recurrent idea of a quid pro 
quo deal reflected Svalbard's subordinate role within overall 
American military-strategic thinking. Although a considerable 
degree of attention was devoted to Svalbard in the early postwar 
years, it never acquired a place in US doctrines or strategic 
planning comparable to that of, say, Iceland and Greenland. 
American strategic thinking on Svalbard gradually turned 
towards the need to deny the Soviets access to the archipelago, 
although there was no need for the western powers themselves 
to establish bases on Svalbard. American analyses from June 
1948, August 1949 and January 1952 all concluded that the 
United States had no interest in establishing "facilities" on 
Svalbard, but that on the other hand it was imponant to deny 
use of the island to any hostile power. 249 
The matter was apparently never the object of direct talks 
between the Soviet government and the British or the Ameri-
cans. It was not discussed at the Potsdam Conference or at later 
bilateral and trilateral conferences, and the Soviets did not give 
any hint, for instance, that there was a link between their 
248 NMFA, 36.6/10 A, Vol. N, Morgenstieme to Lange, 24 
January, 1947. 
""Rolf Tamnes, Svalbard mellom @st og Vest. Kald krig og 
lavspenning i nord 1947-1953, pp. 10-11 (cf. note 8); cf. also the 
same author's The United States and the Cold War in the High 
North (cf. note 8), pp. 46-49. 
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demands on Svalbard and their complaints in the summer of 
1945 about the western Allies' policy in Northern Norway. 
With his message to Molotov of March 1947 Kuznetsov 
enclosed a draft reply from Molotov to Lange. The gist of the 
draft was a firm rejection ofLange's arguments, but at the same 
time it accepted the invitation to start negotiations on a revision 
of the 1920 Treaty.250 Another letter from Molotov to Einar 
Gemardsen, the Norwegian Prime Minister, which was drafted 
on Molotov's order but never sent, reminded the Norwegians 
that the idea of joint defence was, as a matter of fact, a Norwe-
gian proposal. This draft letter concluded that the Soviet 
government had not changed its view, and that the Norwegian 
position as presented in Lange's letter was "unfounded".251 
I have not been able to find documents which specify the 
immediate reasons for the decision not to reply to Lange 's letter. 
The need to take into account American demands for bases on 
Greenland and Iceland has been mentioned as one likely reason. 
Another reason for Molotov's hesitant attitude may have been 
the increasing realisation that Soviet pressure on the Svalbard 
question might strengthen the pro-western forces in Norway to 
the detriment of Soviet interests. Mikhail F. Cherkasov, a first 
secretary at the Soviet embassy in Norway, wrote in a repon in 
March that "Tranmrel, Haakon Lie and other vicious anti-
sovetshchiki" had exploited the Svalbard question to anack the 
Soviet Union. 252 Molotov, however, continued to show an 
interest in the Svalbard archipelago's strategic value. The 
General Staff was asked for the second time to evaluate the 
250 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, ll. 121-124, Kuznetsov 
to Molotov, 10 March, 1947. 
251 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936,ll. 101-03, memorandum 
sent to Molotov on 8 March 1947, signed by deputy foreign 
minister Iakov A. Malik and Kirill V. Novikov. 
252 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, Cherlcasov to MID, 
most likely from March 1947. 
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strategic potential of the land which had been offered for sale by 
Artur S. Levin. The General Staff concluded that it would be 
"desirable" for the USSR to have air and naval bases on 
Spitsbergen. However, the matter would have to be investigated 
further on site, and General V asilevskii therefore proposed 
sending a group of military specialists to Spitsbergen to study 
suitable locations for the construction of such bases. Military 
specialists ought also to be included in the staff of the reopened 
Soviet consulate. It is apparent from Vasilevskii's letter to 
Molotov that the General Staff had not produced any extensive 
study of Svalbard's potential as a location for Soviet military 
bases.'53 
Soviet strategic reassessments 
In all likelihood the idea of Soviet-controlled military bases on 
Svalbard was still largely the pet of the geopoliticians in the 
MID bureaucracy, and not a reflection of strategic realities in the 
High North as viewed by the Army and Navy General Staffs or 
the defence Ministries. However, a more than tentative evalu-
ation of Svalbard's place in Soviet strategic thinking in the early 
postwar years must await the opening of the Russian military 
archives for this period. The emerging Soviet interest from 1939 
onwards in Svalbard in the strategic context reflected pre-Cold 
War notions of global warfare in general, and maritime warfare 
in particular. The focus was on the defence of maritime supply 
routes, i.e. the classical role of navies and naval aviation. 
Although Svalbard had proved to be too inaccessible and distant 
to be of much value for either of the belligerents during the war, 
technological developments in the postwar years created the 
253 A VPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 61, d. 935, 11. 22-23, Vasilevskii to 
Molotov, 21 April, 1947. 
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possibility that the archipelago might play an additional role in 
the intercontinental offensive strategies of the two superpowers. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Soviet Navy in general 
and the Northern Fleet in particular were still vastly inferior to 
the combined forces of the western powers. Western evaluations 
of Svalbard's strategic value to the Soviet Union focused, 
therefore, on its potential role as a base for Soviet long-range 
aviation. In the latter 1940s American analysts argued that 
possession of bases on Svalbard could significantly increase 
Soviet ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations, 
although adverse climatic conditions reduced the practicability 
of having bases on the archipelago. In January 1947 the Chiefs 
of Staff claimed that a Soviet presence on Svalbard "would have 
an offensive potential against the United States", and make it 
possible for the Soviets to strike targets in the USA 5-10 years 
earlier than they would otherwise have been able to do.254 
Recent breakthroughs in aviation technology and the anticipation 
of further advances created an atmosphere of technological 
optimism which also influenced evaluations of Svalbard's 
strategic significance. The Norwegian Defence Staff argued in 
February 1947 that the importance of the Arctic regions for air 
operations made the possession of Northern Norway, Svalbard 
with Bear Island, and Jan Mayen "of great strategic importance 
in a war between the great powers".255 
As part of the debate about the alleged "bomber gap" in the 
United States in the late 1940s it was suggested that the Soviets 
might use bases on Svalbard for offensive operations against the 
American continent with TU-4 bombers, which could reach 
254 Rolf Tamnes, Sva/bard mellom fiJst og Vest. Ka/d krig og 
lavspenning i nord 1947-1953 (cf. note 4), p. 16; and the same 
author's The United States and the Cold War in the High North (cf. 
note 8), pp. 46-47; and Geir Lundestad, op.cit. (cf. note 167), p. 72. 
"'Rolf Tamnes, Sva/bard me//om (iJst og Vest. Ka/d krig og 
/avsperming i nord 1947-1953 (cf. note 4), p. 19. 
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targets in the USA on one-way trips. The Americans probably 
overrated Soviet capacity; at this stage the Soviets were scarcely 
capable of striking targets in the USA. 256 The Americans also 
overrated the strength of the Soviet Northern Fleet: 
US assessments of a growiog threat from the Soviet Northern Fleet 
proved to be a mistake: the Soviet fleet continued to have a more 
defensive and local profile, and lower priority than expected was 
given to the Northern Fleet in the late forties.""' 
Svalbard was not of primary interest to the Soviets in the early 
period of the Cold War, and could never compete with, say, 
their focus on the Black Sea Straits. The Soviet pressure on 
Turkey, which began in the spring of 1945 and which was one 
of the main factors behind the declaration of the "Truman 
doctrine" in 1947, was in stark contrast to the cautious Soviet 
approach to Svalbard. Most likely the conclusions of Soviet 
military analysts mirrored those of their American counterparts: 
it was more important to deny the western great powers control 
over Svalbard than for the Soviet Union to create its own 
military bases on the archipelago.258 
Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the geostrategically-minded 
bureaucrats of the MID apparat who continued to press for 
finalisation of the Svalbard negotiations. In early May 1947 
Kuznetsov urged Molotov to reopen the talks on Svalbard, and 
to start talks with Norway on "a pact against German aggres-
sion". As usual, Kuznetsov presented his proposals as measures 
aimed at curtailing the rising American and British influence in 
156 Ibid, p. 14; and the same author's The United States and the 
Cold War in the High North (cf. note 8), pp. 45-46. 
2S7 Ibid, p. 55. 
"" This interpretation is in acconlance with previous research 
based on Norwegian and western sowces. Cf. for instance Knot 
Einar Eriksen, "Svalbardsp!<lrsmfllet fra krig til kald krig", (cf. note 
3), pp. 157-158. 
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Norway.259 Later the same month Vettov wrote once more to 
Molotov, urging him to finalise the negotiations with the 
Norwegians. He argued, mistakenly, that the Danish government 
had declared its willingness to start negotiations with the 
Americans on the establishment of US military bases on 
Greenland, and that presumably the negotiations would lead to 
a result "satisfactory to the USA". Vetrov concluded: 
[nhis situation presents a particularly convenient occasion to renew 
the negotiations with the Norwegians on joint Soviet-Norwegian 
·· defence of Spitsbergen which were discontinued in February this 
year. The aim of the negotiations should be to solve the overdue 
(nazrevshee) question of the Spitsbergen archipelago, and to exert 
pressure on the Danish-American negotiations on Greenland. 
Vetrov enclosed with his memorandum the draft of a letter from 
Molotov to Lange, based on the draft written by Malik and 
Novikov in March. The letter concluded by expressing the 
Soviet government's desire "to continue in the very near future 
and on the earlier basis the negotiations on a revision of the 
Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920" .'"' 
Vetrov 's argnment was based on the premise that the Danish 
government had accepted the idea of US bases on Greenland. 
This was not the case: on 27 May the Danish government had 
asked the Americans to start negotiations on an abrogation of 
the Danish-American preliminary agreement of 9 April 1941, 
with the aim of ending the American military presence on 
Greenland. When this became clear in the MID, Zhdanova and 
Loginov sent a note to Vetrov, repudiating his argnments in 
favour of renewed Svalbard negotiations. It is also unclear, 
250 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 5, ll. 22-27, Kuznetsov 
to Molotov, 5 May, 1947. 
260 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, ll. 23-25, Vetrov to 
Molotov, 31 May 1947, with enclosed draft of letter from Molotov 
to Lange. 
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therefore, whether Vetrov's memorandum came to Molotov's 
attention at all. Zhdanova and Loginov argued that tltis was not 
the proper moment to put pressure on the Norwegians. It would 
be interpreted as "Soviet expansionist tendencies towards 
Svalbard", and would make it more difficult for the Danish 
government to insist on the abrogation of the April 1941 
agreement. A Soviet initiative on the Svalbard question should 
"as a minimum" be postponed until the Americans gave a 
negative reply to the Danish note of 27 May. Unfortunately for 
the Soviets, the Danish-American talks on Greenland continued 
without result until the creation of the Atlantic Pact, with 
Denmarlc as a member, prepared the ground for the permanent 
Danish-American agreement of 1951. 
Back to square one 
The memorandum from Zhdanova and Loginov contains the first 
hints that the Soviets were gradually adjusting their policies in 
the North Atlantic polar regions towards the maintenance of 
status quo. Zhdanova and Loginov argued that the USSR, not 
having military bases on Svalbard, should concentrate on 
fighting against any change in the existing situation in the Arctic 
Ocean in favour of the United States. Apart from issuing a 
declaration supporting the Danish position, the central Soviet 
press should emphasise that the retention of the American bases 
on Greenland would violate the existing balance of power in the 
region. Such a statement was obviously intended to strengthen 
the Danish position, and at the same time constitute a, clear 
warning that a continued American military presence on Green-
land could lead to renewed Soviet demands on Svalbard.'61 
261 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, ll. 26-27, Zhdanova 
and Loginov to Vetrov, 6 June, 1947. 
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The prevailing attitude in the MID was one of "wait-and-
see", partly hoping for a Norwegian initiative, panly expecting 
the "world situation" to provide an opportunity to raise the case 
again. In tltis respect the outcome of American efforts to 
establish permanent military bases on Greenland and Iceland 
would be of paramount importance. It was decided not to give 
the Norwegians the impression of Soviet impatience or pressure. 
The matter could be raised informally, in order to sound out the 
attitude of the Norwegian government, but at the same time to 
signal disagreement with the arguments in Lange 's letter of 
February 15.262 
The relatively optimistic Soviet interpretation of Norwegian 
attitudes may have been panly founded on a statement by 
Trygve Lie to Sergei A. Afanasiev, the new Soviet Ambassador 
to Norway, just after the latter's arrival in Oslo in July 1947. 
Lie was still not prepared to accept the Norwegian government's 
change of tack263, telling Afanasiev that he "regretted" that the 
Svalbard question had developed contrary to his intentions. He 
gave Afanasiev the following information: 
During his stay in Oslo in March, lie had brought to the attention 
of King Haakon, Gerhardsen and Lange the grave mistake which 
the government had committed with regard to the Soviet Union. In 
so far as the USA's demands for [bases on Greenland] were 
founded [on the need to create security for] the American conti-
nent, the Norwegians could [ ... ] through an agreement with the 
262 The preceding paragraph is a synthesis of a number of docu-
ments in the A VPRF; f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, I. 29, Zorin 
and Silin to Vyshinskii; ibid., I. 30, Kuznetsov to Vyshinskii, 21 
August, 1947; ll. 32-37, Kuznetsov's "Spravka" to Vyshinskii, 28 
August, 1947. 
263 On Lie's efforts to convince the Norwegian government to 
continue the policy line initiated by Lie and his advisors in London, 
cf. Knut Einar Eriksen, "Svalbardspfllrsm:ilet fra krig til kald krig" 
(cf. note 3). 
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Soviet Union on Spitsbergen create a basis for the defence of the 
European continenL This would not come into conflict with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Lie concluded: 
I advise you [ ... ] to be patient and await an appropriate moment to 
raise the Svalbanl question again. Such a moment might come 
soon, possibly after the local elections [ ... ].'"' 
Lie tried 10 convince the Soviet Ambassador that the Stoning's 
decision reflected domestic policy considerations, but that 
Labour Party and Communist victories in the local elections 
would weaken the conservative forces which stood behind it. Lie 
also !old Afanasiev that the western powers had not put pressure 
on the Norwegians to reject the Soviet initiative. Quite the 
opposite: in March 1947 Lie had asked George Marshall about 
the American attitude, and the American Secretary of State had 
answered that the United States would not interfere in the 
matter.265 
It seems likely that Lie's comments had the effect of giving 
additional weight 10 the view that the Soviet Union should not, 
for the time being, take the initiative in asking for the negoti-
ations to be resumed. 
The Soviets' adoption of a wait-and-see attitude also reflected 
their conviction that the Norwegians were deeply dissatisfied 
with the 1920 Treaty, which strongly limited and even under-
mined Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbanl. This, together with 
the importance to Norway of friendly relations with the USSR, 
meant that the Norwegians themselves would bring up the 
264 AVPRF, as quoted in f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, Jl. 32-37, 
Kuznetsov's "Spravka" to Vyshinskii, 28 August, 1947. In his 
memorandum, Kuznetsov quoted Afanasiev's report about the 
conversation. 
265 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 8, ll. 108-112, Afa-
nasiev's report from his conversation with Lie on 9 July, 1947. 
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question and ask for an answer 10 Lange 's letter. When in the 
summer of 1947 Vyshinskii was preparing to go to New Yorlc 
10 attend the General Assembly of the United Nations, he was 
briefed on this eventuality. It was also decided that Vyshinskii 
himself should not raise the matter. 
Kuznetsov, who was instructed to write a memorandum on 
Svalbard for Vyshinskii, repeated his advice from March, i.e. 
that Vyshinskii should object to the argnments in Lange's letter, 
but at the same time accept the invitation 10 negotiate on a 
revision of the 1920 Treaty. Kuznetsov reiterated his earlier 
view that the aim of the negotiations should be to secure Soviet 
economic interests on Spitsbergen, and to create the precondi-
tions for a regional defence arrangement for the Svalbard 
archipelago between the USSR, Norway, Sweden and Fin-
land.266 
The idea that the Norwegians would take the initiative and 
raise the issue with the Soviets when they met in New Yorlc 
was, of course, mistaken. After the change of course in early 
1947 the Norwegian government was even more anxious than 
the Soviets 10 let the matter rest, and hoped that there would be 
no response to Lange's letter. Thus the Norwegians feared that 
the Soviets would take a new initiative, while the Soviets 
expected the Norwegians to take the next step.Z67 
Soviet hesitation was related to the assessment of Norwegian 
foreign policy. This was still quite positive, but Soviet diplomats 
were increasingly worried about signs that the Norwegian 
government was reconsidering its commitment 10 "bridge 
building" and non-alignment. Throughout 1947 the reports from 
the Soviet embassy in Oslo emphasised that the Norwegian 
266 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 142, d. 27, ll. 32-37, Kuznetsov's 
"Spravka" to Vyshinskii, 28 August, 1947. 
=The process leading up to the Stoning's decision of 15 
February 194 7 is discussed in detail in Knut Einar Eriksen, 
"Svalbardsp0rsmA!et fra krig til kald krig", (cf. note 3). 
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government was conducting a foreign policy based on "loyal 
cooperation with all the great powers, avoiding open adherence 
to any of the blocs".Z6' However, both the embassy repons and 
internal MID memoranda emphasised that the USA and Great 
Britain ("the Anglo-Saxons") kept constant pressure on the 
Norwegian government in order to tie Norway more closely to 
the western powers. "Norway stands at the crossroads", was the 
message from Ambassador Afanasiev in late November 
1947.269 At the very end of December 1947 the Ambassador 
talked about the existence of a "campaign to revise Norway's 
foreign policy line", and concluded that Norway had already 
abandoned the policy of equal relations with the "two postwar 
international blocs" .270 
It followed from this that one of the major aims of Soviet 
policy towards Norway was to avoid providing arguments for 
the proponents of a more pro-western, anti-Soviet Norwegian 
foreign policy line. It should be noted that at this time the 
Soviets viewed the idea of Nordic political and military coope-
ration (under Swedish leadership but seen as inspired by Britain 
and the USA) as the main vehicle for pro-western, anti-Soviet 
currents in Norwegian foreign and security policy-making 
"" This quote is from a report by Cherkasov, from late 194 7, 
A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 3, I. 195. 
""AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 3,11. 138-146, Manasiev 
to Malik, 22 November, 1947. 
m A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 143, d. 38, 11. 27-28, Manasiev 
to Vetrov, 31 December, 1947. Norway was at the "crossroads", cf. 
Lange's speech in the Storting on 11 December 1947. Magne 
Skodvin, Norden eller Nato? Utenriksdepartementet og allianse-
sp(Jrsmdlet1947-1949, Oslo 1971, pp. 62-68. 
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circles, and as the major counterweight to the official Norwegian 
"bridge-building" doctrine. 271 
In February 1948 Afanasiev proposed that Lange should be 
told, "informally" and in cautious terms, that the Svalbard issue 
was still open, but that the Soviet government could not agree 
with the Norwegian point of view of February 1947. Afanasiev 
also proposed that the Norwegians should be told that extending 
the Soviet-Norwegian arrangement for Norwegian seal hunting 
in the White Sea272 would have to be seen in the context of 
other "unsolved questions with regard to the Arctic Sea area", 
foremost among them the Svalbard question.273 Although 
Afanasiev's proposal was supported by Deputy Minister V.A. 
"' Cf. for instance Ambassador Manasiev' s report to Malik of 
22 November 1947, "K voprosu o 'Skandinavskom bloke'", 
A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 140, d. 3, 11. 138-46. Although the 
Soviet concern primarily reflected their long-standing and tradi-
tional rejection of Nordic military and political cooperation, their 
apprehensions were not entirely unfounded. In the immediate 
postwar period Scandinavian political and military cooperation was 
seen by the Norwegians as a more obvious alternative to the 
isolated non-alignment of the bridge-building doclrine, than a 
formalisation of the military and political links to the western great 
powers. Limited talks on the political level and between the 
military staffs of the Scandinavian counlries were initiated in 194 7. 
Cf. Magne Skodvin, op.cit. (cf. note 270), pp. 57-58; Knut E. 
Eriksen & Magne Skodvin, op. ciL (cf. note 8), pp. 452-57. For a 
general discussion of the evolution of Soviet attitudes to Nordic 
cooperation, see Sven G. Holtsmark, Enemy springboard or 
benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920-
1955, in the series Forsvarsstudier/Defence Studies, 1992, No. 6, 
Oslo, 1992. 
212 The so-called "Alesund concession" (Alesund-konsesjonen) 
from 1926, which had been renewed every year until 1940. 
m A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 145, d. 2, 11. 4-6, Manasiev to 
Molotov, 23 February, 1948. 
139 
Zorin and A. Krutikov ,'74 a number of high MID officials 
headed by Deputy Minister Vyshinskii decided in late February 
to advise Molotov that 
the political situation is not sufficiently favourable (podkhod-
iashchii) to renew the negotiations on Spitsbergen. In any case we 
consider it inappropriate to take the initiative on this matter. 
Instead it was decided to launch a cultural-political offensive 
aimed at strengthening the healthy pro-Soviet elements in 
Norway.275 A proposal by Zhdanova and Abramov to revitalise 
the entire question by declaring a Soviet sector line in the Arctic 
Ocean based on the postwar border (i.e. taking into account the 
acquisition of the Petsamo area from Finland) left senior 
officials unmoved. The point in their argument was that the 
declaration of a Soviet arctic sector line based on the new 
Soviet-Norwegian border would include Kvitl'lya (Belyi Ostrov, 
White Island) and some other minor islands. in the Svalbard 
archipelago in the Soviet sector. The two authors apparently 
imagined that this could be used as a bargaining card in the 
discussions with the Norwegians!76 
If "the political situation" was "not opportune" in early 1948, 
developments throughout 1948 and up to when Norway joined 
the Atlantic Pact in April 1949 made the situation even less so. 
"'
4 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 37b, p. 146, d. I, ll. 8-9, Zorin and 
Krutikov to Molotov and Mikoian, February, 1948. 
""AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 36, p. 145, d. 2,1. 7, memorandum to 
Manasiev and Abramov, about a conference at Vyshinskii's office 
on 25 February 1948; f. 0116, op. 37, p. 145, d. 4, ll. 1-3, Zorin 
and Kuznetsov to Molotov, 6 January, 1948, with Molotov's 
approval; ibid., I. 4, resolution from a Deputy Ministers' confer-
ence, 17 January, 1948. 
"'
6 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 147, d. 25,ll. 5-7, Zhdanova to 
Abramov, 27 February, 1947; and ibid., I. 8, Abramov to Vyshin-
sk:ii, 28 February, 1947. 
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The negotiations on a Scandinavian defence union which 
continued until early 1949, and the simultaneous consultations 
with the Americans over Norwegian membership in the emerg-
ing Atlantic system,277 barred the Soviets from renewing a 
topic which would have certainly provided additional ammu-
nition to the proponents of strong political and military ties with 
the western powers (the Soviets did not differentiate between the 
Nordic and the Atlantic options). Instead the Soviets were 
constantly considering what might be done to strengthen the 
Norwegian opponents of western alignment. The Soviet Ambas-
sador's report for 1947, which was sent to MID in mid-March 
1948, left no doubt that the Soviet Union's position in Norway 
was rapidly deteriorating. Afanasiev also emphasised that the 
Svalbard question, since it was made public in early 1947, was 
constantly being used by "reactionary" and "anti-Soviet" forces 
to undermine Soviet-Norwegian relations, and to strengthen ties 
with the western powers.278 In March 1949 Afanasiev con-
cluded that Norway was "firmly placed in the Anglo-American 
bloc" .279 
Even prior to that the Soviets were convinced that Norway 
was in the process of joining the Atlantic system. In a memoran-
dum to Molotov of 6 January, Abramov and Afanasiev con-
m On 30 August 1948 S.T. Loginov, an attache at the Soviet 
embassy in Oslo, filed a report called "On the question of Nor-
way's participation in the Atlantic bloc". The gist of his argument 
was that the initiators of the idea of an Atlantic defence arrange-
ment were bent on achieving the participation of both Norway and 
Denmark in the system. AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 149, d. 38,ll. 
137-143. 
"'A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 145, d. 8, "Otchet Posolstva 
SSSR v Norvegii za 1947 god", sigued by Manasiev on 16 March, 
1948. 
279 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 38, p. 38, d. 8, I. 34, from the Ambas-
sador's general report for 1948, sent to MID on 15 March, 1949. 
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eluded that the Soviet Union could not "passively" accept 
Norway's joining the emerging and "hostile" Atlantic bloc. On 
13 December 1948 Foreign Minister Lange had allegedly 
declared during "a secret press conference" that the Norwegian 
government had decided to accept the invitation to participate in 
the creation of the Atlantic Pact.280 Declarations that the 
Norwegian government would not accept foreign military bases 
on Norwegian territory in peace-time "cannot, of course, be 
taken seriously". Abramov and Afanasiev came up with the idea 
of delivering a statement to the Norwegian government on the 
Soviet view of Norwegian membership in the western bloc. 
They hoped that: 
Our declaration will srrengthen the USSR' s position in the 
Scandinavian countries, expose the Norwegian government's policy 
as aimed towards bringing Norway into an aggressive bloc, and 
will srrengthen the position of the opponents of Norwegian 
membership of the Atlantic bloc. 281 
It is interesting to note that these early Soviet assessments of the 
ramifications of Norway's adherence to the Atlantic bloc did not 
mention Svalbard. Tilis was recalled with regret in later Soviet 
documents. They focused instead on the problem of "Anglo-
American" military bases in mainland Norway. Nor did the two 
Soviet notes of 29 January and 5 February 1949, which warned 
against Norway's joining the Atlantic Pact, mention Sval-
"" This, of course, was a misleading interpretation of the 
attitude of Lange and the government at this point The negoti-
ations on a Scandinavian defence union continued until 30 January 
1949. Prior tu the final negotiations with the Americans which 
commenced in early February, the government had not taken any 
decision. 
,., A VPRF, f. 07, op. 2;2,;"p. 326, d. 22,1. 1, Abramov and Ma-
nasiev to Molotov, 6 Jan~. 1949. 
i 
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bard. 282 The same holds true in respect of an MID draft 
answer to the Norwegian note of 5 March.283 When early in 
the year, Ambassador Afanasiev outlined the embassy's activity 
in 1949 for consideration by MID, he did not suggest resuming 
the Svalbard discussions.284 
Afanasiev, however, soon realised that Norway's decision to 
become a member of the Atlantic Pact had repercussions with 
regard to Svalbard. fu mid-May 1949, and prompted by a report 
by S.T. Loginov, who had now advanced to the position of 
Second Secretary, Afanasiev wrote to Vyshinskii (who had just 
succeeded Molotov as Minister for Foreign Affairs) arguing that 
the inclusion of Spitsbergen and Bear Island in the Atlantic 
Pact's area of responsibility constituted "one of the most serious 
consequences of Norway's adherence to the North Atlantic 
Pact". Afanasiev further claimed that the inclusion of Svalbard 
in the Atlantic "defensive" system contradicted Article 9 of the 
1920 Treaty, which prohibited the use of the archipelago "for 
war-like purposes" (dlia voennykh tselei).285 Loginov went 
even further, maintaining that the Norwegian response to the 
282 The Soviet statements of 29 January and 5 February, and the 
Norwegian responses of 1 February and 5 March, 1949, are printed 
(in Norwegian translation) in Johan Jlllrgen Hoist, op.cit (cf. note 
233), Vol. II, pp. 65-70. The Norwegian notes, which contained 
assurances that there would be no foreign military bases on Norwe-
gian territory in time of peace and when Norway was not under 
threat of attack, laid the foundation for the Norwegian policy of 
balancing the need for Allied military backing on the one hand and 
non-provocation in respect of the Soviet Union on the other. 
283 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 22, p. 38, d. 278,ll. 9-11, unsigned Iener 
tu Molotov of 10 March 1949, with enclosed draft statement which 
had also been forwarded to Stalin for approval. 
284 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 38, p. 38, d. 8, ll. 81-85, Manasiev's 
undated memorandum with enclosures. 
285 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 145, d. 7, 11. 7-9, Manasiev to 
Vyshinskii, 14 May, 1949. 
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Soviet notes of 29 January and 5 February meant that "the 
Norwegian government reserved for itself the right to decide the 
question of offering territory for [military] bases at any time, 
even in peace time", and that this also included Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island. 286 
Afanasiev, however, argued against bringing up the matter 
with the Norwegians. The Norwegian government's reaction 
might be to reconfirm its continued adherence to the stipulations 
of the 1920 Treaty, or to 
declare its readiness to revise the Treaty. Under current conditions 
this could mean that as a result of Spitsbergen's new international 
status [the Norwegian government] acquires the right to implement 
military measures on the archipelago. 287 
Afanasiev' s letter confirms that the Soviet attitude ID the 1920 
Treaty had undergone a basic transformation since MoloiDv 's 
initiative in November 1944. The original Soviet aim had been 
to get the Treaty revised, in order to prepare the ground for 
inclusion of the archipelago in the Soviet defence perimeter, and 
in order to secure Soviet economic interests on Svalbard. The 
Norwegian draft declaration of 9 April 1945 had been almost 
completely satisfactory ID the Soviets, and they had subsequently 
kept silent about both the idea of Spitsbergen as a Soviet-
Norwegian "condominium" and the transfer of Bear Island to 
Soviet sovereignty. Now the Soviet position was one of defender 
of the status quo in the region: of the Treaty in general; and of 
the Treaty's Article 9 (the non-militarisation clause) in particu-
""'A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 38, p. 150, d. 2, ll. 34-37, "Norvegiia 
i severo-atlanticheskii pakt", sent together with Afanasiev' s letter 
to Vyshinskii on 14 May, 1949. 
287 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 37, p. 145, d. 7, ll. 7-9, Afanasiev to 
Vyshinskii, 14 May, 1949. 
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lar.288 The new and legalistic attitude of the Soviets was 
revealed when in June 1950 the Norwegians informed them 
about a radar station which had been erected at Cap Linne for 
the use of civilian shipping. The 5th European Department and 
the Soviet military authorities argued that the building of the 
radar station constituted a breach of Article 9 of the Treaty 
because it could also serve military purposes. This argument was 
rejected by the Ministry's Legal Department. With support from 
the Ministry of Shipping, Buev of the Legal Department argued 
that there was a real need for the radar station, and there was no 
proof that the Norwegians intended to utilise it in a way which 
contradicted the Treaty. It was decided not to deliver a protest 
to the Norwegian government.'89 When Glavsevmorput pro-
posed in August that an aircraft should be permanently based on 
Spitsbergen, this was rejected in the MID for the reason that it 
might serve as an excuse for the Norwegians and the western 
powers to initiate much more extensive use of the islands for 
similar purposes. 290 
1951 : Moscow on the defensive 
Throughout 1950 the Soviet embassy sent alarming reports to 
Moscow about the increasing American and British military 
presence in Norway. As early as February 1950 Afanasiev 
"'Which confinns earlier research in the field; cf. for instance 
Knot Einar Eriksen, "Svalbardsp!ilrsmA!et fra krig til kald krig" (cf. 
note 3), pp. 157-158, and Rolf Tamnes' various works which have 
been referred ID extensively throughout this text. 
289 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 157, d. 30, I. 7, Orlov to Golun-
skii, 28 July, 1950; ibid.,1. 8, Buev to Or1ov, 4 August, 1950; ibid., 
ll. 9-10, Orlov ID Bogomolov, 5 August, 1950. 
290 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 40, p. 162, d. 28, I. 58, Plakhin to 
Zorin, 29 August, 1951. 
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argued that the intensive American military activity in Norway 
as well as "possible further demands from the American military 
(voensbchina) for the militarisation of Spitsbergen" would force 
the Soviet government to remind the Norwegians of their 
declarations of 1949.291 The Soviet Ambassador also argued 
that Norway's membership of the Atlantic Pact meant that 
Norwegian territory, including Svalbard, was becoming an 
"operational region" for the American armed forces. 292 In 
November Afanasiev sent an alarming report to Moscow about 
military developments in Norway, but concluded that a formal 
Soviet dbnarche must be based on more conclusive evidence of 
plans for stationing allied forces in Norway .293 Moscow agreed 
with Afanasiev,'94 and in December 1950 the Ambassador 
received instructions to collect and forward to Moscow 
a list (podborka) of basic information and facts [ ... ] about the 
preparations for bases (o podgo10vke baz) in Norway and in 
particular in Northern Norway, i.e. send the material which would 
fonn the basis for our demarche, if it has 10 be made ( es1i ego 
pridetsia delat).295 
Thus the idea of delivering a protest against increasing allied 
military activity in Norway developed gradually from early 
1950. It appears that the Soviets were primarily worried by what 
they conceived as Atlantic Pact plans to station British and 
291 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 156, d. lO,ll. 1-4, Manasiev 10 
Vysbinskii, 21 February, 1950. 
292 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 156, d. 10, 1. 12, from the 
embassy's general report for 1949. 
293 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 158, d. 44,ll. 75-77, Manasiev 
to Zorin, 4 November, 1950. 
294 Cf. Aleksandrov's comments to Manasiev's report, in 
AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 155, d. 6, ll. 15-17, Aleksandrov to 
Zorin, 20 November, 1950. 
"'A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 135, d. 3, 1. 32, Zorin to Ma-
nasiev, 16 December, 1950. 
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American forces in mainland Norway, but it is clear that the 
inclusion of Svalbard in the Western Alliance • s overall area of 
responsibility was an additional cause for concern. However, it 
appears that the MID • s main source of information about 
military developments in Norway was the Soviet embassy in 
Oslo. The embassy, in turn, relied heavily on information from 
the Norwegian and international press, which the Soviet 
diplomats interpreted in accordance with the idiosyncratic Soviet 
view of the world and with the directives from the Centre in 
Moscow. The embassy's reports therefore contained few hard 
facts, consisting of questionable evidence which supported even 
more dubious analyses.296 From early 1951 Afanasiev told 
MID in a number of reports that Norway had been transformed 
into a "bridgehead" (platsdarm) of imperialist aggression towards 
the USSR. 297 
In early December 1950 MID asked the Navy and Army 
General Staffs to supply evidence about "the preparation of 
military bases in Norway (in particular in the country's northern 
parts) for foreign armed forces". 298 The answers from the 
military authorities were rather evasive: both the Navy and the 
Army General Staffs were worried by the proliferation of 
military sites and bases in Norway, and in general by the 
intensive contacts and cooperation between Norwegian and 
allied military authorities. They did not, however, answer the 
crucial question of whether the Norwegians were in the tltroes 
""A typical example of this is a report Manasiev sent to Orlov 
in late November, in which a number of UPA reports served as 
material for extensive theories. A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 155, d. 
4, ll. 46-48, Manasiev to Or1ov, 27 November, 1950. 
297 As for instance in his general report for 1950, A VPRF, f. 
0116, op. 40, p. 161, d. 13. 
298 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 39, p. 156, d. 11,1. 37, Zorin to Zara-
khov and Golovko, 5 December, 1950. 
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of allowing permanent peacetime stationing of foreign troops in 
contravention of the 1949 declarations.299 
In January 1951 the Norwegian government decided to accept 
Svalbard's inclusion in the area of responsibility of the newly 
created Atlantic command, ACLANT. The Norwegian Starting 
was informed about the decision. This prompted the MID to 
start preparing of a note of protest. A first draft was ready in 
early March 1951, and subsequent versions were discussed in 
the following months, until on 15 October Vyshinskii delivered 
a note to a representative of the Norwegian embassy in Moscow. 
The long process of drafting, discussing and redrafting the note 
may have reflected conflicting Soviet foreign policy consider-
ations. The Soviet leadership realised that only limited pressure 
could be exerted on Norway after it became a member of the 
Atlantic Pact. Tatiana Zhdanova, one of the unyielding "activ-
ists", admitted in February 1951 that the SovietUnioncouldnot 
put military or economic pressure on Norway. That left "infor-
mation" and propaganda: in order to weaken Norway's military 
and political ties with the western great powers, "the myth about 
the Soviet Union's aggressiveness" would have to be counter-
acted.300 Thus the need to warn the Norwegian government 
publicly against going down the road of military integration in 
NATO, had to be weighed against the danger of giving ammuni-
tion to the "anti-sovetshchiki" who were talking about Soviet 
expansionist designs against Norway. 
There seems to have been four people in charge of drafting 
up the note. Although Vyshinskii had succeeded Molotov as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Molotov was supposed to approve 
the draft notes and the letters sent to the "lnstantsiia" to get 
""A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 39g, p. 156, d. I, 11. 39-42, Admiral 
Golovko to Zorin, 15 December 1950; and ibid., H. 43-48, General 
Shalin to Zorin, 16 December, 1950. 
'"' AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 40, p. 161, d. 18, 11. 1-4, Zhdanova's 
"zapiska" of 28 February 1951. 
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Stalin's agreement to MID's initiatives. Apart from these two 
main figures, the Deputy Ministers Gram yko and Zorin took an 
active part in drafting the documents. 
The first draft, sent to Stalin in March 1951, referred to the 
Norwegian decision to participate in NATO's integrated 
command system. This meant that the Norwegian government 
had accepted that the Atlantic Alliance's military activities 
would cover Norwegian territory, "including Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island". MID's March action plan included an oral 
statement to the Norwegian government to be published 
subsequently in the Soviet press. In addition, Soviet newspapers 
were to print an article pointing out that including Spitsbergen 
and Bear Island in the sphere of NATO's military activity was 
in conflict with the Paris Treaty of 1920. At the same time the 
article was to stress the Soviet Union's special position and 
interests in the area. The aim should be 
to make it more difficult for the Norwegian government to realise 
this military policy and to support the struggle of the opponents of 
this policy.'" 
The Soviets had been informed by Jacob Friis, one of the 
Labour Party's distinguished left-wingers, that there was 
opposition within the Storting's Committee for Foreign Affairs 
to the inclusion of Svalbard in the allied command. Friis also 
told the Soviets that the Norwegian press had received instruc-
tions not to write about the defence of Svalbard. 302 
In a subsequent draft letter of July 1951 to Stalin, the 
arguments on the need for Soviet demarche, were considerably 
extended. In this draft it was argued that the Norwegian 
301 A VPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 25, d. 292, Zorin to Stalin, March 
1951. 
302 A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 40, p. 161, d. 12, 11. 65-67, Loginov's 
conversation with Friis on 11 June 1951. Cf. also Rolf Tamnes, 
Svalbard mellom pst og vest (cf. nole 4), p. 25. 
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government "in the last months" had taken a number of steps 
which would "make Norway a military base for the aggressive 
North Atlantic bloc". Agreements between the Norwegians and 
NATO meant that "Norway might be occupied by American and 
British troops".303 
The content of this letter was probably influenced by an 
extensive report from Ambassador Afanasiev about "foreign 
military bases in Norway", which he sent to MID in late June. 
Afanasiev' s detailed and alarming report concluded that 
1. The Norwegian government has clearly violated the undertakings 
which it gave the Soviet government in 1949 that it would not 
allow the stationing of foreign troops in peace-time. Hauge' s 
declaration of 21 February this year"" makes it clear that the 
government is retreating even verbally from the assurances which 
it gave, even though it pretends that it is still guided by them. 
2. Norwegian territory is increasingly being transformed into an 
Anglo-American military base, as a bridge-head for an attack on 
the Soviet Union. 
The second part of Afanasiev's report was about Svalbard. The 
Ambassador referred to the conflict between Article 9 of the 
1920 Treaty and the Norwegian government's declaration that 
Spitsbergen, Bear Island and Jan Mayen island305 were to be 
included in the North Atlantic defence area. 
Afanasiev did not have confirmed information that Norway 
or the western powers were preparing for military activity on 
Svalbard, although "journalistic circles" had reported that 
303 A VPRF, f. 07, p. 25, d. 292, I. 8, draft letter to Stalin, July 
1951. 
""About the "base policy" (basepolitikken) of the Norwegian 
government Cf. JJ. Hoist, op. cit. (cf. note 233), Vol. II, pp. 11· 
72. 
305 A small island between Svalbard and Greenland, which is not 
part of the Svalbard archipelago. 
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Norwegian military aircraft had been stationed on Spitsbergen. 
Afanasiev argued however that the Americans were high! y 
interested in the area, although he was unable to produce hard 
evidence in support of his view. 
Afanasiev did not support the idea of making a statement to 
the Norwegian government. The Norwegians would simply 
"deny the facts", or refuse to enter into a discussion about 
Western military activity on mainland Norway. According to 
Afanasiev, the issue of military bases in Norway and in other 
countries should be brought up at international conferences. 
With regard to Svalbard, Afanasiev felt that the Soviet govern· 
ment could make a dbnarche only if it turned out that the 
rumours about military activity on Spitsbergen could be 
proved. 306 However, Afanasiev soon changed his mind, and in 
two letters to Zorin in August he strongly urged the leadership 
to make the demarche about allied bases and Svalbard. 307 
Afanasiev's messages might have been symptomatic of a 
certain hesitation within the MID apparatus about the value and 
effect of a Soviet warrting against allied military activity in 
mainland Norway and Svalbard. New draft notes and letters to 
Stalin were prepared. Vyshinskii 's letter to Stalin with his final 
recommendations, together with the text of the proposed Soviet 
statement, was sent on 6 October or thereabouts. The basic 
argument was the same as the one made earlier in the year. 
Vyshinskii reminded Stalin of the Norwegian government's 
1949 declarations, adding that "the policy of the Norwegian 
government directly contradicts these statements". Vyshinskii 
repeated that "Norwegian territory is in the process of being 
made into a military base for the North Atlantic Alliance", and 
306 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 26, p. 47, d. 143,11. 1-12, Afanasiev to 
Vyshinskii, 23 June, 1951. 
""A VPRF, f. 0116, op. 40, p. 160, d. 7, 11. 33-34, Afanasiev 
and Plakhin to Zorin, 14 August 1951; and ibid., I. 35, Afanasiev 
and Plakhin to Zorin, 18 Augus~ 1951. 
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NATO 's area of "military activity" (voennye meropriatiia) would 
include Spitsbergen and Bear Island. He also reminded Stalin 
that the Norwegians had accepted the remilitarisation of 
Germany. 
The aim of the statement to the Norwegian government and 
of a subsequent newspaper article was to complicate the imple-
mentation of the Norwegian government's military policy, to 
facilitate the struggle of the "peace-lovers" in Norway, and to 
warn the Norwegian government against any military activity on 
Svalbard. 308 
In the two statements of October and November 1951 the 
Soviets used Article 9 of the Treaty to warn the Norwegian 
government against taking measures which would change the 
status quo in the area. Foreign Minister Halvard Lange told the 
British Ambassador in Oslo that 
the Soviet Government had given the Norwegian Government to 
understand through the usual channels of the Soviet embassy in 
Stockholm that the Soviet Note was really aimed not at Norway but 
at the United States, whom the Soviet Government credited with 
plans for establishing bases in Spitsbergen as they had done in 
Iceland.''" 
The change in the Soviet attitude was demonstrated when in 
1951 the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate offered for sale to the 
Soviets land on Spitsbergen. The Soviet Trade Delegation in 
London expressed their interest on the precondition that the 
seller "could produce a letter" from the British government 
"saying that they had no objection" to the deal.310 
'"' AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 40, p. 161, d. 18,ll. 16-17, Vyshinskii 
to Stalin with enclosed draft Central Committee decision, dated 6 
October, 1951. 
''" Rolf Tamnes, Svalbard mellom ~st og Vest. Kald krig og 
lavspeliiJing i nord 1947-1953 (cf. note 4), p. 30. 
310 Ibid., p. 27. 
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1953: Molotov's Svalbard foray postmortem 
The Soviet statements of 1951 did not initiate a new phase of 
Soviet-Norwegian discussions on the status of the Svalbard 
archipelago. 1bis clearly reflected a growing understanding on 
part of the Soviets that further Soviet initiatives on Svalbard 
might strengthen the anti-Soviet forces in Norway and push 
Norway even further into the western camp, thus undermining 
basic Soviet foreign policy aims in Norway. 
A memorandum of June 1953 ty Georgii M. Pushkin, a 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, presented a candid analysis 
of a Soviet policy which had been a failure. Pushkin proposed 
in his memorandum that the Soviet Union should issue a 
declaration that it would strictly adhere to all stipulations of the 
1920 Treaty, as it had done in the past Pushkin's arguments in 
support of his proposal amounted to an unambiguous criticism 
of Soviet policy on Svalbard. Having reminded Molotov of the 
various stages in the Soviet-Norwegian discussions which started 
with Molotov's initiative in November 1944, he continued: 
The information [which was made public in January and February 
1947] about our proposals on Spitsbergen and Bear Island was 
strongly exploited in the Norwegian and Anglo-American press to 
further anti-Soviet attitudes in Norway. The campaign which 
accompanied the issue contributed to a certain degree to preparing 
public opinion in Norway for membership in the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The Soviet statements of 1951 had a similar effect, being 
exploited "by the reactionary press in Norway, USA, Britain and 
other western countries" to launch a new anti-Soviet campaign. 
1bis campaign had included allusions to alleged Soviet inten-
tions to renew the demand for a revision of Svalbard 's interna-
tional status. The American press had therefore argued the need 
for Norwegian military forces to be stationed on Spitsbergen. 
Pushkin concluded that the Soviet demand for a revision of 
the 1920 Treaty was still being used by those who wanted to 
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prevent "an improvement in Soviet-Norwegian relations". He 
proposed, therefore, that the Soviet government should declare 
that it "has no intention of questioning Norway's sovereignty 
over the Spitsbergen archipelago and Bear Island".311 
A formal declaration to this effect was never, as far as I have 
been able to establish, delivered by the Soviets to the Norwegian 
government. Pushkin' s letter nevertheless reflected the new 
Soviet state of mind with in respect of Svalbard, and represented 
the end of Molotov's attempts to revise the geostrategic and 
economic status of the Svalbard archipelago. 
311 AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 42, p. 170, d. 4, 11. 28-32, Pushkin to 
Molotov, June 1953. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
1. The Soviet rationale. During the period under review in this 
study, Svalbard never occupied a position of prominence in the 
deliberations of top level Soviet foreign policy makers. This 
holds true even for the period 1944-4 7 when Svalbard 's 
international status was the object of Soviet-Norwegian dis-
cussions. 312 Molotov's initiative appeared alarming to the 
Norwegians mainly because it concerned the integrity of a 
territory under Norwegian sovereignty, not because Svalbard 
was of economic or military-strategic importance. The way 
Molotov raised the issue in his conversation with Ttygve Lie in 
November 1944, and subsequent Soviet moves and documents, 
suggest that the Soviets somehow did not understand this. This 
is consistent with the tendency, evident throughout the history 
of Soviet foreign policy, to ignore the political necessity for and 
will of small powers to uphold their territorial integrity with the 
same stubbornness with which the Soviets themselves were 
prepared to defend their own borders. 
Seen from Moscow Svalbard was a secondary issue, a matter 
of prestige and some potential value but devoid of emotions. 
Although notions from the military-strategic vocabulary were 
prominent when Molotov broached the issue, the substance of 
such arguments tended to dwindle when discussions moved from 
the sphere of geopolitics to the level of military-strategic and 
operational analysis. 
In the interwar period the Soviet attitude towards Svalbard 
evolved from detachment and uncertainty about the nature of 
Soviet interests in the area in the first post-revolutionary years, 
to efforts to develop economic activity on Spitsbergen from the 
312 A member of Molotov's secretariat, whose name appears in 
the correspondence related to Svalbard, when asked in early 1939 
about the handling of the Svalbard question, answered that he could 
not remember the issue. 
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early 1930s. The start of Soviet mining on Spitsbergen in 1933, 
which followed the general increase in Soviet activity in the 
Arctic regions during the second half of the 1920s, was appar-
ently aimed at providing coal for the development of Russia's 
northern regions and for Soviet shipping in northern waters. The 
available documentation does not support the thesis that the 
Soviet engagement on Spitsbergen reflected a growing emphasis 
by the Soviet decision-makers on the region's actual or potential 
military-strategic value. Consequently there were no Soviet 
attempts prior to the outbreak of the Second World War to 
challenge the stipulations of the Svalbard Treaty. Althougb only 
Norway and the Soviet Union maintained a permanent presence 
on the archipelago, the Soviet government did not signal any 
ambitions to formalise this process of de facto bilateralisation. 
The Soviet accession to the Svalbard Treaty in 1935 was 
motivated by economic and legal arguments, not military-
strategic ones. 
The rising tension in Europe and finally the outbreak of the 
war in September 1939 spawned the first attempts within the 
Soviet diplomatic community to initiate a policy on Svalbard 
based on military-strategic considerations. However, these were 
the initiatives of civilian bureaucrats, although they excelled in 
the use of military-strategic terminology. It appears that in the 
early stages of the war the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did 
not bother to seek the opinion of the Soviet military establish-
ment. The relative detachment of the military authorities 
continued throughout the war. At no point did the Soviets make 
any serious attempt to establish themselves militarily on 
Spitsbergen or Bear Island. The ambitious schemes of Molotov 
and Stalin in July 1941 to open a new front in the High North, 
of which an Allied military expedition to Spitsbergen should be 
part, were allowed to lapse when they met with a conspicuous 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of British military authorities. It 
is unclear to what degree the Soviet military had been consulted 
before Molotov presented his ideas to the British Ambassador in 
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Moscow. There was, however, a lack of consistency in Molo-
tov's arguments in favour of sending troops to Spitsbergen 
which seems to suggest that it reflected general geopolitical 
rather than military-strategic and operational deliberations. 
It appears that Molotov's November 1944 initiative, which 
was aimed at revising Svalbard 's international status, was also 
primarily the outcome of ideas circulating within the civilian 
foreign policy bureaucracy. The arguments were, at least partly, 
based on the doubtful premise that the struggle for the lines of 
communication between Northern Russia and the West had 
demonstrated the strategic importance of Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island. When the military leadership were asked for their 
opinion, it turned out that they were uncertain about the real or 
potential role of Spitsbergen and Bear Island in the future 
defence of the Soviet Union. The lukewarm involvement on the 
part of the military goes a long way towards explaining the lack 
of determination which characterised Soviet policy during the 
period when Svalbard's international status was on the agenda. 
It also contrasts strongly with the determination with which the 
Soviets pursued their interests with regard to the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles. 
Whatever Molotov's main motivation may have been when 
he raised the Svalbard issue in November 1944, it soon turned 
out that the Soviets were apprehensive lest their ambitions on 
the Svalbard archipelago should cut across their more important 
foreign policy goals. Gradually it became clear that the costs of 
a firm Svalbard policy were potentially prohibitive, in terms of 
the effect on the evolution of Norway's foreign policy orienta-
tion and its interaction with aspects of the evolving East-West 
confrontation. 
All this forced the Soviets to switch to the defence of status 
quo as the mainstay of their policy on Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island. The Soviet notes of the autumn of 1951 mark the 
culmination of this volte-face. From then on there was a high 
degree of symmetry between Soviet and western (US-British) 
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evaluations of Svalbard 's role. While at the end of the war the 
Soviets made an effort to change the established situation in 
their favour, both sides were basically more concerned with 
barring the other side from establishing itself on the archipelago, 
than with creating their own bases. 
2. The Soviet regional approach. The available documentation 
suggests that, in the last phase of the war and in the immediate 
postwar period, the Soviet General Staffs313 were much more 
attracted to the idea of an arrangement with the Norwegians on 
the establishment of Soviet military bases on mainland Norway, 
than by the prospects for joint Soviet-Norwegian fortification of 
Svalbard. If anything, the experiences of the war strengthened 
this approach. While Svalbard figured in German and Allied 
strategy mainly as a site for meteorological stations,314 control 
over Northern Norway had enabled the Germans to establish 
naval and air bases close to the routes of the Allied convoys to 
Russia. 
The proposal to move the Soviet-Norwegian border west-
wards to the river Tana was part of a scheme aimed at altering 
Northern Norway's military status. The foreign policy bureau-
cracy, up to and including the Deputy Commissars, strongly 
supported these efforts. On the basis of the available docu-
mentary evidence one cannot say exact! y how close to 
realisation these plans actually came. It seems clear however that 
they were rejected at the very top level, i.e. by Molotov, Stalin 
and their colleagues in the Politburo. The reasons were probably 
the same as in the case of Svalbard - a more forceful Soviet 
policy would have had negative effects on the bilateral and 
global policy level grossly outweighing the military benefits. 
313 The supreme staffs of both the Army and the Navy were 
called "General Staffs". 
314 Cf. Jon Ulvensjllen, Brennpunkt Nord. V ll!rtjenestekrigen 
1940-45, in the seriesForsvarsmuseets smdskrift, No. 6, Oslo 1991. 
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There was a clear link between the proposals on Northern 
Norway and the Svalbard initiative. Soviet bases on Spitsbergen 
and Bear Island would have constituted the extreme northern 
links in a system of bases stretching from Soviet territory, 
through Finnmarlc to the western coast of Northern Norway. The 
use of the term "regional" to characterise Soviet policy towards 
Northern Norway and Svalbard implies that the Soviets tended 
to discuss this area in terms which differed from their evaluation 
of the rest of the country, and which were directly linked to 
Soviet interests in adjacent parts of the European High North. 
Whereas Southern Norway was clearly seen as belonging to the 
Western sphere of interest, this was not the case for Northern 
Norway, although the Soviets were unable to see a clear 
demarcation between the two areas. The idea of a "condo-
minium", which Molotov presented to Lie as the future way of 
administering Spitsbergen, was inherent in the proposed 
arrangement for Northern Norway as well. With regard to 
Finnmark east of the river Tana, it was argued by both the 
civilian bureaucrats and by the Army General Staff that for both 
historical and military-strategic reasons this area ought to be 
transferred to the Soviet Union. 
This Soviet approach mirrored the tendency, widespread in 
the West during the war and the first postwar years, to treat 
Northern Norway as a "grey zone", between the western sphere 
of influence and the Soviet Union. Western suspicions from late 
1944 to the summer of 1945 about Soviet plans to move west-
wards towards N arvik, were close to the truth in terms of the 
preferences, if not the actual plans, of the Sovie_t General Staffs 
and the foreign policy bureaucracy. Even the withdrawal of the 
remaining Soviet troops from Eastern Finnmark in Septe11_1ber 
1945 did not put an end to the MID activists' efforts to achieve 
an "arrangement" in Northern Norway. Not until the winter of 
1946 was it finally decided to accept the prewar Norwegian-







We cannot say exactly when the General Staffs and the 
activists in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs gave up their efforts 
to convince the foreign policy leadership of the need for military 
bases on mainland Norway. The 1947 idea of a Soviet-Norwe-
gian "agreement on alliance and friendship" was clearly an echo 
of the earlier attempts to establish a defence relationship 
between the two countries. 
3. The Soviet decision-making process. This study has shown 
that lower and middle level bureaucrats in the Soviet foreign 
policy apparatus were the driving force behind the attempts in 
the years 1944-47 to alter Svalbard's international status. The 
same circle of "activists" repeatedly tried to convince the foreign 
policy leadership of the need to establish Soviet military bases 
in Northern Norway, and to move the Soviet-Norwegian border 
westwards. The bureaucrats' persistent efforts to convince the 
decision-makers of the virtues of their pet projects, and their 
ability to obtain Molotov's attention, hardly fit the conventional 
view of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus as a monolithic 
structure where all important initiatives originated at the top. 
On the other hand, the bureaucrats were mostly poorly 
informed about the subtleties and overriding priorities of Soviet 
foreign policy, and were unable to view their proposals in a 
broader, ultimately global, context. They did not understand, for 
instance, that a Soviet proposal in the summer of 1945 to move 
the border or to establish Soviet bases in Northern Norway 
would have had disastrous consequences far beyond the Soviet-
Norwegian relationship. They nevertheless supplied the basis for 
final, top level decisions. The decision-makers were usually 
presented with one proposal, not with a set of alt;rnative 
suggestions elaborated by the bureaucracy. If anything, this 
limited the decision-makers' field for manoeuvre: there would 
be a natural tendency to accept the prepared proposal rather than 
to refer it back to the bureaucratic level for reconsideration and 
rewriting, or to end up with a policy of inaction, as happened in 
respect of Northern Norway and partly Svalbard. As part of the 
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bureaucratic process, the Deputy Ministers played an important 
role as the main channel of communication between the Minister 
and the lower level of the bureaucracy. As a rule the proposals 
which reached the Minister bore the strong mark of the Deputy 
Minister in charge of the case. 
This picture of a "normal" bureaucratic structure needs 
modification. Although this study has demonstrated a surprising 
degree of initiative and persistence on the part of lower and 
middle-level bureaucrats, we have seen that the top leaders 
decided not to follow their advice on Northern Norway. With 
regard to Svalbard, Molotov's original initiative clearly reflected 
the bureaucrats' proposals. In subsequent developments however, 
broader considerations outweighed the virtues of the activists' 
proposals.'" One should not conclude, therefore, that the 
Soviets "wanted to establish bases in Northern Norway and to 
move the border westwards". The point is that there was a 
considerable bureaucratic pressure in favour of these proposals, 
and they were discussed at the very top level. As it turned out, 
they were rejected by Molotov and Stalin. If they had been 
accepted, they would have undoubtedly been implemented. 
4. Soviet-Norwegian interaction and perceptions. The Norwegian 
policy from November 1944 to April 1945 of "keeping the 
initiative" proved eminently successful, although it was a policy 
of enormous risks which might equally have ended in disaster 
if the Soviets had demanded immediate implementation of the 
draft declaration of 9 April 1945. This did not happen: the 
Soviets were satisfied that with their draft declaration the 
Norwegians had agreed to a joint Soviet-Norwegian defence 
arrangement for Svalbard, and to discuss a revision of the Treaty 
in general. The finalisation of the negotiations was postponed to 
m Cf. the argument in my previous study Enemy springboard 
or benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation,1920-
1945 (cf. note 271), pp. 74-75. 
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a more "appropriate" moment. Fortunately for the Norwegian 
government this moment never arrived, and the Norwegians 
were not forced to honour their concessions. Soviet perceptions 
of Norwegian attitudes, which were strengthened by Trygve 
Lie's repeated efforts to convince the Soviets that the Norwegian 
government wanted a solution which was "satisfactory" to the 
Soviet Union, led the Soviets to believe that there was no need 
to hasten the conclusion of the talks. 
While Norwegian and western analysts and policy-makers 
were often close to the marlc in their evaluation of Soviet 
motives and intentions, the Soviet bureaucrats' proposals for an 
arrangement in Northern Norway reflected a gross 
misconception of basic Norwegian foreign policy attitudes. The 
Norwegian government and the western powers, at least while 
Trygve Lie was still in office as Foreign Minister, might have 
accepted a joint Soviet-Norwegian arrangement on Svalbard. But 
the Norwegians were certainly not prepared to contemplate the 
establishment of Soviet military bases in Northern Norway or an 
adjustment to the Soviet-Norwegian border. 
The bureaucrats' ideas on Northern Norway illustrate one of 
the basic predicaments of the Soviet foreign policy-making 
structure. The bureaucrats were prisoners of their own idio-
syncratic perceptions of reality, partly because they were short 
of independent information, and partly because they were trained 
to think within the constraints of an ideology which was 
singularly ill-suited as a basis for understanding western political 
thinking and social and political realities. 
5. The role of third parties. Formally, the discussions of 1944-
47 about Svalbard's international status constituted a purely 
Norwegian-Soviet bilateral affair. At no point did the western 
powers put pressure on the Norwegians to resist the Soviet 
demands, nor did the Norwegian government seek their support 
Svalbard was not the subject of discussions between the Soviets 
and the British or the Americans. Indirectly, however, the 
United States government became a decisive actor in the drama. 
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From the very beginning of the discussions, Soviet policy on 
Svalbard increasingly reflected Soviet perceptions of American 
designs on Iceland and Greenland. The Soviet fear of supplying 
the Americans with additional arguments in support of their 
plans for bases in Iceland and Greenland was the single most 
important external factor which restrained the Soviets from 
forcing through their original demands of November 1944. 
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